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This field study investigates the intricate relationship between Friday sermon
(khutba) and the worshippers’ public opinion in Jordan. Prompted by the taboo
label assigned to scholarship on khutba, it probes whether the agenda-setting,
framing and priming process in mass communication (the media) applies to public
communication (the mosque).
The hypothesis is that in a marketplace for loyalties, the preacher can impact his
worshippers’ perception of reality in as much as he can circumvent State
regulations and meet his audience’s expectations by setting their agenda re
khutba theme and its attributes.
Field observations (six months’ long with three Informants) are crosscut with
conclusions drawn from in-depth interviews with concerned actors, thematic
content analysis of 24 different khutbas in Amman and Zarqa, analysis of relevant
coverage in the print and online media, and a questionnaire to 200 mosque-goers.
The period covered is 2008 till 2013, crosscutting the Arab Spring and its ensuing
political change.
Thematic analysis shows the mosque preacher frames his khutba to endorse a
certain definition for the salient theme, suggest a causal interpretation, furnish for
a moral evaluation, and recommend a certain treatment (Entman1993:52). This
process works as a hedge against possible clash with pertinent regulations, and is
filled with content drawn from the mutual expectations between preacher and an
ostensibly dormant religious audience yet highly interactive on social media.
The influence of this speech is affirmative for the legitimacy of the regime by
helping it crowd out political competitors, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood
movement. The worshippers do not expect the preacher to come up
methodological solutions for complex political issues, therefore the dichotomy
vii
between citizens’ disagreement with then changing State regulations (2006) and
the vindication of the Muslim Brotherhood movement as the prime victim of State
control.
The losers in this shuffle for allegiances’ game are the State and Muslim
Brotherhood. The spillover is the preacher and congregation reaching implicit
consensus in setting the khutba’s agenda and its attributes, as both have the wit to
fathom the officialdom’s scheme thanks to diverse available sources to reinterpret
controversial content.
Through this process of framing contest the audience integrates the perceived
message into packages forged by means of prior personal experiences and
discussions with others in the religious space and the public sphere. Therefore
none of the frames can exclusively shape the opinion of the worshippers (Nisbet
2010: 47 & 48) as these frames are effective in as much as they resonate with the
audience’s prevalent schema and their strongly held value constructs such as
ideology, political affiliation or religious belief.
This conclusion opens up for questions regarding the nature of agenda settings
tools being used by both the State and actors in the religious sphere concerning
their functions and viability. The Researcher recommends that a team of
researchers equipped with sound knowledge and experience in ethnography,
critique-based approach and quantitative scholarship further fathoms this
interdisciplinary field in order to unravel how the agenda-setting, framing and
priming processes work together in shaping public opinion in an Arab and Islamic
context.




Debate on the religious discourse, Friday congregational sermon in particular, has
gained considerable attention in recent years. In Jordan, the input of academic
research on this issue has not been correspondent to the importance given to it by
worldwide academic and think-tank circles. It mostly consists of holding seminars
or papers in tandem with the political euphoria that followed the 09/11 event and
its repercussions (aka war on terrorism/terror), and recently the Arab Spring, but
hardly any field study that delves into the local religious sphere and deconstructs it
so as to unveil its underpinning elements and factors for change. A modest
academic interest does not match that given to mosque speech by the media,
officialdom or public debate. The researcher of this study (further on, the
Researcher; an activist who works in media research and development) decided to
contribute to this field by means of empirical field research, thereby delving into
what seems to be a social taboo in Jordan (Al-Rousan 2009:1&5)1.
Scholars attest to the influence that religious discourse, sermon in particular, has
on society in the USA (Gring 2008:269). Debate about mosque speech and its
impact on social and political life in Jordan appears to have gained increased
consideration in recent years. Al-Rousan (2009:5) attributes this to the narrative
that links between the mosque and terrorism. But as previously noted, this interest
stops short of exploring how much the mosque, the single institution entitled to
1 Dr. Safwat Al-Rousan, Department of Educational and Social Sciences, Faculty of Ajloun, Al-
Balqa Applied University, Irbid, Jordan.
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conduct Friday sermons2, shapes the mindset of the congregation and public
opinion at large.
With the advent of the Internet and a subsequent increase in penetration of online
and social media3, in addition to State intervention in terms of regulations targeting
both the media and mosque discourse, public debate has taken the form of
interactive dialogue. This debate tackles a platform which has for long been
constrained in one-way communication formula to the public (from orator to the
audience); a factor for change which renders this study more relevance and
significance. Al-Rousan (2009:4) views that,
“The mosque has been the most controversial issue in Jordanian society,
particularly since the eighties of the last century. The discussion included
issues related to its religious role, how effective is this role, and its political
and social functions. But the link between the mosque and politics remains
the most important issue with regard to the mosque in Jordan”4
Nevertheless, given the intermeshed relationship between citizen, State and the
mosque in Jordan (given Islam is the State religion as per constitution, a
considerable number of built mosques, King as direct descendent of Prophet
Mohammad, and a high religiosity rate among people5), a serious question must
2 The notion by Al-Rousan regarding the exclusivity of mosque as the place where Friday sermon
is conducted is opposed by preacher Wael Battiri, who believes this limitation has no reference in
Quran or hadith, rather embedded in State regulations and policies, although Battiri indicates that
some Islamist groups disavow the State-run and would conduct their prayer and sermon in open
space in Hay Nazzal in Amman.
3 By April 2015 there were five million Internet users, four million facebook accounts in Jordan




content-lacks-accuracy-quality-%E2%80%94-experts accessed on September 17th, 2015.
4 Transliteration by the Researcher from the original Arabic text.
5 While some ensuing polls indicate a prevalent religiosity penchant among Jordanians, a study by
Al-Rousan et al (2013) shows that the ‘religious identity’ constitutes only 17 percent as constituent
of the ‘youth identity’ in Jordan.
Source: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/jsr/article/view/4000 accessed on February
07th, 2015.
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be raised about how much impact religious speech, particularly Friday sermon,
has on shaping people’s worldviews and choices? For the Jordanian State,
religion is a fundamental component of its political ideology, but how do religious
and political actors view the impact of mosque speech in light of the regulatory
tools which the State had enacted in order to counterbalance the influence that
Friday sermon wield on public opinion? Shteiwi6 (1996:90) maintains that,
“The result of the subordination of religion to the State is obvious and
mainly serves to provide political support to the State and further legitimize
its policies and practices without any major challenge. Furthermore, the
alliance between official Islam and the State has been used as a major
weapon in the competition with the Islamic movements and groups in the
country, by presenting a distinct and specific interpretation of Islam”.7
Furthermore, given the mono-directional nature of Friday sermons on one side,
and the interactive nature of new media on the other, this study attempts to
answer how does the media and online users perceive this state-mosque
relationship, particularly that a high level of religiosity in Jordan does not
proportionately correlate to, or necessarily translate into, a high level of
involvement in religious services, nor correspond to a high level of spiritual needs,
as a survey by Moaddel & Azad8 (2002:5) depicts. Nevertheless, the Researcher
views that the impact of religious speech in a setting like the mosque transcends
6 Musa Shteiwi “holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Cincinnati / Ohio / United States
in 1991. He is a Sociologist with 17 years of experience in teaching at the University of Jordan
where he used to teach in the Gender Studies and the Human Rights and Development programs,
in addition, to the Sociology Department.”
Source: http://www.jcss.org/Contents/Director.aspx#.VNYFXp2UeSo accessed on February 07th,
2015.
7 Source: http://www.passia.org/publications/research_studies/Jordan-Palestine/pdf/3.pdf accessed
on September 17th, 2015.
8 Mansoor Moaddel, Professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University.
Source: http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/61413.pdf accessed on February
07th, 2015.
Taghi Azadarmaki, Professor of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran, Iran.
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State limitations as it builds on the communal memory of collective practice of
rituals and subordination to religious discourse compiled throughout ages. Smith
(2008:29) argues that,
“collective memory is housed in gestures, bodily practice, sounds, habits,
movements, and postures [...] They derive their power from being
performed in settings of everyday life among the community and with a
particular relationship to place.  These might be the most delicate, fragile,
and elusive pieces of collective memory but they are also powerful and
enduring.”
This field study alludes heavily to the only study on Friday sermons which Antoun
(1989) had conducted in Jordan in the early 1960s. The author maintains that
given the “cultural gap” that exists between the mosque’s audience and
Imam/preacher, as a “religious specialist” the latter should take on the
indispensable role of “cultural broker”9 by presenting “choice” and the
“reinterpretation of tradition” to his folk congregation.
Akin to the aforementioned study, this field study highlights the religious, social,
political, economic and economic content as the relevant areas of interest which,
along with the contextualization of the mosque setting in time and space, are
factors that should be taken into consideration in studying the interplay between
the religious speech, State, political/religious actors and worshippers in Jordan.
As a theoretical module, this study examines how the preacher, affected by State
regulations and directives and suggestions, apply agenda-setting, framing, and
priming effects in order to shape the worshippers’ public perception of reality.10
9 Ibid, p.257
10 Edelman (1993:232) claims that the selection of frames is mostly “driven by ideology and
prejudice”. Scheufele (p.116) states that “how people think about an issue is influenced by the
accessibility of frames”. Scheufele (p.103) cites Brosius and Eps (1995) who contends that framing
is not a concept with general applicability or explicability but a metaphor that is context-specific,
while other scholars as Popkin (1994) went even further in as not to differentiate between agenda-
setting, framing and priming given that framing is considered a second-level agenda-setting effect,
and priming as the final impact of both processes.
Source: http://www.phil-fak.uni-
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The aim of both the State (by proxy of the religious establishment) and the
preacher (whether a staff of awqaf or freelancer) is to influence what information
and meaning is to be relayed as input to the audience/congregation, hence what
information the recipient worshippers deem as important given their repeated
exposure to the relayed messages (agenda-setting), and how preachers package
and frame elements of the sermon (framing) in such a way as to manipulate
choices undertaken by the audiences who interpret and process that input and act
accordingly (priming).
Framing and agenda-setting entail identical psychological processes, but their
cognitive courses of action are different. The cognitive process associated with
agenda-setting is called processing which implies that the more frequently an
issue is covered by the news media, the more readily that issue flashes in the
memory of the audience. The effect on the audience is attributed to the cumulative
influence of a very large number of messages, words, phrases and images which
differ in content yet deal with the same common issues. Agenda-setting also bears
great impact on what the recipient thinks that other recipients are thinking of,
therefore assigning more significance to issues or themes that have been broadly
tackled by the media. Friday sermon, which mostly embeds the same language
and metaphors directed to a homogeneous congregation, presumably resembles
the optimum domain for this communication process and its ensuing effects.
The Researcher postulates that this principle applicable to the news media applies
also to the public communication sphere (between preacher and worshippers in
the mosque), given the communal sense of religious affinity which binds the wider
community of Muslims in the world, namely the umma.
The effects of the agenda-setting module (McCombs and Shaw, 1968) appear in
how easy the collective memory of people can feed them with issues covered
repetitively by the media. The impact of framing is determined by the extent to
duesseldorf.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Institute/Sozialwissenschaften/Kommunikations-
_und_Medienwissenschaft/Vowe/Forschergruppe/Scheufele_Framing_theory_media_effects.pdf
accessed on May 10th, 2015
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which the conveyed messages suit the thoughts and knowledge which people
already have in their minds. While the salience11 of the issue being broadcast or
preached is an agenda-setting effect, priming explains how information pertaining
to these issues is stored in people’s mind. This data stimulates the mind therefore
influencing people’s judgment and decision making in real life.
In the mosque’s setting related to our field study, the preacher/Imam and the
religious establishment (State institutions behind the screen) attempt to influence
the worshippers’ judgment of issues (priming). This is done by feeding the minds
of the congregation with issues intended to become most salient in their minds and
easy to access and retrieve (agenda setting). The preacher also characterizes the
sermon issue in a religious package in such a way as to fit beliefs and information
already stored in the collective mind of his audience (framing). Danowski (2007,
2009) considers framing as a means to shape the process of agenda setting,
providing a positive or negative view about the issue at hand.
The priming concept (Iyengar, Peters and Kender, 1982) is important as it
evaluates the news’ effect on the audience, the sermon’s effect among the
worshippers in our case. By highlighting a particular theme within the sermon
(which might as well be less important), yet obscuring another more or equally
important one (especially if primed by the State or political/religious actors), the
worshippers are influenced by this salient theme while deeming others as obscure
or less relevant. The transmission of the choice of themes and the attributes of
these themes from the preacher to his congregation is meant to leave a priming
effect on the ground within the latter group.
11 By salience we borrow the definition of (McCombs & Bell, 95), namely “whether or not something
is perceived as important or prominent”.
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1.2. Justification of the Study
In his analysis to framing in cultural settings, Reese (2010:23) posits that any
study should begin with the justification of its importance.
The Researcher, working in media research and development projects, embarked
on this study given the passionate trend of focusing on reform projects and studies
nationwide. Most of these undertakings tackle factors that shape the mindset of
the people and formulate public opinion such as family, media or education.
However, there is hardly any scholarship that targets the apparently "taboo"
subject of religiosity, as Al-Rousan (2009:1) has aptly described it.
Scientific research highlights the mosque podium (minbar) as an efficient means of
communication. Fathi (2001:168) contended that minbar is more efficient in
disseminating information than commonplace interpersonal contacts given the
commonality between the parties involved as compared to a situation where the
same content is being conveyed through different asymmetrical intermediaries. In
addition, communication through minbar is more agile given the context that
several members of the target audience are concurrently exposed to the same
message. Fathi (p.171) asserts that given the dearth of scholarship on minbar and
its influence, minbar as a means of communal communication is worthy of more
interest in social science research.
Whilst neighboring Arab countries have drawn remarkable attention by
researchers12, Brown (2006:3) contended that Jordan’s share of research is
disproportionate to the fact the country has a legal Islamist party (The Islamic
Action Front, political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood movement). The movement
12 Examples:
* Mosque and State in Iraq's New Constitution; Townley, Stephen, (2006), Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy.
* Syria, the Ba‘th Regime and the Islamic Movement: Stepping on a New Path? Zisser, E. 2005.
The Muslim World Journal. Vol. 95.
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was established in 1946 with the independence of Jordan, and its relationship with
the State is best described as a historical gamut of alliance, cooptation, contention
and containment respectively. Also, Kuypers (2010: 286) pinpoints to the lack of
rhetorical studies in the social scientific realm, and attributes this dearth to the fact
that researchers are unfamiliar with what represents validity in rhetorical
scholarship. Kuypers (p.288) defines rhetoric as a persuasive exercise that
attempts to impact our personal and communal behaviors by inducing a voluntary
concurrence with the orator that his disposition is better than another.
Mosques seem not to be the Islamists’ most important platform to Islamize society,
as they also resort to organize and mobilize the youth through informal networks
that traverse through the mosques, Islamic centers and societies such as Quran
memorization centers, family-based dawa groups and professional syndicates.
While research indicates that religiosity plays a crucial role in the life of
Jordanians13, surveys14 yield data that this significance does not necessarily
transform into significant involvement in religious services (Moaddel et al, 2002:
5). This disparity between belief and communal participation is worth investigation
so as to find out which factors play role in transforming religiosity into daily life
action, and how much a reference does the mosque speech (mainly Friday
sermon) constitute for the pious in this respect. This issue has recently taken
precedence with State concerns about the continuum of society Islamization,
radicalism, violence and the ensuing "terrorism".
13 As per an undisclosed survey (2008) facilitated to the researcher by an anonymous State official,
98 percent of Jordanians parents think of religion as an important element of their life, while
religious teaching guides 91 percent of the parents in their daily life.
14 Moaddel and Azad, Comparative Sociology, Volume 1, Issue 3, pages 299 – 319, citing The
Worldviews of Islamic Publics: The Cases of Egypt, Iran, and Jordan.
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/Upload/5_Iran.pdf accessed on September 03rd, 2010.
The survey shows that only 28 percent of the 1200 Jordanian respondents indicated they attend
religious services more than once a week. When asked, “Independently of whether you attend
religious services or not, would you say you are (1) a religious person, (2) not a religious person or
(3) a convinced atheist?” 85 percent described themselves as religious.
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Jarrar (2009:8&9), focusing on the mosque as the radicals' platform for spreading
ideology, posits that an ample literature on the lawful, diplomatic and military
reaction to terrorism is being faced with a dearth in ideological response, and
hardly anything concerning its impact on societies, especially those subject to
authoritarian regimes.
From a Jordanian perspective, Antoun (1989:105) contends that,
“The fact is, the study of the audience’s understanding, interpretation of,
and response to religious messages […] is a subject about which we know
almost nothing. And until we do, the study of Islamic sermons or any others,
for that matter, will be incomplete”.
This study by the Researcher is an attempt to understand the relationship between
the mosque preacher as a “social broker”, State as regulator, sermon as the
message, and the audience as a seemingly apathetic recipient of the message yet
quite interactive in commenting on the sender and the message through different
media platforms or in public space.
While academic scholarship behoove social scientific orientation when
investigating the subject of religious discourse (adherence to parameters of
quantitative and qualitative research), this effort stems from a critical rhetorical
perspective where the Researcher is guided by a ‘hunch’ given the cultural frame
that resides in the orator, text (sermon), audience (worshippers), and context (a
predominantly Islamic culture).
Page 10 of 299
1.3. Objectives of the Study and its Significance
This field study is an attempt to shed light on the intricacies that govern the
apparently simplistic cause-and-effect relationship between religious discourse
and the worshippers’ public opinion. This is done by posing Friday sermon, the
worshippers and media in Jordan as focal point of analysis. Based on selected
examples of multifarious actors, the study will examine the complex interplay
between Friday sermons and the way the worshippers’ perceive actuality through
the application of social sciences’ approaches.
As ubiquitous as mosques seem to be in Jordan (6243 established, and 772 under
construction)15, and as vested as religiosity appears to be in the life of Jordanians
according to statistics (mosques catering to around 1.5 million citizens on each
Friday)16, questions nevertheless abound about how effective mosque speech is in
shaping the viewpoints of the worshippers; to what extent do worshippers at the
mosque really pay attention to the sermon and act accordingly; how much does
the State in reality has stake in shaping the worshippers’ opinion through
regulating the mosque’s message therefore indirectly setting their agenda17 by
proxy of the preacher; whether sermons have changed in content due to changes
in legislations and the political context; how effective is the media in engaging
citizens to discuss the mono-directional and patriarchal public speech of the
mosque?
This query also begs the question on whether the mosque is limited to the space-
time definition of the mosque, or the State’s definition of the mosque, or there exist
other type(s) of mosques that stay aloof of the influence of State regulations and
control, if at all influential!
15 Source: http://www.awqaf.gov.jo/pages.php?menu_id=90 accessed on September 17th, 2010.
16 See supra footnote # 4.
17 John Kingdon (1995:3) defines “agenda” as “a list of subjects or problems to which government
officials and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some
serious attention to at any given time”.
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The hypothesis is that Friday congregational sermon, as a public
communication tool, shapes the opinion of the worshippers in as much as
the orator constructs and conveys meaning in his speech, based on
concepts and models historically cultivated in the mindset of the message
receivers which have an aggregate impact on their perception about reality.
Scheufele et al (2010: 114) posit that the communicator can transform the
audience’s perception of reality given the interactive influence between the framed
message and the “underlying culturally shared audience schema”. D. Reese
(2010: 24) elicits a link between societal connection of meaning and the historical
evolution of beliefs that across time have been taken for-granted by the society
members.
The message is premeditatedly chosen, framed and primed in order to impact
people’s judgment about social reality. This process takes place with the
participation of State institutions through institutionalized intervention by which
they attempt to monopolize religious representations, manipulate the consecrated
message to control the religious sphere, and ultimately impacting the public and
political spheres.
No authoritative scholarship has so far embarked on answering these questions
except an old study by Antoun (1989) who contends that studying the Islamic
sermon [khutba] is important to solve significant queries being raised in a number
of humanities and cultural scholarships.
In another partly-related study by Al-Rousan (2009:1) titled "change in the
mosque's image and function in contemporary Jordanian society”18, the scholar
attributes the dearth of scholarship on mosque-related issues to the tumult that
would come out of tackling such issues within different strata of the Islamic
18 Translation by the Researcher from the Arabic title Tabaddul Sourat al-Jame’ wa Wadhifatuhu fi
al-Mujtama’ al-Urduni al-Mu’aser: Muqaraba Sociolojiyah لمعاصر تبدل صورة الجامع ووظیفتھ في المجتمع األردني ا
مقاربة سوسیولوجیة
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societies. This has rendered access to sociological reference on the impact of the
ubiquitous mosque in Jordan, save some studies of architectural and purely
religious focus, not an easy task to carry out.
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1.4. Review of the Literature
1.4.1. Studies on the Religious Phenomenon
In his study “The religious phenomenon in the Arab-Muslim community”19, Haidar
Ali Ibrahim (1999) calls for adopting the social-historical interpretation of the
religious phenomenon by tracking its time evolution and social and cultural
contexts, that is, avoiding mutual interaction between religion and other social
phenomena. Ibrahim attributes the “deficiency” in relevant research to the
emergence of an approach that employs faith or religious ideology as an
indispensable part of the study. Thus, objectivity of the study becomes
“impossible” given the researcher’s position as an observer directly incorporated in
the observable fact and not just a participant, therefore coming out with end results
and suppositions that are self-expressive.
The Researcher in this study20 comments on Ibrahim’s epistemological disposition
the methodological notion that, in certain settings, field research in human
sciences and the observation of interrelated factors require not only the researcher
becoming an “integrated observer”, but more so undertaking the task of cultural
immersion, that is, total subjectivity in co-living the moment but inter-subjectivity
when penning down and explaining field findings. Ibrahim criticizes the tendency of
some “non-sociologist” researchers who, in studying the role of religion in social
change, they theorize their work confined to Durkheim’s hypothesis and selectively
quote this sociologist’s works to corroborate their own findings. Ibrahim (Ibid) calls






accessed on January 24th, 2015.
20 The term “The Researcher in this study” is being repetitively used in lieu of the pronoun “I”. This
should not imply the Researcher being detached from the subject theme, as in qualitative research;
on the contrary, he is an integral “participant” guided by his culturally preordained schemata.
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for treating religion as a “meaning system” established by society to give a
comprehensive framework to human behavior and understanding. Ibrahim instead
calls for resorting to the Durkheim’s model, which focuses on the ideological
questioning of what is good and right (values), if it can amalgamate the
sociological perspective with historical materialism given the numerous points of
convergence between them, especially the historical development of phenomena,
including thoughts and their modus operandi with other phenomena. Ibrahim also
contends that the religious phenomenon, the subject, has remained outside the
field of scientific study since it includes the supra-human and the transcendent.
The study of the religious phenomenon occupied large space in contemporary
Arab-Islamic thought, but sociology in the Arab world, in terms of its definitions and
renowned attempts within the academia and research institutions, did not
sufficiently contribute to the study of religious phenomenon by using its own
means of analysis despite its paramount importance. Ibrahim (Ibid) views that the
religious phenomenon acts as a factor in identifying and influencing the orientation
of social thought in the Arab and Muslim world. Religion impacted research and
knowledge in the Arab community in terms of the selection of theories, methods
and fields as it delineated the limits that do not conflict with the teachings of
religion and its ethos in order to preserve unity and cohesion in society. This has
kept the religious phenomenon away from being considered a field of science as it
embeds the supra-human and transcendent, stopping at the level of explanation
and interpretation. Sociology did not sufficiently contribute to the study of the
religious phenomenon, which forms a crisis in Arab sociology. The study of the
phenomenon of religious belief as including the dogma and religious ideology
together deprived studies of their objectivity. Some of these approaches contend
that a Muslim community is distinguished from other human societies and
therefore is not subject to their underpinning laws, as its phenomena transcend the
level of human research.
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Other studies seek to formulate a kind of sociology remote from social sciences
established in Western academia which ignore the rights of God and the
individuals; an approach which renders the sociologist a man of clergy and nature.
In studying religious belief and politics, Asad21 stresses the importance of studying
the “senses” in order to discover and categorize ways they can construct
sensitivities and attitudes that are distinct from beliefs. Asad also questions the
notion that formality in rituals is essentially an external type of coercion, for it is
only when forms become elements in strategic interaction that they serve as an
approach to direct or control others. The effects of public forms are diverse in as
much as they have a say in the construction and reconstruction of the self and
cultivating it in a social setting.
To wit, if we think of formal performance (in our case, rituals that proceed or
precede Friday sermon) not as an action that denies choice by imposing
formalities (subjectivity to orthodoxy in creed), but as an activity that aims at
orthopraxy (correctness of behaviour, responsiveness and manners as in sunna),
one may construe the repetition of ritualistic forms as something that goes beyond
the blind compliance with predominant tradition or submission to authority. Asad
elucidates that, while unlimited choice is not allowed in the development of proper
formality needed to cultivate ethical virtues, it does entail the proper exercise of
judgment. Therefore, forms are both potentialities and limitations indispensable for
imaginative thought and behaviour. This is because the appropriateness of formal
performance requires not merely the blind repetition of customary rituals, but also
originality in performing them in appropriate circumstances.
Asad also warns of a Western tendency to perceive codes of conduct in dress,
manner, daily prayers, etc., and the cultivation of religious sensitivities (such as
the control of sentiments in speech, behaviour towards others, and respect toward
21 Asad, T. (2008) Thinking about Religious Belief and Politics, UC Berkeley Graduate Lectures.
Source: http://iah.unc.edu/images/events/EventDocuments/asadreligionpolitics or
http://www.uctv.tv/shows/Thinking-about-Religion-Belief-and-Politics-with-Talal-Asad-15122
accessed on February 08th, 2015.
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the sacred voice) as restriction and repression. This is because, for the Muslim
worshipper, discipline is connected to a strong acknowledgement, esteem and
orientation of divine and sacrosanct presence. Asad ads that,
“if political or religious authority imposes norms of conduct and doctrine on
the individual, and if this imposition is accepted, then this must be a case of
“sincere but inauthentic belief””22
Instead of dealing with this behaviour in terms of belief (inauthentic belief or false
consciousness), Asad suggests that scholars investigate how these senses are
cultivated or how they formulate, and hence what political opinions these
formations make possible or otherwise.
A study in northern Jordan by Al-Rousan (2009:51) depicts that another research
approach intends to strip the Arab mind of its ability by rendering it incapable of
reasoning and prone to error, thereby diminishing the scientific production of
sociology of religion as compared to production in other fields. Despite the great
importance of Islam, Arab sociologists avoided the risk of tackling the core
problematic issue of religion in Arab and Islamic societies, but have conducted
studies on religion akin to those of religious institutions and movements;
descriptive studies on the results or functions of religion. There also emerged a
research trend with a positive interpretation of religion, such as the role of religion
in development, social change and social control; a method to create common
ground between religion and reality. A yet another stream tried to study the
emergence of the so-called Islamic awakening or religious revival, or religious
groups or extremist movements, and the nature of these studies was
characterized by political and media approaches in the following up of events; a
22 Ibid.
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descriptive expert-based approach instead of a methodological academic one.
Asad, cited in Jakobsen (2015:4)23 argues that,
“What matter in Islam […] are not abstract truth claims with no practical
relevance, but ‘practical rules and principles aimed at developing a
distinctive set of virtues’, therefore, Islamic religiosity does not work very
well under the conditions of liberal democracy: it is realized only as an
embodied practice, it makes claims on social and political life, and it insists
contrary to our most sacred-liberal beliefs that ‘the individual does not own
itself’”.
In December 2014, anthropologist Mohanna Haddad commented to the
Researcher that Western sociology had studied religion and its impact on society
in the light of secularization, an approach that goes back to the enlightenment
period and the ensuing separation of church and state with the completion of the
Western constitutions. This secularization process never took place in the world
called Islamic; instead of religion being enveloped in the social process, the social
processes remained enveloped in the religious phenomena, containing their
justification and negation. Richard Antoun (1989:188) maintains that,
‘the separation of church and state is irrelevant as an issue in Jordan not
only because there is no “church,” that is, a formal ecclesiastical
organization, from which to separate but also because government and
religion are perceived as mutually implied”.
In a Western context, Hashemi (2012)24 points out that,
“it is in the dynamic ‘twin tolerations’- whereby state  institutions and
religious authorities learn to respect certain minimum boundaries of
freedom of action- that an understanding of the relationship between
religion and democracy can be rooted”.
23 Source:
https://www.academia.edu/9400881/Secularism_Islam_and_Liberal_Democracy_A_Habermasian_
Critique_of_Talal_Asad accessed on February 09th, 2015.
24 Source: http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Brief_IslamDemocracy_1219.pdf
accessed on April 23rd, 2015.
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Studies on religion and the state has increased after the political change that took
place in Iran in the late seventies, and schools of thought moved away from the
social theory in the interpretation of religion or of religious movements and roles,
and were limited to certain sayings by Durkheim, drifting away from religion as a
system of meaning formed by the individual or community that gives a
comprehensive framework for the human mind and understanding.
There also emerged a critique-minded stream in dealing with the religious
phenomenon linking religion to backwardness; more of an intellectual clash,
especially after the June 1967 war between Arab countries and Israel.
Ibrahim put forward a general challenge related to the approach and vision
pursued by the researchers of the Islamic religious phenomenon, as it represents
a stream of researchers whose studies and writings are marred with multiple
concepts, hanging around the phenomenon without tackling its core, which
renders their writings rich in language, but more of an ideological speech far from
carrying scientific features.
Religion attempts to safeguard the present social order given it notably shapes its
underpinning beliefs and ethics. This could be all the more evident in societies
where religion and its institutions play dominant role in the life of society members,
whether individually or collectively.
In a panel discussion on “Politics and Religion, and the Prospects for
Transformation in the Arab World”25, pundits pinpointed to an augmented state
interference with religious matters, whether in educational curricula, fatwa
[religious decree], or Friday sermon. The aim is to serve the state’s agenda and
political orientations which can be seen as politicization and exploitation of religion
by Arab governments.
25 Transliteration by the Researcher from the original Arabic text, Source: Middle East Studies
Center, Report on a panel discussion, Amman, 23/09/2006 السیاسة والدین وآفاق التحول في الوطن العربي
http://www.mesc.com.jo/Activities/Act_Discuss/seminars/mesc-15-08.html#1
accessed on January 20th, 2015.
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Antoun (1989:187) denotes that Muslim societies were and are still characterized
by the lack of dichotomy between religion and politics. Citing D. Eugene Smith
(1970), Antoun describes these societies as having an “organic” religious system
in spite of all their social structural and cultural diversities, by which religion is
communally expressed in structures of “societal” rather than “religious” nature.
An “organic” system has three features- an integrality ideology, mechanisms of
religious control in society, and a dominant regime. This system integrates religion
and government. As the ruler embodies the role of the custodian of World order
and the State, his authority is validated by the religious bureaucrats, laws and
regulations are the expression the divine authority, and education is a reflection of
the divine teaching. Antoun (Ibid) attests that there is no proper dichotomy
between religion and state in a modernizing Muslim country like Jordan, as the
custody of the mosques has since the early Islamic era rested within the purview
of state care and control. The “organic” feature of Jordan’s religious system is
evident as the king, the direct descendent of Prophet Mohammad, is the sole
custodian of the Muslim [and Christian] shrines in occupied Jerusalem. The non-
separation of state and religion is there not because there is no formal religious
institution from which to separate, but because religion and the State are deemed
as jointly implied.
1.4.2. Studies on Political Movements, Jordanian State and the
Mosque
The centrality of the mosque has always been essential during shifts of regimes
and conflicts among forces competing for power in the Muslim history. This issue
has become all the more relevant in today's Jordanian social and political context
given the declared ‘war on terrorism’ following the 09/11 events in USA and the
11/09 events in Amman (bombing hotels by Al-Qaeda), and most recently the Arab
Spring and the rise of radical narrative in the region. These developments beget
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change in the dynamics that govern the relationship between state, religious
institutions, Islamic movements and religious speech in general. The reliance of
Islamist movements on the mosque as a their legitimate sphere of influence to
Islamize society through dawa, and as their bailiwick to impact public opinion and
mobilize the masses and shape the political sphere are all factors which render
this trio (political movements, state, mosque) worthy of academic study.
Antoun (1989:239) observes that following World War II, the process of
Islamization proceeded apace in terms of the focus on orthopraxy Islam, mainly
through the staffing of jurisconsults and judges, marriage officials and Imams in
addition to a parallel focus on worship. In the last quarter of the twentieth century,
although preachers in rural Jordan have gradually become more co-opted into the
State system, financial independence provided by this bureaucratization process
gave the preachers ample room to contest local customs that contradict with the
prevalent norms in Islam, and to go up against local power groups incongruent to
the religious institution.
Islamization26 preceded fundamentalism and is an ongoing process that will persist
in the Muslim world regardless of the rise or ebb in fundamentalism or Islamic
revival. Amidst this scenery, a burgeoning State power and a concurrent
secularization27 of society as a facet of modernization did not deter the Islamic
religious institution from carrying on with its mandate to convey its own values to
the majority of people through a corpus of preachers, Imams, scholars, judges and
other religious functionaries.
Jarrar (2009:63-66) attributes the change in Jordan’s policy toward the Islamist
movements to the “war on terror” announced by Western powers following the
26 Antoun (1989:242) defines Islamization as “the process of institutionalization, social organization,
differentiation of roles, proselytization, and systemization of doctrine”.
27 By “secularization” Antoun (p.189) does not imply the Western concept of separation of State
and church, but that of State expanding its regulatory functions in many aspects including
education, training and the bureaucratization of local Imams.
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09/11 events, giving the Jordanian regime the mantle it needs to extend its scope
of legal control from the political sphere to the religious one so as to dwarf
opposition to its pro-Western policies. However, the 2005 terrorist bombing in
Amman pushed the government to make known its counter-ideological approach
to curb the Islamists’ ability to mobilize political dissent. This approach took the
shape of preventive and deterrent anti-terrorism legislations, regulating the
religious space to control the ins and outs of religious activity, and controlling
social platforms to be in sole command of collective action. As to the effect of this
approach, Jarrar differentiates between the audience of radical Islamists, who
resort to informal networks of mobilization such as makeshift mosques, and
legitimate Islamic opposition such as preachers of the Muslim Brotherhood
movement. While restrictive legislations have managed to reign in the radicals’
reach, these groups would always find informal ways to disseminate their radical
thought. As for the legitimate group, State restrictive measures would alienate the
majority moderates driving them toward more radicalism. Jarrar however does not
posit any tangible evidence to prove this distinction. As vested as the mosque is in
the life of Jordanians, Wicktorowicz (1999:219), who studied the discourse of the
salafi movement in Jordan, views that very scarce scholarship has been published
in order to fathom the effect of the mosque discourse over people.
The Researcher however views that a decade after the enactment of the anti-
terror legislations, the Jordanian regime has proved adept in reigning in both
groups (salafis and Muslim Brotherhood). Contrary to Jarrar’s conclusion, the
government has ultimately allowed the radicals to conduct Friday prayers in open
space (especially in their redoubt of Salt city near Amman), therefore exposing
their modus operandi and narrative so that the regime can construct its own
counter-narrative in return. In March 2015, a former intelligence brass described
this approach to the Researcher as an antidote or “vaccine” policy without which
the State would not be immune to these radical groups and their stretched arm in
the region as they now constitute a “real threat to the country”.
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As for the legitimate dissent group (Muslim Brotherhood), although the policy of
stripping them off the mosque platform had ostensibly driven many to become
more radical, in Spring 2015 the State has managed to drive a wedge between
radicals and moderates, ultimately causing a split28 in the movement that rendered
the original group an illegal entity. Contrary to analysis by pundits and scholars29
who, akin to Jarrar’s disposition expected that soft and hard containment of the
religious speech begets more extremist narrative (therefore proposing the
alternative panacea of genuine political reform), the Jordanian regime managed to
run the dynamics of social action in such a way as to manipulate the religious
space by selectively allowing the radical groups (jihadist salafists and their party)
to occupy the public space, while pushing the moderate members of the Muslim
Brotherhood movement into a yet more radical path; to wit, an exposure tactic
concerning the jihadists, but a ‘divide and rule’ approach against the movement.
Rousan (2009:237) presents one of the rare sociological studies on the changed
picture and function of the mosque in contemporary Jordan. This Jordanian
researcher mourns the once inclusive role of the mosque (the only institution
Arabs knew in the start of their Muslim state) whence the mosque had exceeded
its religious function to play an inclusive political, economic, educational, social
and military role. One factor behind the ebb of this role is the increasing political
and educational awareness in Jordanian society. The remaining religious role also
lost its impact after the mosque has lost its institutional form. This is because the
Muslim worshipper practices his due rituals to please his community and society,
and to enhance his feeling of belongingness to umma.
28 Source: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/jordan-muslim-brotherhood-revoke-
membership-crisis.html
accessed on April 24th, 2015.
29 See for example- The Mosque and the State: After the Arab Spring, by Nader Hashemi
(December 2012), a joint publication by The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and the
British Council.
Source: http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Brief_IslamDemocracy_1219.pdf
accessed on October 13th, 2015.
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The ability of the preacher to exploit his religious role to influence the political and
social realm rendered the mosque a target for the ruling authority to control its
speech in order to justify reality and maintain a status quo. The aforementioned
study concludes that the mosque oscillates between being subservient to and
under the financial control of either the ruling authority to prop up its narrative, or
the Islamist movements to support their reformist project.
The study also highlights the “concealed role” of Friday sermon in fueling a feeling
of a “foreign danger” among the worshippers in order to enhance people’s loyalty
to the Jordanian regime. Rousan (p. 240) contends that from the 1960s till mid
1990s, the mosque continued to produce its own discourse which embeds the
features of the historical political discourse, but nowadays’ discourse has lost its
once influential role on the masses. And as a rationalization panacea, the mosque
discourse has been localized “Jordanized” so as to deal with the objective
circumstances of the Jordanian arena, which begot a compromised public
narrative that is distorted and bereft of traditional Islamic landmarks, because the
locus of the Islamic discourse is its comprehensive worldview. The study also
views that people who attend Friday sermons en masse are worried about the
political role of the mosque, which illustrates the failure of the Islamist and political
groups in using the mosque as a launch pad to secure a state of balance between
its religious and political role, especially in light of the State’s involvement in
combating terror and radical narrative, therefore people avoiding contact with
political operatives especially in times of political arrest, something the Researcher
has witnessed in his close interaction with the worshippers herewith (see the
Participant Observation part, 5.1.2., Association with Fellow Worshippers).
Recently, the centrality of the mosque as a vehicle for political change has
become evident with the outbreak of the political awakening in some Arab
countries, (aka the Arab Spring), which emancipated in northern African countries
and spread into Levant. Calls for toppling the regimes have sent its ripples into
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Jordan, albeit limited to reforming the regime. The role of the mosque as a
platform for both Islamic and other pro-reform movements has been essential in
serving as the launch-base for street protests led by the main opposition party, the
Islamic Action Front. In March 2011, the Islamic movement led these protests
under the guise of a youth movement called 24 adhar (March 24th). Mosques were
being used as a threshold for public protests mainly after Friday prayers.
Therefore, part of the period covered in this field study is influenced by this
context, especially the “participant observation” field study. This environment
encouraged other banned Islamic groups such as the salafi jihadists and
hizbu’ttahrir (tahrir party) to take to the street and contest the government through
peaceful means, contrary to their tenets which disavow the State and officialdom
as apostates. The jihadist stream has found in the mosque and its sphere a proper
platform to address the worshippers and society at large with demands to release
jihadist prisoners, and to enforce shari'a as the law. The State was being tolerant
and restrained in its traditional retort until the movement gained impetus and wide
coverage by the media, and the notion that the chasm between the jihadists’ new
discourse and that of IAF has become blurred. Thereafter, the State cracked down
on a sit-in by the Jihadist stream which took place in Zarqa city following Friday
sermon on April 15th, 2011, detaining and imprisoning dozens of its recruits. This
was followed by continuous protests by the stream and supporters from other
political and tribal figures demanding the release of jihadist prisoners. The
Researcher was a witness to these protests as part of this field study alongside a
team of collaborators (Informants) as shown in the “participant observation” part
(Chapter Five). Tribal presence was of paramount importance in these protests
especially where the mosque is located in a tribal district. The mosque would then
become the ideal pulpit to announce a communiqué by the stream, and the
neighborhood being used as a public space for pro-state and anti-state discourse
simultaneously. The clan in this setting plays the role of both a propeller for
protest, and guardian for both protest groups, given members of both groups
belong to the same clan. This tactical allegiance between the salafi jihadist stream
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and the clan, historically the backbone of the Hashemite regime, has been justified
by a tribal sheikh to the Researcher as,
“a thorn of spite against the government which has confiscated our public
land properties- wahijat asha’iriyyah”.
Mainstream media, including Islamist newspapers, tend to avoid publishing
viewpoints that highlight this atypical relationship.
This field study views that State control over the mosque has become all the more
evident in tandem with political awakening, taking varying modes with the
mounting tension in the political scenery in Jordan and the region. W. Cant Smith
cited in Antoun (1989) states that any commonplace action by the community has
its dual meanings and repercussions of correct behavior in this life, and a
soteriological [salvation] consequence in the hereafter. Antoun (1989:183) views
that this set of meaning and consequences prevailed throughout Islamic history,
and still permeates the way Jordanians view their State and the monarch.
The Researcher posits that the official State engagement in the religious sphere
has been twofold: while exercising its customary control over the mosque amidst
the abrupt change in the political scenery in Jordan and the region, the regime has
become more concerned about the role which the mosque can play in the religio-
spatial dimension. In as far as the mosque complements the role of dissenting
discourse active in public space the State would shore up its restrictions. The
other side is the State overlooking the intrusion to public space (mosque and its
adjoining open space) by new and outlawed actors, namely the salafi jihadist
stream and tahrir party as a tactic to demystify their discourse and modus
operandi.
Throughout the period covered in the “participant observation” field study
(January-July 2011), recorded observations and those narrated by the three
participating Informants demonstrate several evolving forms of State intervention
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in the mosque. The government has been active in assigning the Imam and
preacher, guiding them on which issues to tackle or not, and how to deal with
pertinent issues (i.e. preachers cutting their sermons short, calling upon the
worshippers to instill calmness during political unrest, urging citizens to participate
in casting their ballots during elections, or slamming non-compliant Islamic groups
by proxy of the preacher).
The mosque represents the public space where a tug of war between the
Jordanian State and Islamic movements takes place in order to influence public
opinion. A constitutional monarchy with the government appointed by King through
his prime minister, the Hashemite monarchic system has for long taken Islam as a
pillar to ossify its legitimacy30. Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood movement had
played into the hands of the government since its licensing in 1946 (also Jordan’s
Independence year) as both parties would find mutual interest in curbing secular
and leftist pan-Arab movements in the 1950s, and Palestinian armed militia
following the 1967 war with Israel. This exchange of interests enabled the Muslim
Brotherhood movement to spread dawa and establish its charity network. The
mosque constituted the ideal space for the movement to compete against other
Islamic movements and practice political influence by recruiting new members,
mobilizing supporters and building its social base (Abu Rumman 2007:12). This
open space was further invested by the movement after establishing its legal
political arm in 1992, The Islamic Action Front. However, this status of coexistence
would at times run into a snag, and even collide, with the changing political climate
in the region and its repercussions on homeland, on top of which was the
enactment of the peace treaty which Jordan had signed with Israel in 1994, and
the rising power of HAMAS as a Palestinian military movement organizationally
linked to the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan, both opposed to any peace
deal with Israel.
30 Source: http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/pages/view/id/148.html
accessed on October 13th, 2015.
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In the late 1980s and following the Gulf War of 1991, the ideas and stances by the
Muslim Brotherhood movement have become marred with a yet more radical
approach and conduct. An anti-Israeli and anti-USA speech enabled the
movement to amass social credit among the public, mainly using the mosques as
a platform, much to the resentment of the government which accused the
movement of pursuing a policy of altercation and inflaming public opinion against
the regime. Abu Rumman (2007:28) states that,
“what actually changed were the political and historical circumstances
which had led to a state of coexistence and historical alliance, based on
mutual interests in the face of common internal and external enemies”.
The Researcher, a media observer and close to figures of the Muslim Brotherhood
movement and the salafist stream, views that a harbinger of things to come was
the movement’s principle of “public dawa; secret organization” which was tolerable
during the era of mutual interests and cohabitation with the regime, but turned
unacceptable when transparency in political positions and discourse toward the
State in times of regional and local instability was a practical exigency.
Abdulkathem cited in Horani et al (1997:16)31, states that what engendered this
official stance toward the movement was its inception as extension to the mother
movement established in Egypt in 1928. In a turbulent region, the Jordanian
government strives to stay aloof of intervention by foreign powers facilitated
through local political movements who would use the mosque to prop up public
support to their ideologies and views regarding Jordan’s foreign policy.
Shteiwi (1996:97) describes the relationship between the State and political
movements as contingent on the threat posed to the State. The regime would then
pursue a “pragmatic” policy towards religious manifestations depending on the
source of threat, be it secular or religious, in order to ensure a certain balance
between Islamic and secular political groups. Shteiwi warns of the future
31 Al-Harakat wat-Tandhimat al-Islamiya fil Urdun, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center and Sindbad
Publishing House, Amman, Jordan, 1997. )مؤلف جماعي(الحركات والتنظیمات اإلسالمیة في األردن 
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repercussions of a continuum of State and religion being hostage to each other,
and society itself sandwiched between both parties (as the case with many Arab
and Muslim states). Shteiwi proposes the panacea in full-fledged democracy
approach if the State would “possess legitimacy in and of itself”32. Shteiwi posits
that this disposition (established in the mid 1990s as less official reliance on
religion by the State for the sake of embracing more democracy) overlooks and
simplifies the role of the mosque as a key platform to amass public support. The
mosque being used by both parties (the State and Muslim Brotherhood as the
prime opposition front and the most organized movement in Jordan) to ratchet up
public support for their respective policy and ideology.
Former Islamic movement leader and statesman Bassam Al Omoush (2011:4)33
contends that the Muslim Brotherhood movement used the parliament as a dawa
podium more than a political platform (i.e. one leading deputy would always give a
no-confidence vote in the 1960s and 1980s given the government did not govern
according to Islam). The 1970s and 1980s were the movement’s  golden period as
it pursued a purely dawa approach, and its main concern was to establish the call
for Islam and contest counter secular or Islamic thoughts, while other leftist and
pan-Arab streams would celebrate the birthday of Lenin and post his picture on
mosque gates. Al Omoush views that the movement’s reliance on spreading
Islamic thought facilitated their public diffusion until the early nineties when they
entered parliament and therefore “found themselves in the political arena and lost
the mosque platform”34. However, the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood
movement in political life in the 1990s was that of improvisation, void of a technical
political program despite the fact that by participating in the cabinet in 1989 they
had managed to control the mosques, hospitals, schools, courts, the poor and
communities at large. Al Omoush attributes extremism in the movement’s narrative
32 Ibid
33 Al-Khitab al-Ikhwani wa-Sulta al-Siyasiya, Al-Rai Studies Center, edition #3, November 03rd,
2011. 3/11/2011، الخمیس 3الخطاب اإلخواني والسلطة السیاسیة، مركز الرأي للدراسات، العدد ضایا الساعة، سلسلة ق
34 Ibid.
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since 1989 to the economic setback and its social ramifications; regional support
to Intifada (uprising in Palestine) and its effect on Palestinian camps in Jordan;
contending speech by rival independent Islamist and leftist deputies under the
dome; an emerging tempered speech influenced by tahrir party and skeptical to
any official stance; long absence of a parliamentary life; lack of individual and
political freedoms; the Gulf War in 1991, Oslo Agreement in 1993; the ensuing
peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994, and lately the Arab Spring which
kicked off in January 2011. In the latest factor, public protests emulated those in
other Arab countries, mainly blocking key streets and squares, but then receded to
a commonly approved place, al-Husseini Mosque in downtown Amman. Al
Omoush concludes with a call for the movement to preserve its dawa mission, to
reread the local and regional political dossiers, not to embrace negative speech
against State policies, and to revive the historical union between the movement
and King for the good of Islam, Jordan and Palestine.
In the forthcoming interviews with the movement’s figures and content analysis to
mosque sermons, the Researcher views this call by Al Omoush as far from being
embraced by the movement, nor is facilitated by the government through its
regulatory directives, legislations or speech by preachers who were appointed to
replace the movement’s ousted preachers.
In Egypt, Georges Fahmi35 views that attempts by the Egyptian state to tighten
control over the public sphere by means of monopolizing public religious activities
(including mosque as key platform of outreach by the Muslim Brotherhood
movement) would eventually complicate things as it causes the emergence of a
35 “Georges Fahmi is a researcher at the Arab Forum for Alternatives in Egypt. He holds a
doctorate from the European University Institute in Italy. His research interests include relations





accessed on April 21st, 2015.
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corresponding religious sphere which stays aloof of state control, ultimately
nurturing an environment ideal for the spread of radical thought. This situation
would be bolstered by people losing their confidence in the official religious
establishments while looking for a more independent religious discourse through
social media and religious studies in makeshift mosques. Fahmi refers to a similar
case in the 1970s following the era of former president Gamal Abdel Nasser
whose policy to curb Muslim Brotherhood resulted in their recruits permeating
society by means of philanthropy, education and preaching. Fahmi however fails
to explain the spread of radical Islam during the subsequent era of presidents
Anwar Sadat or Hosni Mubarak who had embraced a lenient policy towards
Muslim Brotherhood while mounting tight control over the public sphere.
Wictorowicz (2001:52) says that the mosque constitutes a melting pot for post-
sermon protests36 which cannot be easily regulated by governments because
officials cannot stop people from praying, protests are often of impromptu nature,
and common sentiments are stirred up when communal gatherings occur. This
potential by the mosque induced governments to control collective action by
integrating the mosques and their events into direct state administration through
the ministry of awqaf. This writer views that only competent preachers would resort
to quoting ayat [verses of Quran] and hadith in order to “masque” or frame37 the
right intention of their criticism to State policies and current conditions. They
“insulate” themselves from direct retaliation by State officials by directly “wrapping”
the sermon in the word of Allah [God], something presumably immune to State
reprisal. The fact that some preachers use veiled resemblance does not always






accessed on April 30th, 2014.
37 The Researcher in this paper analyses the “framing” technique used by some preachers to
circumvent or to co-opt state control.
Page 31 of 299
translate into disseminating their true intent to the pious, as only a few worshippers
manage to perceive the implicit message. The Researcher in this study condones
this notion by Wictorowicz by means of co-living the moment with a few
worshippers over a period of six months (Chapter Five) and analyzing salient
themes in 24 different sermons which the Researcher had attended (Chapter
Three).
The regulation of the mosque speech introduced by the State in 2006 has
apparently diminished this potential by competent preachers and Imams, as many
are being replaced by less educated and apolitical ones. The State resorted to
diminishing the role of the “religious establishment”38 (mainly ministry of awqaf) in
controlling the religious sphere, thereon relegating this important role to the
security establishment by means of changing pertinent regulations and restricting
the role of the awqaf officialdom to summoning and warning noncompliant
preachers. The aim is to manipulate the religious sphere in such a way as to expel
nonmainstream preachers from mosque podiums either by retreating to their
organizational base (as the case with the Muslim Brotherhood preachers) or
pushing jihadist salafi preachers to conduct Friday prayers in public space instead
of elusive makeshift mosques, therefore a policy of exposure and vulnerability of
their recruits to the security apparatus. This policy necessitates not an
administrative body to plot, implement and assess, but an intelligence-based
security corpse. Fabb (2012) cited in Nielsen39 (2014:7) stated that,
38 Premier Abdullah Ensour acknowledged the weakness of the official religious establishment as
one of the reasons for the growth of "extremism" in addition to the "spread of ignorance in the







accessed on February 20th, 2015.
39 Nielsen, Richard (2014) Networks, Careers, and the Jihadi Radicalization of Muslim Clerics.
Nielsen is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
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“By taking control of the previously independent financial endowments for
all of the most important religious institutions, political leaders gained the
ability to bring the clerical class into compliance by cutting off funding”
Lawrence (1984) views that Islamic fundamentalists want to shift religion out of the
firm formal worship setting in the mosque into the wider public space so as to
adjust the private and public life of Muslims according to the tents of their faith.
By appointing less qualified preachers and curtailing the role of ministry of awqaf,
the State widens the cultural gap between the preachers (mostly uneducated) and
congregation, and lessens the gap between the upper-echelon and lower-echelon
religious chains of command, therefore lessening the propensity of political conflict
conducive to potential violence and civil unrest. Antoun (1989:241) depicts the
case of the Iranian revolution of 1979. As the Shah regime had missed the role of
manipulating the religious sphere, a deeply religious working class has interacted
intimately with local-level preachers and supported them financially. The
unpredicted but logical consequence was the Iranian revolution by Ruhollah
Khomeini.
Abu Hanieh (2008:11)40 depicts the case of the Islamic movements and women’s
participation in political life. Islamic movements in Jordan which shun democratic
practice establish their narrative on the belief of the integrity of Islamic experience
throughout history, validity of Islam and its comprehensiveness to all emerging
issues, yet this speech is characterized by inertia and tradition, albeit an emerging
positive yet lethargic and slow alteration in their practical approach (towards
women’s issues in particular) given their strict principles. On the other hand,
political parties involved in democratic life have managed to acclimatize their
perspective towards religion, state and society. Women in these parties have
started demanding and acquiring more active roles in the decision making process
and the production of speech. However, the ability of Islamist parties to move
40 Abu Haniyeh, Hassan. Al-Mara’ was-Siyasa min Mandhour al-Harakat al-Islamiya fil Urdun,
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008. 2008المرأة والسیاسة من منظور الحركات السیاسیة في األردن، اإلصدار الثاني، آب 
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onward with women’s’ rights is being faltered due to the hardliners and ambivalent
tendencies within their cadres. In spite of their ideological idiosyncrasy, Islamic
movements in their entirety proclaim in their speech that their ultimate goal is to
reinstate the puritanical Islamic way of life.
The Researcher in this study focuses solely on the male gender in the mosque,
but would also allude to the woman as a behind-the-door actor who may influence
the behavior of husband and children in light of the sermon content.
1.4.3. Studies on Friday Congregational Sermon and the Preacher
Perhaps the most relevant albeit old study on Friday sermons in Jordan is that of
Richard Antoun (1989) who conducted a comparative ethnographic field study
between 1959 and 1986 in the northern village of kufralma, Irbid governorate,
henceforth the archaic reference and repetitive allusion by the Researcher to this
unique study. The author’s methodology was to analyze the content of sermons he
attended and recorded while observing the conduct of the preacher and his wider
role in community, therefore letting the sermon content guide him in the course of
investigation. This modus operandi enabled the author discover how the sermon’s
theme(s) crosscut the whole variety of human concern enough to counter-argue
the Western negative stereotypes about Islam or viewpoints taken out of their
context.
While the supra study has helped the Researcher gain insight into the nature of
relationship between the State and religious establishment way before the 2006
Amendment to the Law (given the utter dearth in relevant scholarship), the
Researcher’s approach and methodology herewith is more geared into thematic
content analysis, therefore it cannot be labeled as full-fledged ethnography albeit
its reliance on partial participant observation (partial in terms of the time span and
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limited number of Informants) in order to validate, invalidate or ponder(ate) on
conclusions drawn by other research tools the Researcher employs.
In his study, Antoun documented, analyzed and highlighted the experiential
dimension of the sermon as a “cultural product” and preacher as the “cultural
broker”41. Displaying the capability and degree of diversity in the preaching ritual,
the author explores the process by which the cultural brokers selectively convey to
their community the Islamic corpus of religious beliefs, ritual norms and ethical
standards. The study demonstrates the flexibility of this corpus and its capacity to
be interpreted and prescribed as significant for social process, and sheds light on
the symbolic message of the congregational sermon and the articulation of this
message with different actors in society such as the clan, village community, pious
worshippers or State.
The importance of this study stems from the fact that it archives the historical
context of religious speech in Jordan when scholarship was scarce and the
academic institution had barely existed in the Kingdom. The study also sheds light
on the “framing” of religious speech as a political tool the regime resorted to in
order to ossify its legitimacy and inculcate a modernist way of life in a
predominantly Muslim society run by a Western-allied regime.
Antoun stems from the point of differentiating between “government Islam”,
“people’s Islam” and “local influential’s Islam”42. “Government Islam” is related to
religious scholars and judges co-opted into the State system as fixed public
servants in grand mosques (jawame’) directly run by ministry of awqaf, while
“people’s Islam” is associated with preachers who may act contrary to customary
preaching norms and their mosques serve as platforms for dissonant speech. On
the other hand, “local influential’s Islam” is propagated by preachers who shift their
41 Ibid, p.4
42 Ibid, pp.212 & 213
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opinion in tandem with the way public opinion sways. This distinction does not rule
out the possibility of the same preacher blending two or more manifestations of
Islam, or the notion that these manifestations might be time-bound and one
replacing the other. This distinction and interweave pinpoint to the notion that
Islamic discourse does not propagate Islam as a distinct set of principles,
sacraments and entities, but interlace of various strands that work together in the
organization of social structure and the accommodation of tradition.
In his study, Antoun views the Islamic sermon [khutba] as a form of rhetoric or an
argument which embeds associated images and symbols made up in such a way
as to articulate a key meaning replete with symbolism as an exemplar of the
Islamic culture, Prophet Mohammad being the role model and first preacher43.
Therefore, khutba is inextricably linked to its social structural milieu and the
resulting change in society.
Antoun differentiates between the Western term of “sermon” and the Islamic
khutba, in a sense that orthopraxy [sunna – right conduct; norms that guide routine
relations between community members], rather than orthodoxy [creed, rituals, as
the case with Christianity], is institutionalized in khutba.44 In addition, Rosenberg’s
argument that “the medium is the message”45 relates to American folk sermons in
which the preacher invokes the audience’s reaction, whereas in khutba, the
audience’s response is constrained through encoded worship rituals: the starting
dars dini [religious lesson that precedes the prayer and the ensuing sermon]; the
three calls for prayer; the two consecutive sermons with defined fashion and
43 Ibid, p. 106.
44 Religious guidance for Muslims’ practical life was the main focus of khutba studied in a in
mosques of Southern California, USA in 2009, as concluded in the ‘participant observation’-based
study: The Muslim Friday Khutba: Veiled and Unveiled Themes. Mazen Hashem (PhD), Fellow at
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and a Lecturer at the University of Southern
California.
Source: http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU%20-%20The_Muslim_Friday_Khutba.pdf
accessed on May 01st, 2015.
45 Ibid, p. 102
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length; and the concluding prayers performed both individually and communally.
These rituals proclaim the worldview from an Islamic perspective coupled with the
speech [rather than discourse] delivered in classical Arabic which sacralizes the
message of salvation. Antoun maintains that these formulae confer assurances
that “frame” any discussion of life-felt issues. It is in this sense that the “medium”
to a large extent constitutes the “message”.
This inference is not completely congruent with findings by the Researcher where
the majority of the respondent worshippers in the thematic analysis chapter say
they feel bored of listening to political or economic content in the sermon, therefore
the static audience do not always perceive non-religious content albeit
“sacralized”46 by the supra rituals. In this sense, the Researcher views that the
corpus of sender (preacher), message (sermon), receiver (audience/ worshippers)
and the setting (including the rituals), all are factors which together mold the
“message” as both preacher and audience are tied up to mutual expectations
which frame and delineate the message which carries information and meaning
depending on the salient political occurring in the country or region.
Although Antoun describes the nature of the Islamic religious organization in a
northern Jordanian village in the 1960s as “congregational rather than
Episcopal”47, in a sense that the peasant community solely defines the contract of
the preacher’s work, this referential has changed in the 21st century and has
become under the purview of ministry of awqaf under whose jurisdiction both civil
servant Imams and freelance preachers can deliver the sermon. However, this has
not rendered the congregation neutral or a totally static actor, especially when the
political context is dynamic. In November 16th 2012, the worshippers in the
northern city of Irbid forced the preacher to step down the minbar after the latter
46 Ibid, p. 103
47 Ibid, p. 84
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has described the protesters against price increase as “disbanded people”48. In
another incident on September 19th 2014, some worshippers in a mosque in the
impoverished Hay Nazzal of eastern Amman attempted to prevent an awqaf-
appointed preacher from ascending the minbar49.
As for the influence of the sermon on the audience, Antoun (p. 140-141) focuses
on the fact that Islam is more about orthopraxy (sunna, way of life) than orthodoxy
(creed), and Muslims internalize attitudes conveyed in the sermon and act
accordingly by following the example of Prophet Mohammad, his companions and
the ensuing caliphs. Also, rituals and calls for prayer that precede, interject or
follow the sermon have a persuasive effect for a considerable part of the
worshippers. Therefore, sermons have a molding influence as they invoke,
“calls to action delivered on a regular basis in an optimally legitimate
cultural and social context- in the mosque, face-to-face on the occasion of
the Friday congregational prayer with the sermon punctuated by numerous
religious formulae”.50
Antoun disagrees with evaluations made by Gibb (1947) and Geertz (1968) that an
increased religiosity in terms of veiling, pilgrimage, attendance of Friday sermons
is more of hypocrisy than piety. Although conferring some truth on the depiction by








accessed on November 14th, 2014.
49 Source:
http://ahkelak.com/page.aspx?pg=7&si=6&ni=71870&md=newsdetail#.VB1436mE4Ks.facebook
accessed on November 14th, 2014.
50 Ibid.
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leading to passivity and cynicism and stressing “justification by faith”, sermons
Antoun studied from 1959-1967 do not bear the inference that,
“Islam does not emphasize humanistic values, is not action-oriented, cannot
or does not check despotism, and stresses nominal and formal aspects of
religion than moral action and moral intent”51.
On the contrary, Antoun’s field study points out an Islam that calls attention to
moral action and refuses ceremonial designation of religious duty in favor of
delving into ethical intentions. Therefore, Antoun’s study in socio-anthropology
becomes all the more valuable and relevant given its variance with the way other
Western researchers viewed Islam and its corpus of law, ethics and rituals, mainly
Friday congregational sermon. One example is Antoun (p.246) citing Daniel (1960)
who viewed Islam as a religion with a penchant toward violence and control. Such
writers perceive Friday congregational prayer akin to the way they perceive Jewish
or Christian rituals, and the impact of this negative moral view of Islam according
to Antoun exceeds the U.S. public opinion to the U.S. academia. On the other
hand, Antoun (p.251) is assiduous in pointing out that certain parts of the sermon
do imply that the Islamic corpus of law and ethics embed some negative
stereotypes for certain groups of society such as women, polities [hizbi], in
addition to constraining implications that furnish for religious and legal
discrimination against other faiths such as Christians and Jews, a label the
Researcher also highlights in this study.
Apart from the supra study, the Researcher could not come across previous
studies on this specific subject in Jordan except an old study by Borthwick (1965),
who in a book edited by Prosser (1973: pp. 379-381), records a historical
perspective of the mosque sermons recorded on radio stations from three Arab
countries, including Jordan. The writer states that prior to World War II (WWII),
mosque sermons were being recited, therefore creating a channel of
communication among the ulama. In the aftermath of WWII and in order to institute
51 Antoun (1989:248).
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communication between ulama and the Muslim masses, Arab reformers sought to
write down the sermons, making their language simpler and tackling life-felt
issues. The ruling elites rushed to strip their enemies of this communication tool
useful to mobilize the masses. Borthwick designates Jordan as a country where
official censorship was imposed on sermons, resulting in preachers trying to
integrate their governments’ reformist policies with the Quran, hadith and Islamic
tradition. This view is also held by Antoun (1989:140) who, although admitting that
the rural preacher to some extent succumbs to the religious officialdom, in his role
as a “linker” and “interpreter”, this “social broker” still enjoys substantial freedom to
chose his own themes and content for the sermon, a degree of autonomy at the
time [1960s] was also applicable for preachers living in centralized polities in urban
Egypt. Antoun (p.257) points out the necessary function of the preacher as a
“cultural broker” who exercises interpretation as he presents the tradition in his
product (the sermon) to his audience in order to bridge the gap that exists between
him as a specialist and his mundane audience. This space of freedom available to
the preacher who has the wit to circumvent State regulations half a century ago is
also highlighted in this study.
Friday sermons were used as a framing tool by the ruling elites to legitimize their
nationalist messages to the Islamic-oriented audience. Sermon as an Islamic
institution derives its legitimacy from being a tradition as old as Islam; a regular
practice and an established component of the Islamic nurtured society; sermons
are preached in mosques whose architecture for the worshippers is reminiscent to
the past glorious of Islam. The writer argues that this legitimacy renders the
worshippers more attentive to the sermon and ready to abide by the modern
messages now communicated through the mosque podium. This process bridges
a communication gap that exists between the ruling elites and the traditionalist
community.  The post WWII modernizing ruling elites would direct the sermon and
feed it with modern messages which preachers in return frame in the legitimacy
myth of the traditional masses.
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In another study, Mizher (p.4)52 views that Friday sermon is exclusively
characterized by being one of the main rituals of Islam, conducted in a devout
setting, embedding the obligation to focus on and hearken to the preacher,
sustainable and recurrent every week, and attended by a diversity of worshippers,
therefore writing about Friday sermon is of paramount importance.
An evaluation study on Friday sermon and the orator in Iraq by Safa Ali Hussein53
distinguishes Friday oration among other types of speech for being the most
influential for Muslims given its religiously obligatory nature, and for being the most
familiar and repetitive among all types of oration. The author attests to the scarcity
of studies on Friday sermon and calls for an increased interest in the subject
issue. The elements of the sermon are verbal oration, audience, persuasion and
lobbying; the orator being the most important element in the sermon given his
stance as the successor of Prophet Mohammad on the mosque podium. In early
Islam the orators used to be the caliphs and regional princes given their
sovereignty and eloquence. Thereafter, with the expansion of Islam, those rulers
lacked these attributes and the sermon became a profession with scientific criteria
that requires capacitating the orator who should acquire an innate talent, eloquent
tongue, be well versed in shari’a jurisprudence, aware of his audience’s mindset
and social strata, promptitude, good manners and role model, intellectual, clever
and of a leadership character. Through interviews and questionnaires, the study
states that the ratios of mosque orators who lack these attributes range between 9
to 33 percent; a high proportion given the eminence and sanctity of Friday sermon
as an obligation and one of the main pillars of Islam. The writer attributes this
degraded level of orators to the vast number of mosques therefore the scarcity of




accessed on January 12th, 2015.
53 Friday Sermon and its Orator, a Corrective Study.
Source: http://www.iasj.net/iasj?func=fulltext&aId=42841 (Iraqi Academic Scientific Journals)
accessed on April 19th, 2014.
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orators, lack of understanding and appreciation to the role of the sermon and
orator by both state and society at large, low level or professionalism and
seriousness by the orators, and low level of education in shari’a schools.
These results are akin to the situation of the mosques in Jordan in terms of the
government’s inability to equip the ubiquitous mosques with competent preachers.
The question remains whether the governments are serious in letting the mosque
preacher shape the public opinion without chaffing under its official control and
censorship.
The study covered the historical background of the mosque and sermon in early
Islam, but lacked the theoretical underpinnings in public communication necessary
to consolidate its prepositions, and stopped short of shedding light on the legal
and political contexts surrounding the religious speech in Iraq, something the
Researcher will attempt to cover in this study.
In a context where the worshippers are a minority (USA), Hashem (2009:13) says
the main function of Friday sermon is “to remind forgetful humans”, based on
Quranic verse that reminding is beneficial to the believers, therefore it is the duty
of every Muslim to remind his fellow believer of the principles of Islam. Besides,
the urge to remind in the sermon is dominant because of people’s inherent
capacity to do good or evil, therefore reminding in public religious speech is
logical. Another indirect reason which Hashem (p.14) cites is the notion that the
preacher is entrusted to an untainted religious text; therefore he is a mere
deliverer of this knowledge rather than an agent inspired by Allah. Being tied up to
the expectations of the mosque attendees, the preacher should be cautious to
transfer this entrusted knowledge by anchoring his message with references in the
Quran, hadith, and glean examples from the historical Islamic literature. This
would limit the preacher’s choice to attach “frills” to the religious texts as the
Muslim tradition expects only little scholarship in him. Untrained preachers tend to
avoid frilling their sermon so as to avoid correction by the audience and lose their
Page 42 of 299
self-image, whereas competent preachers stick to the limits of parochial themes
they were trained to, as reliance on historical references bestows blessings upon
them. Within the confines of this expectation between preacher and audience, the
former delivers a “dormant but generative message” which, although floated in
meaning and not quite effective, it can be cognitively tackled in the future. Hashem
(p.15) contends that by “floating”’ a metaphor in the minds of the audience, the
preacher allows this meaning to impact their behavior or the way the worshippers
assess issues in real life scenario.
Given that Sunni Islam did not invent a clerical system, and there is no official
practice to ordinate the preacher, the concept of Imamate is lax. Therefore, a
community leader knowledgeable of the corpus of Islamic teachings can assume
this role. On the other hand, ulama are expert scholars who, although have
acquired considerable prominence and reverence, they usually do not directly
practice command in the religious sphere. In Jordan, the State managed to
relegate to itself a task which Islam had not invoked in the first place; that is to
decide who can and who cannot be an Imam/preacher. This is being done not
through ordination or excommunication (any Muslim can deliver a sermon as a
practice which has followed the enactment of the 2006 Amendment to the law) but
by creating a socio-legal context which works as a censorship for would-be
preachers.
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1.5. Study's Problematic Issue
The Researcher views that a hybrid of factors accumulated throughout ages
participated in shaping the mindset of the worshippers at the mosque. The
mosque speech is just one of these factors, some of which crosscut producing
messages that people intake thereby formulating a non-monolithic frame of the
mind regarding Islam and its manifestations in orthodoxy (creed) and orthopraxy54
(sunna). Historically, this frame is believed to has had cultivated a cultural context
which in the second half of the twentieth century became further reinforced by the
media outlets, particularly State television55.
One study that highlighted this field of communication is Cultivation Theory by
George Gerbner (1973), who assumed that the influence of mass media on the
audience is strong and enduring given the ever-present and consonant flow of
messages which the media outlets feed the audience with56. Media effects depend
primarily on the selective informational intakes by the audiences and their
homogenous set of social and economic connections, and are assumed by return
to reinforce people’s established attitudes rather than create new ones. The
Cultivation Theory presumes that what matters in the analysis of the contribution
of communication means to the receivers’ conception of social reality is the overall
pattern of messages. Mass media, television in particular, inculcate mundane life
by feeding the audience with social context thereby the audiences’ concept of
social reality is shaped by the images and lifestyle which the mass media conveys.
54 Orthopraxy refers to the application of Muslim laws and ethics in real life and the way religion is
directed towards society rather than theology or State (see Antoun 1989:10).
55 83 percent of Jordanians rely on satellite television to follow political news, State television (JTV)
topping the list of all viewed media outlets (23.4 percent), whether local or international.
Source: http://www.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/8e6e492d-62bc-4f6d-9792-45440ac7b9c8
accessed on January 13th, 2015. A separate study by Pies & Madanat (2011:6) shows that JTV is
only deemed more credible in local news (38 percent).
Source: http://www.mediaact.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/WP4/WP4_Jordan.pdf
accessed on January 13th, 2015.
56 Scheufele et al, Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects
Models, Journal of Communication 57 (2007), p.10.
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The general pattern of messages in the contribution of communication vehicles
(mosque podium in our case) to the audiences’ conception of social reality is what
the Researcher will analyze using the here below research tools. However, field
research as a tool to validate, invalidate or ponderate the hypothesis proposed by
the Researcher will not be based on Cultivation Theory, given the long span of
time it took Gerbner to test his hypothesis; something impractical in the course of
this study.
In response to the core questions the Researcher has posed in this study, and
more relevant and practical than the Cultivation Theory, this study will probe
whether the ‘agenda-setting theory’ and its accompanying factors in mass
communication, namely framing and priming, do apply to the public
communication sphere; mosque speech in our case.
Agenda-setting research in political communication was sparked by a study
carried out by McCombs and Shaw (1972), who pinpointed to a great
correspondence between the prominences that the mass media lays on certain
issues and the significance attributed to these issues by the mass audience (public
object agenda versus media object agenda as described by Du (2008:52)) 57. The
Researcher in this study concludes that the correlation between agenda-setting in
Friday sermons and public agenda-building is not isolated from social reality, but
contingent upon other variables, mainly the audience’s (mosque worshippers) pre-
cultivated norms and values, and the preacher’s prior knowledge of these norms
and values. This is akin to the idea that in agenda-setting, the effect is not a factor
of a few messages being received by the audience, but attributed to the
57 Ying Roselyn Du (2008), Mass Media’s Agenda Setting Function in the Age of Globalization: A
Multilevel Agenda-Setting Test. A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication.
Source: http://dc.lib.unc.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd/id/2219
accessed on May 13th, 2015.
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cumulative impact of a multitude of messages, each carrying a different content
but all of which tackle the same common problem.
Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) cited in Du (2008:10) maintain that a main
source for constructing and transmitting news framing to the public is ideology
which wields prime impact on news framing by means of the dominant ideology in
society (in our case, Islam), elite ideology or policy orientation which the
government or administration practices (in our case, the religious establishment,
awqaf departments and/or security apparatus), and media ideology by routine
journalistic practice.
De Vreese (2005:52)58 argues that frame-setting (second stage of agenda-setting)
takes place in the interaction between media frames and the predispositions and
prior knowledge of the audience. Trampota (2006:123) cited in Kalvas59, et al (no
date) contends that in the course of the framing process many participants attempt
to enforce their own point of view on the subject issue “so that it resonates with
their needs”.
The Researcher views that in a public communication setting where the dominant
ideology tend to shape the message, framing takes place through the interaction
between the preacher and his audience where the dominant ideas and views of
the worshippers in the mosque, coupled with policy orientation and regulations on
the part of the government, and the occupational ideology framed in the media
(which also set the agenda for the preacher and audience in terms of selective
salience of issues), all three factors work together to exert influence on the
58 Source: http://msap-unlam.ac.id/download/bahan__bacaan/New%20Framing.pdf
accessed on May 13th, 2015.
59 František Kalvas, head of Department of Sociology, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen.
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worshippers who listen to the sermon. In the context of popular communication,
setting the agenda by the medium (minbar) on the receiver (worshippers) is only
one side of actuality; the other side entails some degree of reciprocity between the
speaking minbar, the listening worshippers and State regulators whereby these
three variables all build up the agenda (salient issues in the sermon) and thereby
influence the public sphere.
A spillover of agenda setting is priming, defined by Iyengar & Kinder (1987)60 as
an alteration in people’s principles that they exercise to create political judgment.
This process takes place when, based on news content, audiences use specific
issues as yardsticks to assess the performance of governments and politicians. In
political communication, priming and agenda setting are a function of memory and
accessibility-based models of information processing. Diatram et al (2007) cited in
Scheufele (2000) stated that people form attitudes, judge on issues and make
decisions based on the most salient issues and those that are easy to bring to
mind. (Ibid)
In Jordan, the formation of public opinion in the religious sphere started with
mosques furnishing “cultivating” peoples’ perception of social reality. Thereof, as
of the mid sixties of the twentieth century, mass media started making certain
issues more salient in the audiences’ minds (agenda setting) - often issues that
appeal to the already cultivated norms, thereby shaping the concerns which
people tally when judging about issues and leaders. Priming is an extension to
agenda-setting, that is, by having certain issues more salient in the audiences’
intellect, media outlets and communication platforms shape the reflections that the
people consider when judging on public figures, political leaders and relevant
issues.
60 Kalvas et al citing Iyengar, S & Kinder, D. R. (1987), News that Matters. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Source: wapor.org/wp-content/uploads/.../Kalvas_Vane_Stipkova_Kreidl.doc
accessed on January 26th, 2015.
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But while the locus of effect in agenda-setting and priming lies with the intensified
accessibility which a problem gets from its handling in the news (Price &
Tewksbury, 1997), that is, whether we think of an issue, framing has to do with
how we think about it. With framing, the locus of effect lies with the particular way
these issues are presented. It refers to how the communicators use forms of
presentation to portray issues in ways which resonate with the audiences’ already
cultivated schema. It also describes how in certain issues the audiences make use
of information and presentation features as they shape their opinions and
impressions. In psychology, framing as a micro-level construct has to do with the
way communicators (in our case, preachers/Imams) present information in such a
way which resonates with the audiences’ existing schema (Shoemaker & Reese,
1996). In sociology, framing as a micro-level construct refers to the way by which
people use information and modes of presentation as they form their
consciousness on relevant issues.
Research on political-effects articulated by McQuail (2005) and labeled as
“negation effect” states that framing and priming are based on the thought that
mass media had potentially powerful attitudinal effects which to a great deal are a
function of existing predispositions and other features of the audience which in
return affect how the audience processes mass media messages. Framing contest
in religious speech goes beyond the mere premeditated mobilization of senses as
to rationalize action, build up recruitment and attain public support. What gives it
ground to perform effectively is the principle of one Islamic nation (umma) where a
Muslim is only free in as much as he/she adheres to the umma’s collective
predispositions. A similar conclusion is drawn by Borthwick (1965: chapter 5) who
views the sermon as effective as a legitimizing actor and weak as a modernizer,
adding that from an Islamic viewpoint, individual freedom is only perceived of with
respect to umma, the wider Islamic nation. Al-Shaqsi (2006) posits that,
“Framing processes include a wide range of cultural practices and
processes through which meaning is constructed and mobilized. At a
minimum, people need to identify collectively and feel aggrieved or
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successful mobilization is unlikely. Framing processes can thus provide the
sort of shared meanings necessary to facilitate social mobilization”.
Possibly, nothing resembles this framing structure more than religion; a frame by
itself, and Friday congregational prayer [which includes a sermon] is par
excellence the ideal legitimization for framing as a means to influence public
discourse. Al-Shaqsi (2006) citing Klapper (1960) embraced the utilitarian view
that factors which reconcile media messages and the audiences’ response (such
as opinion leaders’ group norms, selective perception, individual predispositions,
message diffusion through interpersonal channels, and the commercialization of
mass media) underpin the role of psychological and social elements in
understanding the end product of the media.
Lerner (1958) compared the characteristics of the audience to mass media
communications in modern societies (as anonymous, heterogeneous receiving
descriptive content by professional communicators), with the audience in
traditional societies where the communication process is based on primary group
contacts (face-to-face channel, prescriptive content uttered by hierarchical
source).
The Researcher views that mosque preachers send messages to the audience
that appeal to their cultural context. Part of this context is the legal environment
which the State has laid down, and the extent to which the State and its extended
influence can, in the preachers’ perception, exert due control over the mosque
podium as a medium for public communication. By enacting regulations to
religious speech, the government had presupposed that Friday sermon wields
impact on the mosque worshippers. The Researcher views that it is not Friday
sermon or mosque speech per se which primarily formulates the mindset of the
worshipper, but that a prevalent Islamic culture had furnished the individual frames
which guide the preacher in acting as a “cultural broker” (Antoun 1989:4), and the
worshipper in processing the religious input.
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Through partial participant observation (emic approach), the Researcher will
explore the extent to which the mosque’s main element, Friday sermon, and other
factors play role in shaping the masses’ viewpoints regarding social reality in
general, and consequently play role in undertaking conscious decisions. This
however does not necessarily presuppose that Friday sermons do address the
daily concerns of the people or propose practical solutions to their daily concerns.
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1.6. Research Questions and Hypothesis
1.6.1. Research Questions
The aforementioned furnishes for the following research questions:
- How do State institutions set the agenda for the Islamic speech in the mosque?
- What role did the consecutive laws of preaching, guidance and sermonizing at
mosques play in regulating the mosque discourse in general and in censoring the
speech of the Islamic movement through Friday prayer?
- How did the latest Amendment (2006) to the Law of Preaching, Guidance and
Sermonizing at Mosques shape or alter the speech of different Islamic
ideologies/movements via Friday sermon?
- How do religious and non-religious State figures view the change in the
influence of mosque speech over the worshippers’ opinion as a result of the 2006
Amendment?
- What social reality do sermons, outside of State intervention, present to the
sermon audience? Given that State regulations came to rectify/change something
in the normal sermon discourse, what is that normal discourse towards which the
regulations are directed?
- How does the press tackle Friday sermon, and how do interactive new media
platforms engage the users in holding different actors into account?
1.6.2. Hypothesis
The Researcher views that regulating the mosque oratory has to some extent
influenced the content of Friday sermons. This process is being effected in as
much as the preacher manages to deliver the sermon using frames that
circumvent State regulations, and aided by the notion that the historical accretion
of these frames had set the worshippers’ agenda. This is based on topics which
the preacher tackles and the attributes he gives to these issues. The preacher in
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return is bound to the expectations of his congregation, and whether consciously
or not, he selects from a gamut of interpretations to feed his sermon with content
that appeases to both State and audience. The Researcher condones the
postulation posed by Nisbet (2010:46)61 that,
“the storyteller’s preferred meanings are filtered by the predispositions of
the audience, which in return, shape their judgments and decisions”.
Frames are best described by Erving Goffman (1974) cited in D’angelo (p. 45) as
“schemata of interpretation” that allows individuals to situate, make sense of,
categorize and brand issues, events and topics. Therefore, words prompt the
audience to confer meaning through the lens of the prevailing cultural beliefs and
worldviews. Price and Tewksbury's (1997)62 contend that for a message frame to
be effective it has to be relevant and applicable to a definite existing interpretive
representation which the audience obtained through social learning.
In a religious setting, frames are most influential when they resonate with strongly
held perceptual lenses of the worshippers who would generate strong feelings
about another value constructs which the preacher has suddenly presented as
salient and relevant to the congregation.
The ensuing parts of the study, validated through partial participant observation,
will try to answer the question of whether this agenda of the preacher, as one actor
in the wider religious establishment, is being transformed to become the agenda
and the attitudes of the mosque congregation.
61 Matthew C. Nisbet (2010), Knowledge into Action: Framing the Debates over Climate Change
and Poverty. Chapter Three: Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical






accessed on June 23rd, 2015.
62 Ibid.
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A general observation by Ottaway63 states that a common feature which
categorizes Muslim parties in Arab countries (including Jordan) is their failure to
persuade people they can come up with better responses than anyone else. The
Muslim Brotherhood, the foremost influential Islamic movement in Jordan which
relies on the mosque to influence its grassroots base, has allegedly failed to
deliver a mosque speech convincing enough to garner public support, especially
after the political setback the movement had suffered in the 2007 parliamentary
elections64. However, these elections were later on admitted of being subject to
rigging and fraud65. The problem does not lie with the mosque per se, as polls
conducted in 2008 show the vast majority of Jordanian youth placing their trust in
national institutions such as worship places and the zakat fund. On the other hand,
in social integration/self group identity only one third self-identify with the Islamic
religion, two thirds believe slogans launched in society do not represent their
ambitions, and as low as three percent say they are members in religious
institutions66. Therefore, religious allegiance of the movement’s public base is only
conditionally associated to the movement. State regulations (mainly the 2006
Amendment) expelled the movement’s preachers from the mosque minbar, but
their speech was already void of content that carries real elements of change and
in keeping with the State policy of co-optation. Following the 2006 Amendment
63 Marina Ottaway, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, quoted in F. Gregory
Gause III (2009), Islamists and the Grave Bell, from the September October 2009 issue of The
National Interest.
Source: http://www.nationalinterest.org/PRINTERFRIENDLY.aspx/id=22036
accessed on October 20th, 2009.
64 See notes by Gause (2009) in supra footnote, and Abu Rumman (2007) p.68.
65 Source: http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/17/jordan-s-elections-observer-s-view/37d6
accessed on June 04th, 2013.
66 Shteiwi (2008), Jordanian Youth: Attitudes, Values and Perceptions - a social survey conducted
between 17-30 August, 2008 on a national sample of 2000 youth from across the Kingdom aging
between (18-30). [“A questionnaire was developed, presented to a committee of experts and tested
before conducting the field survey”]. This age group comprises almost 40 percent of the population
according to official statistics.
Source: http://www.dos.gov.jo/sdb_pop/sdb_pop_e/index.htm
accessed on October 24th, 2010.
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which was induced for political purposes, the State retained its legal sanctions and
the movement was taken aback as it has lost its platform necessary to enlist public
support. Apparently, the Amendment ostensibly affected an already void and
bombastic rhetoric, while reducing the movement’s ability to utilize the mosque,
and left the pious to the detriment of state-friendly ill-educated preachers67.
Khalifeh Al-Dayat, former mayor of Deir Alla municipality in Jordan Valley told the
Researcher the State has had to enlist support by mosque servants to take over
the function of the main Imam and preacher, an action which has inflicted even
more on the quality of sermons.
Askari (1974) views that as a means of public communication, the khatib
[preacher] uses Friday congregational prayer to support certain policies, awaken
public sentiments, or spread utter propaganda68. Durkheim, Marx, Radcliffe-Brown
and Bloch cited in Antoun (1989:125) view that religious symbols and rituals serve
either to reflect the norms of society or to emphasize them and confirm social
structural claims. The sermon which this writer analyzed does not merely reflect
the prevalent “patri-oriented” community in the village, but emphasizes rahm
[kinship] as an alternative symbol delivered by the preacher and deemed minor in
the lives of 1960s’ Jordanian villagers.
Official surveillance to mosque speech has not been totally effective in controlling
the speech of other evasive Muslim groups who eschew involvement in political
life and rely on face-to-face interaction through informal networks. Jarrar (2009:66)
viewed that to some extent, the State’s restrictive legislations tend to control the
reach of radical Islamists, diminish their discourse and its mobilizing outcome on
mainstream Islamists; nonetheless, fundamentalists will always try to find other
informal structures to spread their message of change.
As the vast majority of Jordanians express high level of religiosity, the State’s
67 As per comment by a retired security officer to a study by the Researcher on June 04th, 2013
68 As cited in Fathi (1981).
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public policy is to curtail Islamic opposition and activism through regulating Friday
sermons, based on its security-driven assumption that sermons have an impact on
people’s attitudes. However, content analysis to Friday sermons which the
Researcher has attended reveals these sermons are disconnected from the
concerns of people and their life-felt needs at the practical level. Abu Rumman
(2007:62) concludes that the Muslim Brotherhood movement’s take on foreign
policy is unrealistic, and all through its history it has failed to provide a viable
strategy to develop and reform the economy; its discourse representing general
principles and ideals rather than pragmatic political alternatives. Hashem
(2009:13) states that,
“the degree to which khutbas stay close to Islamic texts and do not venture
much into the texts’ possible horizons is quite striking. In fact most khutbas,
and the larger part of any khutba, are typically geared toward preaching
what Muslims already know.”
Through cultural immersion, the Researcher herewith investigates whether this
public policy of “legal deterrence” posed by Jarrar (2009:32) has or has not
affected the attitudes of the worshippers at mosques and their adherence to the
mosque speech as reference in shaping their worldviews. What shapes the
opinion of the worshipper and sustains religiosity in society, albeit not translated
into parallel involvement in religious services, is an array of historically cultivated
factors that formulate the communal religious space. Friday sermons embedded in
those “other factors” constitute only one and not the predominantly effective factor.
Hannah, et al (2008) categorized radicalized mosques, prisons and educational
institutions as the three nodes for radical Islam, with more leverage given to
prisons in the case of radical Muslims69. An unpublished and classified survey
conducted for a State entity in Jordan in 2008 and disclosed by a friend of the
Researcher shows that in a paternal religious society the least of reference for the
youth are the father and Imam, while peers and the mother top the list.
69 Source: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR571.pdf
accessed on October 18th, 2010.
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In the absence of examples on sermons prior to the 2006 Amendment to the law,
this portion of the research will expand on and try to clarify to what extent have
State regulations affected the way worshippers take the Imam and his sermon as
reference in their views about social reality and in undertaking life-felt decisions.
The Researcher intends to investigate these “other factors” by means of
participant observation with a limited number of worshippers at mosques in central
Jordan (Amman and Zarqa, two major and socioeconomically interconnected
cities). The objective is to validate, invalidate or ponder(ate) the supra perception
of policy makers based on the premise that the content of Friday sermons does
not significantly affect the mindset of the worshipper at the mosque, and Friday
congregational sermon is more of a religious ritualistic practice than a stylebook to
deal with life-felt issues.
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1.7. Data Collection and Analysis, Methodology
The Researcher resorted to quantitative and qualitative research methods, using
the following five tools for observation, data collection and analysis:
1.7.1. In-depth interviews with concerned actors
Interviews were mostly conducted face to face, audio-recorded then transcribed
from Arabic into English. Out of the 14 interviews only one interviewee (Abu
Mohammad al-Maqdisi, the jihadist salafi doctrinaire) asked the audio interview be
deleted after transcription for security reasons. Interviewees were mosque Imams,
government officials (actual and former), members of parliament, and
worshippers/attendants of Friday sermon.
Interviewees were chosen according to their direct role in legislating relevant
regulations or being subject to these regulations. One interview would lead the
Researcher to another and pinpoint to other potential actors; a snow-ball method.
The Researcher faced the technical difficulty of transcribing these numerous
interviews; time management as certain actors were busy (i.e. deputies during the
sitting parliament); and red tape with regard to interviews with State figures. Some
target interviewees apologized or declined to answer back, especially those close
to decision making circles or the Royal Court.
Several interviewees commended this study as missing and very much needed in
the Jordanian context, although some State officials posed concern and
questioned the motives behind delving in this subject by the Researcher.
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1.7.2. Thematic content analysis of Friday sermons
Although this study took place after the Amendment to the laws that regulate
mosque speech was enacted in 2006, therefore incomparability of prior versus
post-Amendment content, thematic content analysis of Friday sermons and media
coverage on relevant issues is a core data collection method in this study.
Sreberni & Mohammadi (1994) highlight the analysis of communications as the
ideal way to investigate the dynamics of social change as it sheds light on the
development of opposition vis-a-vis State repression.
1.7.3. A stock analysis of news coverage (print and online)
The Researcher tracked news on mosque-related issues, with focus on the
interactive feedback by readers/users of the mushrooming electronic websites,
many of whom are worshippers at mosques. Mosque regulations were enacted
concomitantly with laws aimed at "terrorism", in addition to regulations targeting
the media, therefore the natural tendency of people to use new media and social
media to express their different views. This platform for disseminating news and
opinions by users takes precedence as Internet penetration ratio is on the rise in
Jordan70.
1.7.4. Participant Observation
The Researcher carries out a partial participant observation limited to visiting the
mosque to attend Friday congregational sermon, listen to the sermon, relate the
70 In April 2011, Internet penetration rate reached 38 percent of the population as per The
Telecommunications Regulatory Commission. By 2015 it reached 76 percent.
Sources: http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=84104 and
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/internet-penetration-rises-76-cent-q1
accessed on October 16th, 2015.
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content of the sermon to the political and social and legal milieus, seek the
background of the speech, delineate correlations, and apply the effects to the
personal behavior of the accompanying Informants (three in total).
Following the Martian perspective (Genzuk 2003: 3), and while trying to
understand the observed setting, the Researcher would also attempt to see the
normal setting as seen by someone from a different background, be it social or
religious, given the insider (Informant) is accustomed to the setting and thus may
not notice it, while the observer (the Researcher) views things from an angle which
the insider may not notice or question. This does not imply the Researcher
becoming a full member of the group under observation, rather attempts to gain an
insider and outsider’s perspective by staying at the edge of the observed
community.
The Researcher carried out this field study between January and July 2011 at
different mosques in the Greater Amman area. This was possible thanks to help
rendered by “privileged informants” limited to the foregoing three regular
worshippers; the only persons who readied to participate, while others declined
due to the sensitivity of the subject, inability to commit oneself to a lengthy study,
or personal unfamiliarity with the Researcher. In this sense (limited time span and
number of Informants), this constitutes a partial participant observation field study,
but central in correlating conclusions by other methodologies used in this study.
This study has not been subsidized and the Researcher did not pay the informants
any honorarium in exchange of their participation, nor did they ask for such
remuneration. The aim of the investigation is to develop an insider's view of what
is happening during Friday congregational prayer, to experience the environment
and correlate it with the sermon, and to feel what it is like to be a worshipper. That
is, to use partial participant observation as a unique means to understand how the
audiences interact with the sermon and its context, including coming into terms
with the regulating law and its influence.
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Encounters in mosques and social mingling with the informants, whenever
possible, helped the Researcher sense and understand certain behaviors and
reactions by the preacher, worshipper and the State with regards to the influence
of the sermon and the context that engulfs it. These observations become all the
more important when certain outcomes of quantitative nature give an impersonal
image of the subject and deconstruct the religious sphere, whereas the actuality
begs an interpretation of a qualitative nature. Thus, the outcomes of this part of the
study helped the Researcher validate, invalidate or ponderate certain results and
findings by other research tools of the study, especially when using quantitative
tools which lack an in-depth and qualitative approach such as the questionnaire.
Apart from an old but scarce and significant study by Richard Antoun (1989), the
Researcher is most likely the first Arab Christian to conduct such a study in
Jordan, therefore being faced with concerns posed by family members and
acquaintances given the "cultural immersion" required to conduct this peculiar
study, which even Muslim scholars would not indulge in. The fact that "privileged
informants" have had to accompany the Researcher during visits to the mosques
would sometimes compound the debacle as one Informant is affiliated with the
jihadist salafi thought, at times was known as target to the security apparatus.
A friendly and cooperative spirit prevailed between the Researcher (a Jordanian
Christian), and each of the three Informants. The degree of receptiveness was the
same even with SJ who has a salafi jihadist penchant, supposedly the most radical
among them. SJ had been banned from preaching in mosques given that in one of
his sermons he urged the worshippers not to greet Christians on their holidays.
The Researcher was active in advocating the release of detained jihadist recruits
in Jordan, whether on social media or through sit-ins, and answered a demand by
SJ to join 100 Jordanian figures in signing a public petition demanding the release
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of jihadist prisoners in Jordan71. Also, SJ would also seek the Researcher’s advice
on the best way to portray the jihadists’ protests in the wake of the Arab Spring.
SJ was all receptive to the idea of the Researcher praying with him at mosques,
although he knew such a prayer was void unless the non-Moslem proclaimed al-
shahadatayn72. This fiqh point was later clarified during a visit the two conducted
on February 15th, 2010 to the doctrinaire of the salafi jihadist movement, Abu
Muhammad Al Maqdisi.
Only one Informant (MA) invited the Researcher to embrace Islam,
notwithstanding his rather moderate perception of Islam as compared to SJ. This
could be attributed to the fact that MA was a member of a dawa group active in his
neighborhood. When asked whether this invitation was driven by his own
conviction or upon urge by the Imam, MA replied, “both".
From the forgoing incident one can infer that fellow worshippers and the preacher
are influential on the worshipper’s perception of the other regardless of the school
of thought the worshipper belongs to, as long as the worshipper can reconcile his
own convictions with guidance by the Imam or preacher.
The third Informant (AA) expressed his acceptance of Christians notwithstanding
his rivalry to the Shiite sect, primarily based on the teachings of the mosque
preacher. His position towards the “other” can be understood as an attempt to
prove his being a devout Muslim by slamming other Muslim sects deemed as
heresies. This was the part of the sermon AA remembered most. Thus, a Christian
71 Source: http://ar.ammannet.net/?p=131598
accessed on December 15th, 2011.
72 The shahadatayn is to publicly declare “There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the
messenger of God”.
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does not constitute a problem for AA although the former does not admit the
prophecy of Mohammad.
It should be noted here that a feeling of receptiveness to the Researcher was
evident through reciprocal visitations to informants’ homes; keenness about the
Researcher's safety and his belongings while inside the mosque; beseeching
Allah's blessings on him during pilgrimage to Mecca (by MA); introduction to
mutual friends and going to visit them; initiation of phone calls and suggestions to
visit mosques; keenness not to cause nuisance in commuting to the mosque;
facilitating the recording of some sermons; and the notion that before his onset to
pilgrimage in Mecca, MA called the Researcher asking to clear himself of any
moral debt or hurt that he might have caused so as to fulfill a clean duty according
to the teachings of Islam.
These observations contradict with what how some preachers label Christians in
their sermons, and denote that worshippers either do not act upon hate speech
(which had driven the State to amend pertinent regulations), or do not take this
content as targeting Jordanian Christians, but "Western crusaders".
The aforementioned remarks possibly indicate that what the State deems as “hate
speech” by some preachers does not translate into a blanket detestation of the
“other” by the worshippers in mundane life. One can also construe that the 2006
Amendment to the law did not stem from the government’s alleged need to combat
hate speech, as former MP Emad Maayah alleged in the interview73, but from
other undisclosed purposes.
73 See the interview in Chapter Six.
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1.7.5. Questionnaire
The Researcher carried out a qualitative survey, not a quantitative one, although it
resorts to quantitative data to infer qualitative relationships between variables by
means of correlating this data with data produced by other research tools of the
study [in-depth interviews, participant observation, analysis of the media
coverage], therefore illuminating the working out of the analysis in a detailed
fashion.
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1.8. Research Sample
In the content analysis part, the Researcher attended and recorded Friday
sermons in 24 different mosques between June and December 2008 in the
Greater Amman area and Zarqa city, this is two years after the enactment of the
Amendment to the Law of Preaching and Guidance at Mosques in 2006 (thereon,
the Law). This area is being chosen for research practicality as it constitutes more
than 50 percent of the population, and the peculiar nature of Zarqa as a hotbed for
several Islamist movements and its diversified demography. Mosques are being
chosen according to their proximity and accessibility, or following the choice of the
accompanying research enthusiasts/ worshippers.
Regarding the press coverage, the Researcher tracked news published in
Jordan’s five main daily newspapers, official Petra News Agency, and several
online newspapers or electronic websites, in addition to readers’ comments
especially on changing law regulations. The aim was to view how much salient
news and comments by readers and officials corroborate or contradict with
research findings.
As for the participant observation part, the Researcher asked twelve mosque-
goers and Imams to help him find out four people plus one Imam ready to spend
time with and study their behavior, each representing different religious affinity and
social strata. Most of the volunteers declined due to the stretched period of study
(six months), and the only available Imam apologized due to his ailing health. The
Researcher was thus left with only three Informants; two who work as taxi drivers,
with no particular affinity to any religious group, and the other one works as a
journalist/editor informally affiliated to the jihadist salafi movement. As to their level
of income, one Informant is a middle class citizen, and the other two can be
classified in the lower middle class stratum, all married and between 30 and 50
years old. The period of investigation spanned between January-June 2011 with
some interruptions due to time limitations of the Informants, and pressure by the
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Researcher’s parents and family members especially after his involvement in after
Friday sermon sit-ins by the salafi jihadist movement and reform activists between
May and June 2011.
The Researcher follows and strives to adhere to the methodological principles of
participant observation-based research outlined by Genzuk (2003:374) deemed fit
to the local context of this study. The Researcher here below states these
principles, justification of why there were used and how they helped the
Researcher understand the different aspects of the study which were not possible
to identify with had the project been limited to the other tools.
1) Naturalism: the researcher can best carry out the research and capture human
behavior of the worshippers by "first-hand contact" as opposed to inferences from
"artificial settings" such as what the actors would say in interviews about what,
how and why they behave elsewhere. In order to make it possible to generalize
the discovered results to other similar settings, the Researcher strives to as much
as possible reduce his influence on the behavior of the Informant. Naturalism also
implies that events and processes should be interpreted in light of how they relate
to the context in which they occur. The Researcher came to this conclusion after
having asked fifteen worshippers upon their exit from the mosque74 about the
sermon theme which they and the Researcher have just attended; none of the
inquired worshippers could answer the question! The reason could be that these
people are not accustomed to broach such a question in such a setting, or that
they were absentminded during the sermon (as some interviewees opined; see
Chapter Six).
Thus far, the best way to discover whether a worshipper can remember the theme
of the sermon and its influence on him is to co-live the moment with him, feel him
and observe his behavior and opinions inside and outside the mosque.
74 An-Nasr Mosque in Amman on August 01st, 2008.
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2) Understanding: in order to effectively explain actions by the worshipper, a
researcher must understand the underpinning cultural perspectives. Although the
social setting being studied is of time and space proximity to the Researcher (a
Jordanian Christian), the Researcher had never been to a mosque or close to the
life of a worshipper right after his participation in a Friday congregational sermon.
Nevertheless, this gives the Researcher the benefit of averting the construction of
an a priori miscomprehension because the setting is familiar. Therefore, the
Researcher tends to ask questions and raise issues albeit their being familiar to
him as a fellow citizen.
3) Discovery: in lieu of approaching the setting being studied and the resulting
phenomena with a set of predispositions and hypothesis, thereby being chained by
these assumptions, the Researcher would instead construct hypothesis and
theoretical ideas that explain and lay down a frame of the ensuing observations as
they unfold over the course of the research. Therefore, the field study is
exploratory and can be modified as it proceeds instead of being constrained by an
a priori approach. The objective is to analyze each of the above queries at first-
hand level and deconstruct the underpinning factors so as to come out with a
logical and consistent conclusion as to what shapes the opinion of the folk
worshipper in Jordan.
The Researcher faced several obstacles which to some extent limited a full-fledge
field research as desired. These are- limited time available for the participant
Informants (two of them who work as taxi drivers and finish their tedious work late
in the evening and want to be with family); limited financial resources as most
encounters require going to a café to extrapolates; pressure by kinship and family
members who deem this work endangering to the Researcher's security especially
when covering street protests or mingling with jihadist salafi operatives; in addition
to the psychological notion that praying at mosques while not adhering to the
Muslim faith is deemed as sheer hypocrisy.
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The three Informants who participated in this study constitute an “opportunistic
sample”75. The Researcher herewith refers to these participants in pseudo initials
in adherence to ethical and professional codes related to participant observation
research criteria. These Informants are:
1) MA: a 40 years old taxi driver from Amman; media activist; Jordanian of
Palestinian origin; lower middle class stratum; married to one woman; father of
four children; high school education; no particular political or religious affinity.
2) AA: a 40 years old taxi driver from Amman; lower middle class stratum;
Jordanian of Palestinian origin; married to one woman; father of three children;
high school education; introduced to the researcher by MA; no particular political
or religious affinity.
3) SJ: a 35 years old from Amman who works a language editor in an Islamist
newspaper; lower middle class stratum; Jordanian of Palestinian origin; married to
one woman; father of three children; high school education; close to the jihadist
salafi movement.
In the course of the tools being used, the Researcher analyses salient behaviors
and tendencies by these Informants. The aim is to uncover idiosyncrasies
germane to the Informant [worshipper] regarding the following angles: his choice
of the mosque, association with fellow worshippers, attitude towards the
Researcher, association with friends and family members, personal behavior,
religious authority reference, and State and the mosque.
75 Antoun (1989:196) defines an opportunistic sample as a convenient sample of available
informants willing to answer the questions.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
2.1. A Historical Background/ Political and Legal Context
The Law of Preaching, Guidance, Sermonizing and Teaching at Mosques (“Law”)
dates back to 1955. Prior to this period, an embryonic Muslim Brotherhood
movement in Jordan utilized the mosques to organize meetings in urban centers76.
Boulby (1999) viewed that the movement’s main recruitment vehicle was the usra
(family) of which it would seek out recruits mainly at mosques. Given Jordanians
were bereft of other influential institutions, the mosque constituted their major
venue for culture and education across the towns of Transjordan. The ensuing
period of Jordan’s history was an era of political upheaval in the region77. The
Muslim Brotherhood and the tahrir party stayed out of the Congress78, although
the constitution, promulgated in 1952 sketched down people’s basic rights such as
equality before the law, freedom of conscience, freedom to conduct religious
ceremonies, individual liberty, freedom of opinion, right to property, the right to
hold public assemblies and to establish political parties.
Abu Rumman (2007:19) describes the 1950s and 1960s as reflecting the
inception, introduction, establishment and ongoing growth of the movement in
76 (Mitchel, The Society, 9, cited in Boulby 1999:42)
77 Dann (1989) contended that King Hussein Bin Talal (1953-1999) believed that, “nothing but brute
force applied at once – with minimal time allowed for preparation- could save him and the
Hashemite state from disaster. The [Patriotic] Congress spanned the opposition that had identified
with the Nabulsi administration: the government coalition of National Socialists, Ba’ath and
Communist, Independents connected with Amin al-Husayni; and the Qawmiyeen [pan-Arab
nationalists]” (pp.60-64).
78 Boulby (1999) viewed that “the former had thrown in their lot with Hussein for the time being, and
the latter disliked identifying with secularists of any hue…Martial law, proclaimed under the
provisions of the 1952 constitution, was applied widely… The American government had from the
first accepted Hussein’s claim to be an aggressive fighter against Communism, and it had
encouraged him to shore up his stand”.
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society as they disseminated their dawa (propagation of Islam) by investing in
mosques, schools and benevolent activities. The State’s response was to bolster
the movement against the influential nationalist-leftist front of the 1950 and 1960s,
and the rise of the Palestinian factions in the 1970s. Boulby (1999:159) describes
the 1960s and 1970s as a period when the movement would put up a communal
support base by establishing its own bodies and the permeation of Ministries such
as education, and religious affairs. The dynamics of the relationship between the
State and the movement enabled the latter to shore up its popular base, build its
public welfare system, social networks, electoral platform, and press on to a peak
of alliance before heading down to crisis both internally and with the regime. Al-
Horani et al (199719 & 276)79 stated that the Prime Minister issued a decree
allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to propagate its dawa at mosques and public
fora with no interference by the security apparatus, save in the case of law
violation by the movement which persuaded its crowds against the communists
and left-wing parties by means of sermons delivered at the mosques and other
podiums. To contain the influence of the communists, Boulby (1999:20) stated that
King Hussein80 managed to solicit the movement’s support, thereby fortifying an
unstated coalition with it which would stand the test of time through the 1980s.
Bearing in mind that Islam is the country’s official religion, successive Jordanian
governments took notice of the influence of the mosque khatib (preacher) on
public opinion and realized the important benefits or perils proceeding from the
mosque podium. Gole (2002:173) stated that Islam carves out its own public
space as new Islamic discourse, communal rituals, and traditions materialize and
mix into public life. In the ensuing period, this public space thus far been controlled
by state-inhibited discourse on Islam and its various manifestations came to be
challenged by a competing version of Islamic discourse, values and behaviors. In
an interview conducted with Abdullah Uqaylah on July 26th, 1992 and cited in
79 Transliteration by the Researcher from the original Arabic text.
80 The Hashemite dynasty in Jordan claims to be the offspring of Prophet Mohammad.
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Boulby (1999:77), the former Muslim Brotherhood figure contended that during
their campaigns for the 1989 and 1993 parliamentary elections, the movement
would,
“organize and mobilize support through “institutional infrastructures of
mosques, schools, university campuses and medical centers, as well as
through the use of big assemblies, discussion meetings, and street
banners”81
Ibrahim Zeid al Kilani, a prominent figure of the movement and Minister of Awqaf
in 1990 attributed his success in the 1993 parliamentary elections to the Friday
sermons he used to deliver82. Mosques constituted a disputed arena for amassing
support whether by the movement or the regime. Jarrar (2009:46&64) contended
that the security apparatus utilized mosques to persuade and recruit young jihadist
fighters to head to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet occupation forces. Not long
before the war on terror in the wake of the September 11, 2001 events, opposition
trends including Islamists explained that public opinion reached an unmatched
state of concurrence to contest the uncontestable political, social and economic
policies of the state. The regime would retaliate by passing and enacting new
legislative measures to reassert the dominance of official Islam over public space,
thereby containing the movement’s speech within other, non-public spheres.
Boulby (1999:116) viewed that the motives that stand behind the government
targeting the movement in the 1989-1993 period were the latter’s large social base
and considerable representation in parliament, its agenda to Islamize society, and
its backing of improved pluralism, public freedoms and calls to hold the
governments accountable. Abu Rumman (2007:76) contended that the movement
81 Waterbury (A Political Economy, 131) cited in Boulby (1999:83) stated “The school, like the
mosque, has the advantage of being an institution within which it is very difficult for authorities to
control political activities among people who congregate in a perfectly legal manner.” While an
article published in Jordan Times in June 19th, 1992 refers to a governmental decree banning
prayers in open spaces.
82 Reference - Al Ghad newspaper, p. 14 (04/07/2010). See Annex I, p.7.
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was unable to rise above the effects of state policies to do away with the
movement’s civil society networks, or adapt and come up with alternative
strategies to serve its grassroots. This tradeoff between popularity and change on
the ground was not something easily attainable for the movement. Hamid
(2005:10) viewed that the Islamic Action Front as operating openly but under
scrutiny by the media. IAF was required to synchronize oratory and practice, a
stance which predictably proved almost impossible as it lacked vital guidance,
unambiguous vision, and readiness to risk the dissatisfaction of its popular base,
henceforth the IAF finding itself in a political limbo incapable of mapping out a
clear policy for the future. The Researcher views that this intransigence in IAF’s
policy and mother movement reflected on its discourse in the mosque, ultimately
propping up the level of contestation with the State which, moved by other
objective motives, resorted to regulate the Law as a means to control the religious
sphere.
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2.2. State and Religiosity
Abu Rumman (2011) describes the Jordanian model in managing the relationship
between State and religiosity as that of "conservative secularism"83. Antoun
(1989:189) upholds this point positing that policies of modernizing the state in a
secular fashion are apace without a parallel decline in the reach of religion in
society. According to this political model, the State, historically sustained since its
inception in 1921, pursued a formula of "balances" by avoiding both strong linkage
and direct confrontation between State and religion. While the regime did not base
its legitimacy on sheer religious reference, it has not given up on the religious
dimension of internal policies, and to a lesser degree external policies. Abu
Rumman adds that these "balances" were reflected in the constitution (religion of
the State is Islam, but the nation is the source of all powers), and on the State's
relationship with the Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, when it allowed
them to register and enabled them to reach out and influence society. However,
this formula retained a visible whitespace and sometimes intellectual clash with
movements call to instate an Islamic state. The State maintained a clear distance
from the Movement's discourse and ideology, or engaging in policies subject to
religious considerations in determining political interests. In contrast, the
government issued instructions and regulations affirming respect for Islamic
sentiments, as happens in the fasting month of Ramadan when nightclubs are
closed and eating in public and the sale alcohol is banned. The author concludes
that State policy towards the Islamists is generally subject to purely political and
security considerations, and does not affect religious and doctrinal dimensions of
these groups save in aspects where they would lead to security problems or social
tension, thereby the State avoiding unnecessary collision with the public mood. At
the same time, Abu Rumman views that there is a "strategic cautiousness"
approach towards these movements, even regarding movements working within
83 The Jordanian Model in Managing the Relationship between Religion and State. Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, 2011, Amman, Jordan (translation from the Arabic version).
عن مؤسسة فردریش ایبرت،عمان، األردن2011الدین والدولة، نشر عام النموذج األردني في ادارة العالقة بین : العلمانیة المحافظة
Source: http://www.judran.net/?p=964 accessed on January 28th, 2015.
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the official circles and state interests given the fact that all these movements,
although differing in tactics, they all share the dream of establishing an Islamic
state. According to the supra study, there are two "kitchens" which draw the state
policy towards religiosity. One is the "security kitchen", concerned mainly with the
security side in relation to the religious establishment such as the awqaf (Islamic
endowments), shari'a colleges and the Islamic rooted charity works. This "kitchen"
prioritizes considerations of social, political and security stability, ensuring that in
managing these institutions they do not go astray of the line of official policies as in
the mosques since there are "established links" with respect to Friday sermons,
preaching lessons and the Holy Quran memorizing centers. The other "kitchen" is
attached to the Royal Court and headed by Prince Ghazi bin Mohammad,
concerned mainly with the academic and cognitive aspect, in addition to
overseeing the appointment of directors of religious institutions such as the
supreme judge, general mufti, minister of awqaf, and presidents of the Islamic
universities. Nevertheless, Abu Rumman contends that to date, there is no formal
council with clear and defined powers to delineate the policy of the State towards
religiosity and which sets forth development stages of State institutions involved in
this field, a fact which impairs any steps taken towards building a religious
message of the State. The Researcher here below refers to one vivid example of
this imparity. In November 2004, King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein initiated the
Amman Message (“AM”) which sought to,
“declare what Islam is and what it is not, and what actions represent it and
what actions do not… to clarify to the modern world the true nature of Islam
and the nature of true Islam”84.
This blueprint for tolerant Islam was later on imbued with religious authority by
fatwas (pl. of fatwa- a legal religious ruling or edict) issued by the World leading
ulama (senior Islamic scholars) whom by July 2006 endorsed the AM’s
fundamental rulings recognizing the legitimacy of Islam’s eight madh’habs (legal
84 Source: http://ammanmessage.com
accessed on September 01st, 2010
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methodologies) and precisely defining who is a Muslim, prohibiting takfir
(disavowing others as apostates) amongst Muslims, and setting forth the
standards and prerequisites for fatwa issuance. In this regards, Price (1994:670)
puts forth the notion that,
“Legislation is commonly used by the controlling group or groups in the
market to enforce and reinforce identities useful to them”.
The AM is sought to be instituted, spread and implemented through diverse
pragmatic channels such as- to endorse legislations with the supra Three Points of
the AM to define Islam and outlaw takfir as religious reference; forge inter-Islamic
treaties; and disseminate the message through the wide use of publishing and
multi-media, school curricula and university courses, and the training of mosque
Imams to include it in their sermons.
In what appeared to be a tactical stance (Jarrar 2009:27), the Muslim Brotherhood
Movement of Jordan, the main opposition front, announced in 2006 its adherence
to the AM85. Boukhars (2006:5) illustrates the Movement’s general purpose, and
the regime’s counter policy as,
“the development of a broadly based and active Islamist civil society which
would potentially lead to the establishment of an Islamist state… The
regime tolerated the Brotherhood’s pragmatic dissent while seeking to
utilize its flexibility and ideological weight to discredit the most radical,
uncompromising Salafis”.
Amongst factors that explain the escalating crisis between the Jordanian regime
and the Movement, Abu Rumman (2007:29) pinpoints to the fact that the latter had
evolved as the most influential shaper of public opinion in the Kingdom which
drove the state security apparatus wary of their strength and expanding popularity.
Abu Rumman & Abu Hanieh (2009) state that takfir was one of the recent threats
85 Source:
http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=35
accessed on September 01st, 2010.
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to Jordanian national security which drove the State to redefine and globalize its
security strategy to confront the globalized Jihad86. Among the new strategies
which the State has adopted was further focus to crack down on the principle of
takfir through banning extremists from participating in public fora or in religious
institutions. Knowing the impact mosques have on citizens87, the Jordanian
parliament also enacted laws regulating sermons delivered at mosques or any
other public forums that advocate terrorism, and criminalizing any type of calling
to, encouraging or abetting terrorism. Abu Rumman & Abu Hanieh
(2009:156&158)) alluded to publishing the “Amman Letter” [Message] as,
“an example of the kind of instruments that would be used in intellectually
confronting extremist thinking on the one hand, and for presenting Jordan
as the role model and representative of “Moderate Islam”, on the other”.
Jarrar (2009:27) contended that on the outset, AM was an ideologically refined
retaliation to the misrepresentation of Islam by Osama Bin-Laden and Al Qaeda
followers, but it also exposed a new route in tackling the political opposition,
especially the Islamic movement, its foreign adherence, and in essence its part in
amassing extremist political opposition to achieve the movement’s political
objectives,
“Most importantly, it placed parameters for the issuance of religious edicts
fatwas which radical Islamists use as a vehicle to spread their ideology,
including the takfiri ideology i.e. to declare a person an apostate. In the
immediate term, the Message was a benign effort to counteract and reduce
86 The word jihad connotes “holy war” in Islam. The verb jaahada means “to strive or struggle in the
path of God”. Inward jihad refers to “the personal struggle to become a better Muslim” while the
outer jihad is “the effort to make one’s society reflect the principles of submission to God… Muslims
commonly use the term jihadists for those who engage in this outer struggle with violence”. Source:
Confronting Misoislamia, p. 119-120, (Hussain, A) cited in Teaching Religion and Violence
(Pennington 2012) Oxford University Press, Inc.
http://books.google.jo/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7BW_RA-
7AtQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA118&dq=jack%2Bshaheen%2Bsermon&ots=qxBdzvwOZ_&sig=lSW-
xyV54t5gBFdhIznelwMbWFQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false accessed on August 05th,
2014.
87 According to official data, Imams and preachers meet with 1.5 million citizens of different society
strata every week. See Annex I, p.16.
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the political credibility of radical Islamists. Thus, it lacked the legal
framework or teeth to delegitimize such acts by making it a crime
punishable under the law”.
This view is further corroborated by Al-Rousan (2009: 220) who contends that the
government promoted AM through mosque podiums as a tool to,
"to ferret out the discourse of violence and terrorism and instill a discourse
of tolerance in its place".
However, from the political parties' point of view this move is being interpreted as
clampdown on freedoms. In the short run, the AM was a gentle attempt to thwart
and diminish the political authority of Islamic fundamentalists. Hence, it did not
possess legal support or strength to delegitimize and legally criminalize their acts.
In addition, it did not succeed in attracting noteworthy audiences, especially
among Jordanians because it was a top-down scheme propagated by a pro-
Western king88 deemed as lacking sufficient credibility as a religious point of
reference in the Muslim world to issue this counter discourse. Jordan’s close
alliance with the US has watered down such initiative to a mere pro-American
propaganda89. Another failure reason for the AM is the nucleus of Al-Qaeda
cadres and its dedicated ranks of associated radical groups who have proved
unaffected by counter-ideological speech and received it as an offensive
discourse. The ensuing years witnessed a basket of legislations and policies
enacted by the Jordanian state aimed at curtailing the strength of the movement
including new regulations targeting preaching and guidance at mosques. The
importance of mosques as informal social podiums used to disseminate religiosity
and rally communal action became more evident with the amending laws that
88 Jarrar (2009) contends that “King Abdullah implicitly acknowledged this in a speech in
Washington D.C. in September 2005 in which he noted that “God willing, [the Amman Message]
will expand to engage the popular preachers and grassroots activists -- what is called the (Muslim
street)” Quoted in Jordan Times, September 14 2005. (p.27&28)
89 US Ambassador to Jordan Robert Stephen Beecroft visited Ministry of Awqaf and commended it
for conducting workshops to mosque Imams on the Amman Message.
Source (http://www.alrai.com/pages.php?news_id=359856). See Annex II, p.21.
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regulate the media and publications. Governments in Islamic countries know the
role mosques can be used to foment social and political change. Kifner (1989:1)
cited in Sreberni & Mohammadi (1994) contends that,
"in the Iranian revolution, new technology spread the word of Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, first through tape cassettes telephoned from abroad
and played over mosque loudspeakers".
This requires the state to regulate religious speech and control its outreach. Jarrar
(2009:31) attributes the motive which drove the Jordanian state to regulate
communal religious space as to help thwart the diffusion of non-conformist Islamic
views thereby restraining oppositional figures from utilizing public religious
platforms to rally dissent.
The Researcher herewith depicts a case where the ministry of awqaf replies back
to a letter to the editor by a reader objecting incitements to women via mosque
podiums, saying,
“The ministry was taken aback by the newspaper publishing this article
before sending it first to the ministry or asking its opinion. This action is
unfamiliar with a well respected newspaper”90
This opinion by the officialdom denounces a mainstream newspaper publishing an
objection by a citizen, expecting all state-friendly assets to back its policies by
obscuring information to the public; a notion the state is keen not to stoke public
opinion when it comes to its dominion over the religious sphere.
90 Al Rai Newspaper, 30/10/2010.
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2.3. The Mosque as a Religio-Spatial Setting
Antoun (1989:263) contends that following Mohammad’s emigration to Medina in
A.D. 622, popular attendance of salat al-jum’a [Friday congregational prayer]
became a mandatory injunction indicating religious and political significance for all
free male adults who carry arms and are eligible to protect the newly established
umma, or Muslim nation. This requisite attendance has become a unanimous
religious injunction by the four sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence. The shafi’i
school of law (which Jordan’s fatwa system follows91) maintains that forty male
Muslims are needed to qualify a Friday congregational prayer, a condition not
being applied in Jordan. The aim of khutba according to Imam al-Ghazali is to,
“help man realize his religion and to revive and animate the indifferent; the
sermon should draw on verses of the Quran, authentic traditions of the
Prophet, and edifying tales of the prophets and saints of past; the sermon
might even include recitation of poetry and weeping, but it should not
arouse false hopes (of salvation).”92
Mohammad’s successive caliphs and their appointed governors and judges would
lead the congregation in prayers and deliver khutba [sermon] which often includes
political announcements. The Imam or preacher delivers khutba on behalf of the
community, dressing in formal traditional costume and engulfed in a prescribed
and ceremonial framework of prayer and worship formulae which follows the
adhan [call for prayer]. In modern times, the preacher delivers his speech in
classical Arabic, but would sometimes choose to utilize colloquial Arabic in order
to draw examples from mundane life or to stress a certain point. It is also
customary to point out to the ruler’s name after conferring salutations upon
Prophet Mohammad, his household and companions therefore conferring
91 Jordan follows the shafi’i school in its fatwa system.
Source: website of General Iftaa’ Department
http://www.aliftaa.jo/ShowContent.aspx?Id=47#.VLE6NCuUeSo
accessed on January 10th, 2015.
92 Antoun R. (1989) Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case Study in
Comparative Perspective, Princeton Legacy Library, p. 88.
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legitimacy upon him. Following the Prophet’s practice, the preacher delivers two
successive sermons; the first is longer and called the sermon of warning or
exhortation, the preacher then sits down on the minbar before proceeding to the
second and shorter descriptive or qualifying sermon which includes the lifting up of
prayer to Allah to invoke blessings again on Prophet Mohammad, his household
and his companions.
A field investigator in Jordan, Antoun elucidates that the phenomenon of preacher
existed even before Islam, playing the role of his tribe’s spokesperson whose
stigma was that of a bellicose power, praising his own tribe and defaming its
adversaries. This attribute was retained in the early Islamic period, save that the
religious value replaced the tribal pedigree. Since the emergence of the Islamic
umma in Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah [Medina], the mosque played a
multifunctional role; it was the institution where Muslims deliberate their salient and
communal issues such as war and peace, a shelter and an educational institute.
This umma is at the same time a religious and political community of believers
who adhere to one jurisdiction under Allah. The minbar was the eminent platform
which embodies a religio-political influence wherefrom important communal
declarations are delivered, and the sermon embedded more social and political
essence than content of pure religious or ritualistic nature. Sermons would mesh
religion with issues pertaining to the family, soteriology (directed to salvation) and
eschatology, rituals and moral principles, and then the preacher concludes with
asserting that the Quran and Mohammad (as statesman and prophet) was the first
preacher in Islam and a role model for Muslims in all ages. In addition, the
religious and ceremonial parts of the sermon gives legitimacy to the sociopolitical
meanings given the minbar is considered the most consecrated part of the
mosque which carries blessings on the worshippers. Preachers with excessive
emotional gimmicks were criticized.
The mosque furnishes the religio-spatial structure where Muslims interact as a
community and practice their rituals. As the fundamental body for religious
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practice, the role of the mosque is composite and multifaceted. Historically, it is
where Muslims pray, gather together for the Friday sermon and religious lessons,
obtain fatwas, collect and disseminate zakat. The mosque also served as the
platform where the religious and political symbols are blended to rally a sense of
camaraderie and collective action among Muslims.
Antoun93 infers that the mosque preacher tackles issues pertaining to this life and
the hereafter; language and style are more formal and classical when tackling
religious concerns and educating the worshippers in shari’a and Islamic ethics,
therefore uniting the Islamic community with relevant laws; the religious institution
is divided in allegiance as free preachers relate to the mundane people while
judges, scholars and appointed preachers are attached to the caliph.
The Researcher in this study elicits a varied view based on observations collected
at several mosques; the speech of appointed preachers who are attached to the
officialdom, therefore the regime, is laced with lingo that contradicts with the
established laws and traditions of the country. This is a telltale of a preordained
turn-a-blind-eye policy which prioritizes the exercise of control over the mosque for
political and security-driven purposes. Once this policy has accomplished its
objectives, the propagation of antagonistic/hate speech further serves the interest
of the regime as it instills an image of a religious establishment keen on Islam in
face of aggressions by several enemies (West and Israel). Besides, this leeway
exposes to the security apparatus preachers who have a jihadist penchant.
Mosques in Jordan fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Awqaf, Islamic
Affairs and Holy Places, objectives of which include,
93 Ibid, pp. 70-71
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“The maintenance, development, preservation, and management of
mosques and Awqaf funds; the development of mosques to deliver the
message of Islamic education”94.
To achieve this, the Ministry will,
“Maintain, preserve and manage the affairs of Islamic Holy places and
maintain Islamic relics such as mosques and holy shrines; Oversee the
construction, maintenance and financial management of mosques to enable
them to carry their mission; Guide Muslims to virtuous ways and acquaint
them with principles of their faith through sermons and preaching, lectures,
seminars, publications and other methods that serve the purpose”95.
The Ministry of Awqaf's statistics show that less than half of the mosques are
manned with state-appointed Imams. In addition to the state-run mosques, there
are private mosques built by donations of individuals. These mosques have their
own Imams and their sermons were not as subject to state control as the state-run
mosques, hence the need for the state to regulate their speech as well.
Noteworthy to observe is that the vast majority of Jordanian parents (98 percent)
think of religion is an important element in their life, while religious teaching guides
91 percent of parents in their daily life96. In a separate survey, 96 percent said that
religion was very important in their lives, and 86 percent of the respondents








accessed on September 05th, 2010.
96 Source: undisclosed survey (2008) facilitated to the researcher by an anonymous State official.
97 Source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/Upload/5_Iran.pdf accessed on September 03rd,
2010. Total: 1200 respondents, all Muslims. Source: Moaddel and Azad. The Worldviews of Islamic
Publics: The Cases of Egypt, Iran, and Jordan.
Jordanian parents account for 34 percent of the population [Source: Department of Statistics/
Unemployment Survey 2005].
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(1981:163-172) viewed that the mosque is not merely a place where the
community of worshippers practice their weekly prayer but it also represents the
locus of their community. This is clear when we look at the non-religious activities
conducted and mediated through mosques especially in villages which the
Researcher elaborates in the media coverage part (Chapter Four, Annex# Three).
Al-Rousan (20093:) describes the mosque as reflecting the authority of the group
in Muslim community and a source of its symbols. It represents a place to practice
the most important forms of religious activity for Muslims, surrounded by a halo of
sacredness which makes Muslims look unto it as one of the most important holy
places that constituted the symbol of their state because of its association with the
sanctity of Allah the Creator and the person of Prophet Muhammad. Its importance
stems from being the prime place for worship, which is a sacred place for the
performance of rites and rituals, and expresses Muslims' religious and social
solidarity. If we assume that the mosque is an institution with multiple functions
and roles from a religious point of view and from the verdict of history, what
essentially governs these functions are a gamut of religious directives, and the
political system forms their function and scope. The mosque differs from one
Islamic society to another in terms of laws and directives that regulate it on the one
hand, and its effectiveness and impact on society on the other hand, although
mosques are involved in one common denominator; their religious function.
Mosques in Jordanian society have been the most controversial issue particularly
in the post-mid-eighties of the last century, including their religious, political and
social role, but the political role remains the most relevant and important link. The
main reason behind this controversy is the speech which linked between religion
and terrorism, thereby directly reflecting on the mosque.
Abuhilalah98 views that it is not a religious duty to expand in building mosques,
based on a hadith that the whole earth has been made to me [Prophet
98 Article by Yaser Abuhilalah, Al-Ghad Newspaper, May 5th, 2009.
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Mohammad] a mosque and for purification, and that even during the apex of the
Islamic civilization, mosque building did not witness the expansion we see today.
Abuhilalah criticizes the exaggeration in mosque decoration and architecture in
Western Amman while cultural annexes are absent.
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2.4. The Introduction of Regulations over the Mosque
Jordan constitution was promulgated in 1952 in the era of the unity of the two
Banks (Trans-Jordan and Palestine), the presence of many political parties and
their strong representation in parliament. Article (107) of Jordan constitution
stipulates that,
“The organisation of the affairs of Moslem Waqfs and the administration of
their financial matters, among other matters, shall be regulated by a special
law99”.
Albeit it’s tactical alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Boulby
(1999:62) highlights the notion that the regime’s worries about the Movement
came to surface in 1955 when the government passed a decree subjecting Friday
sermons to close monitoring and control. Pending the passing of this law, which
only took place in 1962, mosques came under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Awqaf100 [Islamic Endowments] presided by the Supreme [Islamic] Judge. In the
ensuing period, 1962 till 1967, the State lifted martial law and recommenced
parliamentary life. Article two of the 1955 Law stated,
“notwithstanding the provisions of any law in force, no one is allowed to
preach, guide, sermonize or teach at any mosque, whether conducting this
in the present or not, unless licensed in writing by the Supreme Judge or
who acts on his behalf in the directorates and regions”.
99 Source: Legislations Pertaining to Ministry of Awqaf, 2008: pp. 6 & 7.
100 A waqf is defined as “appropriating an owned property as an inalienable property of God, and
dedicating its yields to a certain entity even if availed. The ‘waqf’ is considered charitable if its
yields are dedicated to a piety as a start, and as a progeny if its yields are dedicated to a person (or
specific persons), their offspring after them and to a charitable entity upon their demise”. The awqaf
(pl. of waqf) are defined as “all Islamic endowments, including mosques, whether financed by the
budget of Ministry of Awqaf (MoA) or not”. The ‘mosque’ is defined as “the place dedicated to
perform the prayer, and is open for everyone to conduct requisite prayers and other acts of
worship. Its annexes include the Holy Quran quarters, library, women’s praying area, Islamic
center, mosque-staff housing, ritual cleansing area, mosque garden and arena, and any other
edifices annexed to it” [Source: website of Ministry of Awqaf].
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In 1962, a Royal decree dissolved the parliament due to an alleged lack of
cooperation between the legislative and executive bodies101, henceforth the
cabinet could endorse the Temporary Law of Counseling, Preaching and
Guidance102. The point of reference for applying the 1962 Law became Prime
Minister instead of the Supreme Judge as was the case with the 1955’s Law. The
Council of Ministers also endorsed the Temporary Law of the Council of Preaching
& Guidance (No. 45/1962) with the membership of a staff of Ministry of Interior,
Council of Awqaf, and General Directorate of Guidance and News; a sign of a yet
more security-driven control. As per article (6) of the Temporary Law, the Council’s
remit of responsibilities included,
“the supervision over mosques, their annexes (libraries, clubs, gardens)
and religious institutes which equip graduates to carry out preaching,
guidance and other Islamic rituals, and appointing general directors, and all
Imams, teachers and staff who would carry out tasks which the
management of the mosques and religious institutions deem necessary.103”
Abu Rumman (2007:12) contended that the “public temperament” towards the
Muslim Brotherhood movement changed in the 1980s as signs of belligerent
Islamic action began to surface. The government resorted to endorsing the Law of
Preaching, Guidance and Teaching at Mosques no. (7) of the year 1986, article (6)
of which entitled The Council of Preaching and Guidance to regulate and watch
over sermonizing, guidance, preaching and teaching at mosques, and oversee the
cleansing of mosques from disparity, disagreement and disorder.
Article (7) of the Law stated:
101 Aruri (1972) contended that “King [Hussein bin Talal] dissolved Parliament for voting Rifai
[Prime Minister] out of office. He charged that it ‘did not truly reflect the electorates’ will”. (p.181)
102 According to Article 94 of Jordan Constitution “In cases where the National Assembly is not
sitting or is dissolved, the Council of Ministers has, with the approval of the King, the power to issue
provisional laws covering matters which require necessary measures which admit of no delay or
which necessitate expenditures incapable of postponement. Such provisional laws, which shall not
be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, shall have the force of law, provided they are
presented before the Assembly at the beginning of its next session, and the Assembly may
approve or amend such laws” (Source: Jordan Foreign Ministry official website).
103 Source http://lob.gov.jo/ui/laws accessed on May 15th, 2010
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A. In case where a preacher violates articles of this Law, Minister can ban him
from preaching as notified by the General Secretary and the Director of
Preaching and Guidance of the Ministry.
B. If the preacher insists on preaching after informing him of the banning
decision by a written notice, he is punished with a jail sentence of one week
to one month, and a fine of twenty to hundred Jordanian Dinars.
C. The Minister can lift the ban from the person who was banned from
preaching according to paragraph (A) of this article if he deems the banning
reasons no more persist and the preacher has become qualified to carry out
the task of preaching and guidance.
D. Fatwas104 are issued by the general Ifta [the act of issuing a fatwa] staff
whether by the General Mufti or muftis commissioned by the General Ifta
Department in the entire Kingdom.”105
Interviewed former Member of Parliament and IAF member, Taysir Fityani,
rejected the exclusive right of the General Mufti to issue fatwa and attributed this
to the State’s attempt to exclude knowledgeable scholars from this task106.
The government in 1987 issued the Ordinance of Preaching, Guidance,
Sermonizing and Imamate at Mosques as part of the supra Law which sets forth
104 A fatwa is “an Islamic legal opinion or ruling” (Abu Rumman 2007: 36). Legislation by Ministry of
Awqaf (2008, pp.48-49) stipulates “The General Mufti is appointed by a Royal decree and manages
issues of Department of Ifta, carries out the general Ifta policy, heads the Council of Ifta and Islamic
Research and Studies. The Council of Ministers assigns members of the Council based on the
General Mufti’s recommendation. The General Mufti issues fatwa(s) in issues related to him and
avails to the Council cases within its remit of expertise. No person or any entity is permitted to
confront legal fatwas issued in general cases contrary to the provisions of Law of Ifta. No person or
entity is allowed to contest or doubt fatwas issued by the Council and the General Mufti with the
aim of offense and defamation”.
105 Source: Legislations Pertaining to Ministry of Awqaf (2008:27-29)
106 Fityani added “We were surprised to find Fatwas are confined to certain people and penalties
levied on whosesoever otherwise have issued a Fatwa… It is not accepted that Ifta is exclusive to
the General Mufti or that someone who practices Ifta be subject to penalties such as fines,
imprisonment and confinement. It is of no sense that if someone has asked me about the decree of
prayer I end up in prison or pay financial penalty. Thus, the Law has not differentiated between
general Fatwa related to the country and special Fatwa(s) related to individuals and their daily
issues. This stems out of attempts to confine, alienate, and ban experts from practicing their
missions and tasks”.
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minimum academic qualifications for preachers and Imams, their preconditioned
accreditation by a committee assigned by Minister of Awqaf, and the exclusive
jurisdiction of ministry of awqaf to assign Imams to preach, teach, sermonize or
guide at mosques. Under this Law, a preacher could not delegate others to
undertake his aforementioned tasks without the written approval by the Director of
Awqaf; Imams were required to keep a record of the names of orators, themes of
their sermons, dates of their visits to the mosque and other activities carried out at
the mosque. The Ordinance also stipulated punitive measures in case of
violations. The preacher is someone who preaches guides and teaches in
mosques, whereas the Imam107 is the one who conducts the task of Imamate for
the Muslims during their prayer at mosques.
Interviewed Abdul’ilah al-Takhaineh, Assistant of Director of Legal Affairs at
Ministry of Awqaf, viewed that,
“Preaching and guidance are two synonyms which refer to religious lectures
given at the mosque’s arena or in other public places (schools, universities,
public halls etc.). Under the umbrella of preaching and guidance come the
tasks of sermonizing, teaching Quran, and organizing circles of lessons
inside the mosques’ arenas or their annexes. The sermon is the Friday
sermon delivered at Ad-dhuhr [noon] prayer or in a feast day (Al Fitr and Al
Adha holidays). Anyone who would undertake any of the previous tasks
needs permission by the Ministry”.
Mohammad Shaqra (a mosque Imam in Amman and former Minister of Awqaf)
differentiates between Imamate and guidance as,
“Imamate constitutes the highest rank one can reach as it resembles the
Prophet’s (Mohammad) statute, and is loftier than guidance. It has two
features – the Imam drawing people to pray behind him thereby bringing
107 The concept of ‘Imamate’ is being used not in the Shiite sense of the word, but to define the
task of the Imam in the mosque, namely leading the people in prayer “The Shi’ite doctrines on
leadership and imamate are also different from those of Sunni counterparts. The Sunnis, who are
in the majority, maintain that caliphate and government are elective and do not partake in the
dogma and belief structure of Islam. The Shi’ites, on the other hand, consider imamate as a part of
Shi’ite theology and the Imam, being chosen of God, receives his title through hereditary
succession from within the household of the Prophet” (Kamali 2005: 286).
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them closer to God, and the Imam embodying in himself the Prophet’s most
important sacrament; that is prayer. Thereby, the prayer part of the mosque
is not subject to the Law of Preaching & Guidance because the Law is not
concerned with drawing the pious to the Imam given the prayer itself is the
effective factor”.
Apparently, a State-affiliated official gives more importance to rituals than to
guidance for the worshippers, implicitly insinuating the fact that sermons are void
of issues that tackle people’s life-felt needs.
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2.5. Regulations during the Post-Democracy Era/ The 2006 Law
Amendment and its Toll
The following period (1989 onward) witnessed the initiation of a historical political-
reform program. Robinson (1998:387-410) states that,
“during this time Jordan has held [several] parliamentary elections, enacted
a number of liberalizing laws, removed many restrictions on the press, and
minimized the role that the security services, or mukhabarat, play in
suppressing the opposition. Moreover, the liberalization program survived a
number of severe challenges, including the Gulf War…; the implementation
of a difficult austerity program; and the conclusion of a controversial peace
treaty with Israel”.
Boulby (1999:59&136) views that these elections constitute a momentous turning
point in the regime’s history, heralding the country’s second parliamentary
experience and the Muslim Brotherhood’s ascension to power whose relationship
with the regime in the following period turned unpleasant in the 1980s, as the
latter, watching the Movement’s political power on the rise, opted to change its
policy from cooptation to that of containment.
In 2001, a new law, the Law of Islamic Awqaf, Affairs and Shrines (number 32),
was endorsed, which stipulated,
- The establishment of an endowment to help support mosques with Imams,
preachers and teachers, so that a Ministry fund by the name (Dawa [calling,
missionary work] Fund) is to be established and financed by support from
the General Budget and other donations.
- All mosques in the Kingdom are endowed.
 Avail to Ministry [of Awqaf] the right of supervising and administering all the
mosques108.
108 Source: Legislations of Ministry of Awqaf, 2008
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In April 2006, the Jordanian Parliament promulgated an Amendment to the 1986
Law according to which Paragraph (A) of Article (6) now reads,
“[The Council] establishes a general policy of sermonizing, guidance,
preaching, teaching and overseeing its concerns” (Ibid),
Henceforth, this subjects all issues pertaining to the mosque under the jurisdiction
of the Council of Preaching and Guidance. Article (7) of the same Law was also
amended as follows: “
A. No one is allowed to deliver a speech, teach, sermonize or guide at
mosques unless qualified and has a written approval by Minister [of Awqaf]
or whom the Minister delegates.
B. In case a preacher violates articles of this Law, the Minister can prevent
him from sermonizing or teaching or preaching or guidance at mosques as
notified by the General Secretary and the Director of Preaching and
Guidance of the Ministry, given he [the preacher] is notified in writing of the
banning decision.
C. The Minister can lift the ban from the person who is banned from preaching
according to paragraph (B) of this article if he deems the banning reasons
no more exist and the preacher has become qualified to carry out the task
of preaching and guidance.
D. With consideration to the regulations of legislations in force, anyone who
violates the regulations of paragraphs (A) and (B) of this article is punished
with a jail sentence of one week to one month, and a fine of twenty to
hundred Jordanian Dinars.” (Ibid)
Al-Rousan (2009:46) attributes this legislative change to an outdated law which
the government has deemed overlooking a pressing need to regulate preaching
and teaching at mosques, while the Islamic movement (Muslim Brotherhood)
interpreted it as a direct targeting by the government against the movement,
thereby causing a lot of criticism to the Amendment. This view is upheld by Jarrar
(2010:64765) who lists State control over the religious space and rituals among
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the counter ideological approaches adopted by the government following the 2005
terrorist attacks against hotels in Amman. The aim was to deter the recruitment of
worshippers and limit the movement's ability to enlist public support. The
Researcher condones Jarrar's view given the package of parallel legislations
targeting individual freedoms in general and the Islamic movement in particular.
These laws include the law of public assembly, the anti-terrorism law, the press
and publications law, and the fatwa law. However, the mosque is viewed by the
Jordanian State as very effective and much more influential than the media, as a
classified Wikileaks document depicts a statement by a former chairman of the
Royal Hashemite Court109. This viewpoint is also shared by interviewed IAF deputy
Taysir Fityani who views the Law of Preaching, Sermonizing and Teaching at
Mosques as “the most dangerous among these laws”. Apparently, the law
aphorism and comments by State officials suggest the ban on Imams was being
applied on a selective standard (whosesoever violates the law), but comments by
members of the movement indicate there was a blanket ban on their Imams. This
is further corroborated by views of researchers specialized in the movement in
Jordan.
Abu Rumman (2007:68) asserts the government has banned members of the
movement from carrying out their activities at mosques, these activities being
indispensable for enabling the movement to communicate and relate to
Jordanians, and sustain a broad social network. The ban was also applied at
different levels and due to changing political temperaments between Jordan and
neighboring countries. Horani et al (1997:278) described the mid-eighties, when
Jordan pursued a rapprochement policy with Syria, as a policy to curtail the
Movement’s activities and cracking down on the free will of its mosques preachers.
This view is also maintained by Abu Rumman (2007:76) who described this policy
as one of the means the regime adopted to restrict the Movement’s influence,
adding that recently the regime has endorsed the Preaching and Counseling Law,
109 Source: http://ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=85300
accessed on September 02nd, 2011.
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and the Anti-Terrorism Law, thereby holding people legally accountable if they
carry out any kind of religious preaching without previous authorization by Ministry
of Awqaf. In addition, The 2005 annual report of the National Centre for Human
Rights (covering the period June 01st, 2003 till December 31st, 2004) depicts the
following text on Freedom of Opinion and Expression - Restriction on Methods of
Expression and the Right to Communication,
“Mosque pulpits were not safe from restrictions to freedom of opinion and
expressions”110.
On September 08th, 2004, Ammannet.net (the first online radio in Jordan and a
community-based FM station) reported the security apparatus has seized the
house of Dr. Ibrahim Zeid Al-Kilani, former Minister of Awqaf, and the houses of
other members of the Islamic Action Front arresting 39 of its prominent figures for
delivering speeches and religious lessons at mosques without a prior permission
by Ministry of Awqaf. A Ministry of Interior source said some people stood up at
mosques’ platforms and delivered speeches in which they disdained the State, its
policy and leadership without acquiring the prior approval of the Ministry of Awqaf.
110 Source: http://www.nchr.org.jo/english/Publications/AnnualReports.aspx
page 31 accessed on July 22nd, 2011.
This annual report depicted the human rights' situation in the Kingdom from June 01st, 2003 until
December 31st, 2004, that is two years before the 2006 Amendment was enacted. The NCHR is
state-funded and its chairman of the board of trustees is appointed by a royal decree.  The Report
added that “In September 2004, administrative governors detained a number of speakers for
violating the provisions of the preaching law, on the pretext that they did not obtain licenses from
the Ministry of Awqaf (MOA) to give the Friday speech. The Ministry went further than that by
seeking to unify the topics of the Friday speech, thereby violating not just the right of freedom of
opinion and expression, but also the principles of the Islamic Shari’ah, which urges the call to
God’s true path through wisdom, and order good deeds and banning bad deeds. Mosques are
homes for prayer and knowledge, and a meeting place for Muslims to communicate and discuss
matters of their religion and life. Terrorism and religious extremism did not rise from mosques
where everything takes place in public. It resulted from marginalization and in isolated
environments of individuals who had no chances in life and therefore preferred death, or whose ties
with society decreased and whose trust in the state diminished and so they rebelled against it.
Dialogue, allowing means of knowledge and communication, and enhancing methods of
expression, as well as taking into consideration the requirements of justice, redress and equality in
the enjoyment of right is the acceptable means of fighting terrorism and extremism, not banning,
prohibiting, restricting and incriminating”.
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Abu Rumman and Abu Hanieh (2009:158) listed the Parliament passing laws
against preaching or advocating terrorism in any shape, especially in Mosque
sermons, among the recent policies the State has undertaken to curb threats to
national security by extreme Islamists. A study by Hashem (2009)111 emphasizes
that,
“within the Islamic context, a centralized regulatory system for the khutba is
not conceivable. Some Muslim governments have tried such an approach; it
largely failed. While it might have succeeded in suppressing unwanted
messages, it delegitimized appointed khatibs and, by default, gave
credence to alternative voices. Some European countries tried such an
approach (France, in particular), and we cannot say that it was a success.”
The key question to be broached is how the latest changes in the regulatory
environment changed the dynamics that govern the relationship between the State
and actors who contest the state’s influence in the religio-political sphere, mainly
the Muslim brotherhood movement; whether pertinent laws and regulations have
influenced Friday sermon; or whether Friday sermons do wield influence over the




accessed on May 01st, 2015.
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CHAPTER THREE
THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF FRIDAY SERMONS
3.1. Methodology
Between June and December 2008 the Researcher attended and recorded 24
Friday sermons in 24 different mosques in the Greater Amman and Zarqa
directorates where 55 percent of the population lives. These two main cities are
geographically connected, therefore the demographic integration between them
albeit the peculiar nature of each city. While Amman is the metropolitan capital,
Zarqa constitutes a mosaic of ethnic, tribal, religious and economic varieties. It is
also a breeding ground for several Islamic movements, mainly the Muslim
Brotherhood movement whose preachers are being banned from preaching
following the Amendment of the Law in 2006, and the jihadist salafi stream
(movement) that thrives in the in-between shantytown of Ruseifeh.
This survey commenced two years after the enactment of the Amendment to the
Law in 2006, henceforth the impracticality of drawing comparisons and
conclusions regarding the resulting change in mosque speech prior to the
Amendment, at least from the point of view of the recorded sermons. However,
certain perceptions can be drawn from the relevant literature and interviews which
the Researcher conducted with Imams/ preachers and other involved actors.
The first three visits to mosques were carried out through previous arrangements
with the Imams by the help of research collaborators, but when the Researcher
became acquainted with the setting, ensuing visits were being directly
implemented without hindrance whether by government officials or mosque staff.
Although, then Minister of Awqaf Abdulfattah Salah, when interviewed by the
Researcher, he objected that these visits were being carried out without a prior
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consent by the ministry. The Researcher checked with a legal expert on the
minister’s objection and found it groundless.
All sermons were audio-recorded, then salient themes penned down right after the
Researcher has returned home for memory aid in case the recording was not
clear112. The Researcher translated dominant themes into English, and with the
help of a collaborator, most of the sermons were transcribed (into Arabic).
The objective of the analysis is to track down dominant topics and relate them to
the socio-political and legal contexts in light of the 2006’s amendment to the Law
to find out the mode by which the preachers (whether independently or by proxy of
the official religious establishment) circumvent relevant regulations by means of
framing in order to impact the opinion of the worshippers.
The reason why themes, instead of words, are being taken as the unit of analysis
is the impracticality of finding frames in a single sentence uttered by the preacher;
instead, frames are implicit, yet discoverable across a series of themes that
resonate with the cultural context of the worshippers and their pre-cultivated
schema. In this sense, the Researcher is a critic who embraces the disposition of
(Kuypers 2010: 292) that “criticism is an argument”, therefore arguing for a
particular understanding of the religious rhetoric, and analyzing it is an art well
established in qualitative research. From a rhetorical perspective, there are no a
priori assumptions to discover salient themes, but through analywing the sermon
text in its cultural context frames are being detected. This is because frames can
be discovered by searching for them in the sermon’s narrative as they “convey
thematically consonant meanings across…time” (Entman, 1999:7, cited in Kuypers
2010:301). This “across time” factor is best exemplified in mosque sermons which
embed consonant concepts, metaphors and idioms engraved in a sacralized text
112 In some cases the recording was not quite clear given the Researcher could not place the
recorder close to the minbar or sit in front of it.
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and empowered in culturally accepted norms historically cultivated in the
audiences’ schema.
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3.2. Categorization of Sermon Themes/ Operational Definitions
Based on empirical observation of the 24 recorded sermons, an a posteriori
breakdown of the content classifies salient themes into spiritual, social, political
and economic issues, in addition to preachers’ rhetoric regarding other Islamic
groups or other religious and ethnic groups, and last but not least is du’a
[supplication] which concludes the sermon and carries important religious, political
and other messages. Although this typology is congruent to how some actors/
interviewees113 view the role of Friday congregational sermon (one of the
mosque’s main functions), these themes have appeared after recorded sermons
were classified and frames appeared as salient or tacit in the given text.
Thematic classification draws from the sermon itself, while du’a is given a separate
category. Other content of liturgical nature in the sermon is excluded, especially in
the prelude, and the same applies to du’a, except when the preacher mentions the
Muslim ruler/king, alludes to other sects in Islam, other religions or ethnic groups,
or mentions jihad and other worldly issues.
The Researcher could not cite similar scholarship from where to derive a definition
for each category, therefore the normative meanings ascribed to each one of
them. However, this ascription is also related to the context. For example,
unemployment and inflation define the economic factor given the causal
relationship between these two factors114, and the fact they appear as major socio-
economic indicators in local and international data115.
113 Interviewee Taysir Fityani views the role of the mosque as a general and integrated role-
political, economic, social, cultural and religious. See other viewpoints in Chapter Six.
114 Source: http://eml.berkeley.edu/~webfac/wood/e100b_sp08/lecture15.pdf
accessed on August 10th, 2015.
115 Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview
accessed on August 10th, 2015.
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Du’a is given a separate category given its genre position in the sermon (Al-
Habach, M, no date, p. 12 & 13).















44 33 17 8 16 118
Percentage 37% 28% 14% 7% 14% 100%
In analyzing each of the above cohorts, and to serve the research and its
objectives, the Researcher sets forth a separate operational definition to each of
these cohorts. A record of the subject themes can be found in Annex # Two.
3.2.1. Spiritual Content
The Researcher sets forth the operational definition for spiritual content as that
which connotes exhortation for the worshippers to adhere to Islamic ethos, the
fundamental tenets of Islam, symbols and way of life in Islam but without direct
indication to its overlap with the sociopolitical environment.116 This includes
enjoining right and forbidding wrong; the virtues of Ramadan and other Islamic
holidays; the status of the Islamic holy sites (especially al-Aqsa mosque); lessons
116 This does not imply the separation between State and religion, politics and religion or any
reference to secularism as in the West, given that Islam does not condone this principle in life. In
Jordan, although the State had induced some secular legislation, separation between state and
religion as in the West does not exist especially in legislations pertaining to civil status of people
(see section 1.4.1.).
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from the Islamic history and forays; exclusivity of Islam as the true religion; refuting
heresies in Islam (i.e. Shiites; Quraniyoun117); the role model of Prophet
Mohammad and his household and companions; fate and destiny and doomsday;
forbidding usury (riba); avoiding internal strife (fitna); cursing the enemies of Islam.
This cohort also refers to the five pillars of Islam, namely the profession of faith
through shahadatayn118; salat: conducting the five daily ritual prayers; zakat: giving
of alms; sawm: fasting the holy month of Ramadan; hajj: pilgrimage to Mecca.
Among these five pillars, only the shahadatayn relates to belief, while the
remaining pillars refer to deeds which crosscut with the milieu in which the Muslim
lives. It is incumbent on the preacher to remind the worshippers to observe these
pillars either directly or by reference to examples in the life of Prophet Mohammad
and his companions and Islamic history.
A close participant observation to the three participating Informants/worshippers
indicates discussion going on among themselves and within their families about
injunctions by the preacher; a talk that halts if the preacher cajoles the regime or if
the political occurring is louder than the customary religious duty.
Content which resemble cliché or common religious statements repetitive as mere
ritual, especially in the first part of the sermon, is not factored for in this cohort as it
does not constitute a subjective part of the sermon theme. However, this content
still provides for the ideological foundation of information and guidance that the
preacher imparts in his weekly theme. Antoun (1989) described sermons delivered
in a rural Jordanian mosque in the 1960s as,
117 Al-Quraniyoun is a group which emerged in the twentieth century who “under the guise of
‘returning to the Quran’ have rejected in totality, the legal authority of the sunna […] they are also
known as ahl-Quran, Quranites, Submitters, and inkar-e-hadith”.
Source: https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Quraniyoon accessed on October 24th, 2014.
118 The two shahada(s) are: declaring there is no god but Allah, and Mohammad is the messenger
of Allah.
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“framed in the prayer formulae that adumbrate, denote and enunciate that
message [of salvation], their construction often makes the climax of the
sermon coincidental with asking for particular works of righteousness”.
This cliché/formula in the prayer part includes tahlil (I bear witness that there is no
god but Allah; basmala (In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful);
takbir (Allah is greatest); tasbeeh (I proclaim Allah’s glory); tahmeed (Praised be
Allah); ta’awwudh (I take Allah’s refuge from Satan the rejected); tasliya (O Alla,
bless and greet with peace our cid Mohammad and the household of Mohammad).
By bypassing these calls, the Researcher does not underestimate the impact of
this normative content on the worshipper, but that this impact cannot be verified or
gauged given their generic nature. Antoun (1989:171) maintains that these calls
are persuasive to a great portion over the congregation, and because of their
centrality, intricacy and concentration, key rituals and pillars of faith are subject to
symbolic interpretation in spite of their doctrinal nature.
As shown in the foregoing table, sheer spiritual content constitutes 37 percent of
the sermon themes. Mubarak (no date)119 says that Friday prayer consists of two
segments; the first is longer and has a more religious nature, whereas the second
is shorter with political substance tackling issues pertaining to the daily life of the
worshippers.
Among the 24 sermons in the second part of the sermon, only five preachers
commended the worshippers to adhere to one or more of the five tenets of faith
wherein three mentioned zakat; one combined sawm and hajj; and the remaining
preacher joined sawm and salat. These obligations of faith are mentioned not as a
cliché supplication repeated in each sermon, but alluded to in one or more of the
sermon themes listed above.
119 Hadia Mubarak, The Oxford Encyclopaedia, Oxford University Press.
Source:
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0461#ThePoliticalFunctionoftheKhutbah
accessed on June 28th, 2014.
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Apparently, zakat120 has a higher preponderance, as it comes next to prayer in
Quran121. This salience of zakat also enables the mosque to perform certain duties
apart from the ritual ones such as almsgiving throughout da’wa, and zakat
committees who also encourage the mosque neighborhood to attend prayers and
religious lessons. Then come sawm and hajj, and sawm and salat respectively,
most likely in juxtaposition with the timely fasting month of Ramadan. However,
the fact that only three of the 24 preachers urged the worshippers to pay off their
zakat is probably based on their prior knowledge that the worshippers are more
inclined to give zakat directly to the poor or through the mosque committee122, and
that in an Islamic state, Muslims are required to provide their zakat to bayt mal al-
muslimeen [the house of the money of Muslims] responsible for supporting the
poor and the orphan123, instead of paying it to Ministry of Awqaf whose revenues
are subject to political formulae and secular considerations.
The subsequent notion that several preachers urged the king to rule according to
Islamic shari’a instead of “unjust” manmade or statutory laws (a perception also
shared by a wide array of Jordanians) possibly supports this assumption.  A
nationwide survey depicts that around three quarters of Jordanians believe that
applicable laws should be strictly based on the Quran.124
120 Muslims should pay 2.5 percent of their income as zakat. People can pay zakat directly to the
poor and the needy, through charity organizations, or through the endowment of zakat at the
Ministry of Awqaf which in return supports the mosques. Other than that, people can also pay
sadaka [alms] through a mosque committee.
121 Surat 2:43 “And establish prayer and give zakah and bow with those who bow [in worship and
obedience”.
Source: http://quran.com/2
accessed on September 17th, 2015.
122 This view is being relayed to the Researcher by banned preacher Wael Battiri; that most people
prefer to pay their zakat directly to its due recipients or through charity organizations.
123 Source: http://scholar.najah.edu/content/provision-wealth-orphan-islamic-jurisprudence
accessed on September 26th, 2014.
124 Source: http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/chapter-3-role-of-islam-in-politics/
accessed on July 04th, 2014.
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By starting the sermon with a spiritual essence, the preacher establishes the
dogmatic underpinning and the necessary framework for issues of down-to-earth
nature, therefore an ideological foundation for the sermon theme, and possibly a
hedge against potential counterarguments or answerability by the State. Out of the
80 suggested sermon themes in the non-mandatory toolkit of Ministry of Awqaf125,
half are of pure religious nature, indicating the State is keen to employ the
religious speech to furnish for the ideological guidelines of people’s life-felt issues
and to stay away from concentrating on political issues or exegesis that may
depart from the source. The State also attempts to stave off preachers from
loading up their sermons with political issues, as Informant SJ indicates,
"the Imams of the two mosques I regularly attend (Masjed Nazzal and
Masjed Zeinab) […] received official ordinance by Ministry of Awqaf not to
tackle […] political issues in their sermons"
This policy is nevertheless selective, as the State through the ministry of awqaf
sometimes instructs the Imams to urge the worshippers to thwart public
protests126, especially when orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
Antoun (1989:102) views that the sermon does not merely convey information to
the worshippers regarding their proper behavior; it also imparts decisive meaning
which carries an affective as well as cognitive feature. This understanding, passed
125 Antoun (p.139) recounts that by 1964, the Department of Religious Endowments [awqaf] started
distributing its monthly newsletter with suggested sermon themes, asking preachers to keep a
written copy of the sermon. Antoun noticed that in spite of this governmental policy, preachers have
had a considerable space of freedom as to choose their sermon topics.
126 On August 21st, 2014, Ministry of Awqaf sent a circular to the awqaf directorates in the kingdom
asking them to urge the worshippers not to participate in a nationwide sit-in and strike by the
Association of Jordanian Teachers (controlled by the Muslim brotherhood movement), backed by a





accessed on August 21st, 2015.
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on via prayer formulae which accompany the sermon and declare the Islamic
ethos, constitutes a reassuring frame for any debate on life-felt issues.
This writer views that most significant is that the sermon topics comprise vacant
frames127 which may contain variable content, and their effect is not restrictive but
open to interpretation. One example is the topic of jihad to defend the sacred sites
of Muslims, which could as well serve as a political call to deter Zionism on the
one hand or a connotation to the nature of miracles on the other (the night journey
of Prophet Mohammad to Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem)). This observation is
congruent to Entman’s (1993:52) definition of framing as selecting and
communicating certain aspects of a perceived reality,
“in such as way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”.
This is also explained by the “spreading activation” nature of framing (Scheufele et
al, 2010: 117) where if framing applies to parts or the entirety of the audience’s
schema all other associated schemata are prone to be activated as well.
Therefore, if the preacher’s sermon resonates with the “act of jihad” schema, the
cause, consequences and treatment cognitive schemata of jihad in the mind of the
worshipper are also activated.
With regard to the worshippers, as concluded in the Media Coverage (Chapter
Four) and the Questionnaire (Chapter Seven), the audience is more inclined to
listen to religious substance that nourishes their query for faith-based guidance on
life-felt issues rather than emotional discourse that stands idle of changing the
course of things.
Friday sermon is meant to inculcate religious awareness in a society with high
religious affinity where variant actors attempt to contest the religious establishment
in shaping the worldview of the worshipper. Spiritual framing of the sermon theme
127 Ibid (p.136)
Page 103 of 299
is significant to the regime which tends to ascertain its legitimacy by self-reference
to religious symbols (King as the ancestor of Prophet Mohammad, the custodian of
the Islamic shrines in Jerusalem, and the guardian of pluralism in Islam through
the Amman Message and other royal initiatives). These prerogatives and
pedigrees are best sustained by framing the desired messages in a spiritual
envelope such as the call for moderation and tolerance in Islam, timely focus on
al-Aqsa mosque, or pledging obedience to and conferring blessings upon the
Muslim ruler. Al-Rousan (2009: 6&7) defines Friday sermon as a process through
which religious symbols in a Muslim community are restored so that the
community retains the symbols of its religious and social structure.
This process of selecting a certain perspective and a particular interpretation to the
message is inevitable as Van Gorp (2007) and McQuail (2005:379) indicate;
therefore it embeds a certain way of thinking into the course of communication.
Entman (1993:52), cited in Esther Vlieger and Loet Leydesdorff  (2011: 30), adds
that framing is either conscious or unconscious where, by selecting certain
aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salience128 than others, the
speaker endorses a particular issue giving it his own definition, interpretation,
evaluation and recommendation. In our case, the preacher, whether intentionally
or not, focuses on certain facts while ignoring others given that a particular idea
never has its intrinsic meaning (Gamson 1989), but is backed in the frame given to
it by the communicator.
Entman (1993) elucidates that framing is evident in the sender, the content itself,
the receiver and within the cultural milieu. The Researcher views that a prevalent
Islamic culture had furnished the individual frames which guide the worshippers in
processing the religious input uttered by the preacher who in return is tied up to
the expectations of his constant and harkening audience.
128 Salience refers to “whether or not something is perceived as important or prominent” (McCombs
& Bell, p. 95).
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Pure spiritual content also serves as a safe haven used by the preachers to avoid
involvement in controversial socio-political or economy-related issues which
require technical wit to prescribe solutions for, or might bring about unwanted self
censorship and reproach by the State, especially in times when the government is
facing public unrest, heightened political opposition by the Islamic movement or
regional turmoil. Spiritual speech is employed as a frame to pass on decrees
related to different political and social issues such as forbidding riba, or attacking
Jews and their allies through direct indisputable reference to the hadith and Quran.
By the same token, and as Imam Shaqra maintained (in the Interviews, Chapter
Six), a preacher can better off convey his political message [frame it in a religious
substance] without necessarily stoking the ire of the government.
Spiritual speech which explains the deity and its oneness, or monotheism (tawhid),
might also be seen as a framework to uphold a top-down hierarchical and
authoritarian politico-religious agency which defies full-fledge democracy and
reform recipes suggested by Western donors and the opposition. An example of
this framing course is when the preacher calls upon the worshippers to follow the
footsteps of Prophet Mohammad and his household and companions, follow the
injunctions of the religious scholars and Muslim ruler, then concludes the sermon
by enjoining Allah’s blessings upon King Abdullah II, the 43rd descendant of
Prophet Mohammad.
Bloch (1975:15) maintains that formalized speech129 reinforces hierarchical
relations in society, diminishes the prospects of defying traditional authority and
thwarts the tackling of certain issues or conflict-ridden acts by the speaker. In
contrast, Antoun (p.232) demonstrates that the preacher succinctly introduces a
certain event, problem or personality into the course of formal discourse. One
129 Antoun (p. 229) describes formalized speech as “an established form set generally by the
tradition of the Prophet’s own practice and specified much more narrowly by the practices of the
rightly guided caliphs, their successors, and the scholars of Islam.”
This formal shape of the sermon is evident when it gives no space for modification of the main
sermon theme or for tackling of additional subjects, and is punctuated with several prayer formulae
that juxtapose certain phrases.
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example is when the preacher favors the King for a certain duty in juxtaposition to
responsibilities undertaken by Prophet Mohammad and the successive Islamic
leaders, therefore ascribing to the country’s monarch a mantle of authority and
legitimacy. This formal oratory, along with its accompanying rituals, communicates
messages of political significance relevant to the contemporary scene, and their
effectiveness lies in being ensconced in formal mono-directional discourse, from
orator to audience. This formality is preserved by the worshipper’s sense of umma
wherein an individual’s possible disapproval to the sermon content is suppressed
or by the collective choice by the community of worshippers to hearken to the
sermon. Antoun (p. 130) defines the traditional referent of umma as,
“the religious community of Muslims founded by Muhammad and lasting to
the present day to the extent that Muslims continue to inform their lives by
Islamic law and ethics”,
But the writer also denotes a modern referent as “the sovereign nation-state”. In
our case, the preachers most likely take on the first definition. By doing so they
legitimize the nation-state by calling upon the worshippers to obey the Muslim ruler
and bestow divine blessings upon him by means of ossifying the collective bond of
umma. This du’a is seen (as shown in Participant Observation- Chapter Five) as
incongruent to the basic tenets of Islam by both pro-regime worshippers (Informant
“MA”) and anti-state worshippers/Imams (Informant “SJ”). This independent
perception of spiritual content in the sermon denotes a space of emancipation
ejoyed by the worshippers from the hegemony of the official religious
establishment and the preacher who should take on the task of the cultural broker
who reinterprets tradition and therefore bridge between ideology and politics.
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3.2.2. Social Content
The operational definition for this speech refers to the way Islam prescribes the
relationships among Muslims, and between Muslims and other religious and ethnic
groups in society and at large; social habits and traditions; the nature of social
contract; collective behavior necessary to enhance social justice and peace in the
Islamic nation. This includes calls for harmony and unity among Muslims; enjoining
or forbidding certain behaviors and their ensuing repercussions; the relationship
between Muslims and non-Muslims in society; the vice of emulating the
disbelievers; the status of women in society; Islamic society as a role model for
social justice; almsgiving and the payment of zakat as a means to attain social
justice; methods of fighting wickedness in society; the status and significance of
family in society; tribalism and nepotism; consumerism.
Twenty eight percent of the total themes tackled social issues. The vast majority of
Jordanians are Muslims who view religion as “very important” in running their daily
life130. As shown in the interviews with the worshippers (Chapter Six), 83 percent
of the respondents feel the sermon theme has addressed a problem in society,
while around two thirds believe the theme has changed a certain behavior in their
life or corrected certain misconceptions about the sermon theme.
Given the notion that the nation (not the Quran) is the source of all powers, but
Islam being the State religion (as per Constitution), Muslim clergy would rationally
use the minbar to prescribe Islam as the legitimate and practical reference in
guiding and running the worshippers’ individual and collective concerns. This
guiding principle is backed by the pervasive nature of the mosque in Jordan, and
the notion that the regime invests in the religious sphere to promote its legitimacy
among the people, therefore a useful tool to address sociopolitical issues with a
130 Pew Research Global Attitudes Project depicts 99 percent of Jordanians say “religion is ‘very
important’ or ‘somewhat important’ in their personal lives”.
Source: http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/09/17/chapter-2-religiosity/
accessed on June 30th, 2014.
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religious framework to permeate the public sphere by means of influencing the
religious speech as previously noted.
Whereas the Constitution equates between all Jordanians before the law, with no
discrimination regarding their rights and duties on the basis of race, language or
religion, preachers however promulgate a sense of unity and commonality among
“Muslims” rather than a bond of equal citizenship among all Jordanians, including
non-Muslims. This eclectic sense of favoritism is further galvanized as the
preacher urges the worshippers not to take Jews and Christians as their allies131
or to emulate their lifestyle, attributing to these two groups (labeled as kuffar
[disbelievers] or mushrikun [polytheists]) certain wrong doings such as
“consumerism”.
In a timely different context (the 1960s), Antoun (1989:193) records a sermon in
which the preacher has likened ahl al-kitab (the people of the Scripture, namely
Jews and Arab Christians), with the unbelievers who ridicule Islam as the true
faith. The writer quotes al-Baydawi’s interpretation of the Quran in which a similar
verse132 may construe ahzab133 [parties] as confederate sectarians and agents of
social discord who engaged in theological arguments about the nature of God and
Jesus, in contrast to the Unitarian or monotheist Muslim view about Allah. Antoun
(p.196) adds that the implications of the Quranic meaning for hizb (party) are such
that divisions within society imply weakening the wider Islamic umma.
131 The Quranic verse in Surat Al-Mā'idah 5:51 says:
“O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact]
allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you - then indeed, he is [one] of them.
Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people.”
Source: http://quran.com/5
accessed on June 30th, 2014.
132 Surah 5:57, A) “O believers, take not as your friends those of them, who were given the Book
before you, and the unbeliever, who take your religion in mockery and as a sport- and fear God, if
you are believers…”, (Ibid).
133 Al-Ahzab refers to “those who deny part of Quran”. Antoun (1989:193) contends that
Mohammad’s severe opposition to these groups, particularly Jews and Christians, was based on
the Prophet’s assurance regarding the revelation of all prophets.
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One would argue that the State prefers to turn a blind eye to this seemingly
exclusionary speech given the prevalence of other pressing priorities, and officials
reckoning that in the short term, the impact of this discourse on public opinion is
minimal vis-à-vis the more tolerant counter speech espoused by the State, or the
prevalent tradition of tolerance and coexistence in society. Another view held by
Jarrar (2009:47) maintains that the Jordanian government does not have the
capacity to monitor all the mosques and enact the pertinent law in such a way as
to rein in what it deems as takfiri thought or hate speech. The Researcher
nevertheless views that the regime has the statecraft capable enough to render
this speech play into its hand by inculcating a sense of religiosity and commonality
among the worshippers as long as this pietism does not amount to direct
opposition to its policies or causing civil unrest in the short run, a policy more
efficient than just reining in the takfiri speech.
In addition, a preacher’s cajole to his audience is a reflection of a speech that
beseeches the applause of the worshippers. This state of reciprocal expectations
between the preacher and the worshippers is such that the preacher sets the
agenda of the sermon themes based on what would beget the approbation of the
recipient worshippers134, while on the other hand the worshippers choose to pray
at a certain mosque if, among and atop other motives, the preacher addresses life-
felt issues which require faith-based definition, causal interpretation135, moral
evaluation, and treatment recommendations for worldly problems (following
Entmans’ definition of framing) and an appeal to public sentiments.
As marked in the participant observation part of the study (Chapter Five), the only
common factor regarding the worshippers’ decision on where to pray is the
134 As outlined in an earlier note, Hashem (2009:15) depicts the same case of mutual expectations
between khatib and audience in US mosques (khatib being worried about losing the audience if he
delivers a highly intellectual sermon at the expense of heart purification, therefore tuning his
sermon to meet these expectations).
135 See Chapter Five - Participant Observation, 5.1.1., Choice of the Mosque.
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nearness of the mosque to one’s own residence, a condition that would change if
the preacher has not related his sermon to the surrounding milieu.
Prescription on how the Muslims should respond to evil is two folded; while one
preacher would exclusively relegate the use of force in fighting wickedness to the
State, another preacher generalized the use of force to Muslims after curbing
wickedness by mere word has failed.
Another indirect divergence from the established laws and tradition is when the
preacher forbids riba, whereas the banking system in Jordan is mostly not shari’a-
compliant and functions on interest rate. Although the sermon is void of direct
attack against the prevalent banking system in Jordan (could amount to felony by
the penal code), an indirect invoking of shari’a-compliant loan is when the
preacher, by and large, calls upon the king to adhere to shari’a instead of
“iniquitous statutory laws”.
In verifying the impact of this discourse on the worshippers, a more focused insight
by the Researcher through limited136 participant observation did not depict a way
of thinking or a behavior by the Informants that construes bigotry or social
exclusion, something evident in the Informant’s amicable dealing with a non-
Muslim (the Researcher himself), strict adherence to shari’a when it comes to
socializing with female fellow pilgrims, attitude toward an ultra-pious wife, or
driving commuters to a bank.
The notion that Friday sermons were not used as a channel of communication to
promote sociopolitical modernization in Jordan is apparent in the analysis of Friday
sermons in Jordanian mosques (in addition to Syrian and Egyptian), an
observation which Borthwick (1965:108 & 189) cited in Antoun (1989). This
erstwhile study shows that while sermons in urban mosques in these Muslim
136 This tool is referred to as limited in terms of the timespan [six months], and the number of
participating Informants [three].
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countries do promote loyalties, their development of skills necessary to modernize
society is negligent,
“preachers are promoting nationalism but they are not furthering political
modernization [which] involves the development of skills rather than
emotions”.
This view is starkly contrasted by Antoun (1989) who, while admitting that his 26
recorded sermons embed only a “few implications for modernization or modernity”,
this writer bases this “stark” disagreement with Borthwick on the notion that a
number of other sermons [without stating how many!] did focus on issues “not
unrelated to modernity” such as education, work, justice, marriage, reconciliation,
and magic. This argument is based on the distinction Manning Nash (1977:21)
makes between “modernization”, as the improvement of “skills” necessary to
pursue knowledge and technology, and “modernity”, which refers to “attitudes” that
should be instilled or buttressed to assist the appliance of this pursuit for
modernization in all stages of production. Antoun (p.127), citing Nash (p.8),
defines modernization as a process which bifurcates into technological innovation
and the mobilization of people out of a traditional culture into a modern society.
Throughout his fifteen years of study, Antoun (p.128) argues that evidence from
minbar and the life of villagers indicates a positive relationship between religious
renaissance and modernization.
The Researcher agrees with this writer’s disposition that the preachers may
promote “modernization” in their sermons without necessarily invoking “modernity”,
or vice versa. Some of the sermons in this study do invoke attitudes conducive to
“social mobilization” such as attacking charm, magicians, superstitious tales,
tribalism and nepotism, in addition to banning violence against women. However,
these values are offset by other exhortations that do not inculcate certain attitudes
and values conducive to civil peace (a prerequisite condition for modernity) such
as invoking violence (fighting wickedness by sword), sectarianism (disavowing
other faith groups as infidels or apostates and worthy of curse by Allah), or the
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absence of invoking egalitarianism between all citizens (limiting the acts of birr
[good] and taqwa [piety] to fellow Muslims), to name but some observations. One
separate example is a news report137 about a campaign launched by an
entrepreneurial youth community project in Eastern Amman in 2005 where the
campaign’s entrepreneur reported that,
“There were leaflets on the streets and speeches in mosques claiming
Ruwwad [project’s name] was a front for foreign investment and that girls
weren't safe there”.
This apparent dualism between theocracy and a civil state renders this speech
subservient to the regime’s inclination to ossify its religious legitimacy while at the
same time maintaining the rule of law by making sure this speech does not
metamorphose into act on the ground rather remain confined to the religious
space.
3.2.3. Political Content
The operational definition of political content refers to religious messages that
embed constructs of meaning which, if enforced, they may entail alteration in
Jordan’s relationship with other countries [i.e. invoking Muslims to enjoin
mujahedeen has a political connotation as it involves sending activists to fight in
foreign countries; sympathy with “brotherly Muslims” especially mujahedeen in
belligerent zones], or exhortation to induce change in the balance of relationship
between the State and religion, religious symbols which invoke public sentiments
and collective action, and reference to sayings by Islamic leaders of other sects.
The issue of al-Aqsa Mosque is deemed political when the preacher calls upon the
worshippers to liberate it, unlike when brought up as a pure religious symbol
associated with the night journey of Prophet Mohammad (al-Isra’ wal Mi’raj) in
which case it is classified under religious content.
137 Source: http://www.cnbc.com/id/102435840# accessed on February 20th, 2015.
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Political and religious content are mutually intertwined. As Antoun (1989:245)
citing Cantwell Smith (1957) indicates; the quality of life for a Muslim largely
depends on the course of history and the resulting social implications. This is due
to the fact that since the birth of umma, the religio-political role of the Islamic state
(in safeguarding the worship and enactment of shari’a law and ethics) is closely
related to its politico-military function- to protect the umma against internal strife
[fitna] and external threat [ghazwa].138 Therefore, any commonplace act by the
community of believers implies a meaning of right conduct in this world and
soteriological consequences for the life hereafter so that the religious and political
acts are interchangeably consequential. For example, apostasy is akin to
treachery, and lethargy in protecting the homeland is tantamount to religious
regression.
Out of the 17 themes of political nature [constituting 14 percent of total themes in
the 24 sermons], 15 themes [88 percent] alluded to the Arab-Israeli struggle,
primarily the issue of Palestine and al-Aqsa mosque. The remaining two themes
are of less relevance to the worshippers’, namely refuting statements by Lebanese
Shiite leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, and urging Muslims to join the
mujahedeen. However, the first issue connotes preference to religious over
political affinity given the ebb in Nasrallah’s popularity which had surged following
Hezbollah’s victorious fight against Israel in 2006, but has lately plummeted in light
of the current sectarian strife between Shiites and Sunnis in the region.139
138 A study by Mazen Hashem on the discourse of Friday khutba(s) delivered in Southern California
mosques depicts the concept of umma as cited within three parameters “the exemplary potential of
the ummah, the duty to help its people, and the importance of unity within the ummah's social
divisions”.
Source: “The Ummah in the Khutba: A Religious Sermon or a Civil Discourse?” Journal of Muslim
Minority Affairs, Volume 30, Issue 1, 2010.
Source: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13602001003650606#.VUOE9PmUeSo
accessed on May 01st, 2015.
139 The rate of Jordanians who consider Hezbollah as an “illegal resistance organization” has
surged from as low as three percent in 2004 to 66 percent in 2015 (according to The Center for
Strategic Studies in Amman), whereas Pew Research depicts 55 percent of Muslim Jordanians
expressing a favorable view of Hezbollah in 2010, a rate which dropped to 18 percent in 2014.
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Political substance in the recorded sermons relates to issues close to the minds
and hearts of Jordanians, that is- Israel and the Palestinian issue (given more than
half of the population are Jordanians of Palestinian origin,140 especially in Zarqa
city); the symbolic eminence of al-Aqsa mosque for the umma at large; the
centrality of Palestine to the Jordanian people in general; political and religious
hostility towards Israel as a bordering militant and religious country which
endangers the very existence of Jordan (calls by the Israeli right wing for Jordan to
become the alternative homeland for the Palestinian people); al-Aqsa mosque as
a religious symbol yet of political significance, and King Abdullah as its sole
custodian; jihad and the fact that several Jordanians had left the country to fulfill
this chief religious duty in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.
As outlined in the worshippers’ views (Chapter Seven), around two thirds of the
respondents expressed boredom of istening to sermons that tackle political (and
economic) issues141, and a close ratio said the preacher had addressed a political
issue in his sermon. Although a relatively long time span between the two
studies142, when asked to rate proposed sermon themes according to their
importance, Jerusalem/ Palestinian issue topped the list, whereas the pressing






However, these variant rates depict a public opinion oscillating between Hezbollah as a competent
foe to Israel and its role in the sectarian fight between Sunni and Shiite Muslims mainly in Syrian
and Iraq.
140 Source: http://photos.state.gov/libraries/jordan/231771/PDFs/09_hr_jordan.pdf
(page 16) accessed on October 05th, 2014.
141 In Antoun’s study (1989:202), political diversity is construed by the tested villagers in negative
terms as with ahzab “party men”. Out of 65 sermons, only one dealt with a clear political subject
(the loss of Palestine). Antoun attributes this apathy in tackling political issues to the preacher, and
the fact that the congregation has a negative image of parties.
142 The two studies were conducted in 2008 and 2013 respectively. In the former study, Jordanian
society was still reeling under the direct repercussions of the war against Iraq in 2003, and the
latter being conducted at the hiatus of the Syrian crisis (a spillover of the Arab Spring).
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local political issue, that is reform in Jordan, is rated last and way far from the top
three issues.
These findings are in congruence with the aforementioned political issue, that is
the Israeli-Arab conflict, as it reflects an issue of top concern for the worshippers
(al-Aqsa Mosque, Israel, jihad) albeit its occurrence outside the borders of Jordan,
whereas the local political issue of reform, or the Syrian refugee crisis (which at
the time entails direct impact on Jordan) are not rated as important.
The Researcher views that although the worshippers do not expect the preacher
to come up with practical and workable solutions for complex political situations,
they still listen to sermons that offer a religious underpinning for hot political
issues, offering definition, interpretation, moral justification and treatment
recommendation for these issues (following Entman’s definistion of ‘framing’),
therefore fulfilling the religious duty to pray and listen, albeit without high
expectations to foresee an emancipation or a way out of the status quo ante by the
preacher143. It also ossifies the issue of Palestine and al-Aqsa mosque in the
collective memory of the worshippers whose nostalgic hopes for restoring the
occupied lands and the Islamic holy places lies in the sacred and religious realm
given the realpolitik by the ‘secular’ Arab states has failed, therefore fulfilling the
pinnacle religious duty of jihad144.
143 Imam al-Ghazali, a renowned jurisprudent of the eleventh century, advised that the sermon
content should “draw on verses of the Quran, authentic traditions of the Prophet, and edifying tales
of the prophets and saints of past; the sermon might even include recitation of poetry and weeping,
but it should not arouse false hopes (of salvation).” Source: Antoun (1989:88).
144 [Hadith] Narrated Abdullah bin Masud: “I asked Allah's Apostle, "O Allah's Apostle!
What is the best deed?" He replied, "To offer the prayers at their early stated fixed
times." I asked, "What is next in goodness?" He replied, "To be good and dutiful to your
parents." I further asked, what is next in goodness?" He replied, "To participate in Jihad
in Allah's Cause." I did not ask Allah's Apostle anymore and if I had asked him more, he
would have told me more”.
Source: http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/bukhari/052-sbt.php
accessed on October 07th, 2014.
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When put in an historical perspective, Antoun (p.225) depicts the prescription for
solving a political issue by a 1960s’ preacher in rural Jordan according to the
following sequence: religious awakening; political and if need be compulsory
alliance of umma; armed struggle against the enemy respectively. In this rather old
study, this prescription by the preacher is in juxtaposition with the audience’s
perception regarding the “most important factor in history” where almost half of the
respondents selected “military force”, and when asked “what is the best practical
solution to the Palestine problem”, the majority associated the solution to a divine
will.
This comparative observation indicates that the religious discourse has since long
not altered the panacea prescribed by the preacher for political and security
challenges facing the country, wherein the supra formulae by both preacher and
congregation suggests that political and religious solutions entwine together. As
previously inferred, both preacher and the worshippers act according to
intertwined expectations, that is, the preacher sets the agenda for his sermon’s
topics according to the expectations of his congregation (that is, the preacher’s
selected themes become the audience’s preferred themes), framing them in a
religious mantle to invoke legitimacy and reference upon his speech (that is,
attributes of these themes move from the preacher’s agenda to the audience’s
agenda). On the other hand, the congregation expects the preacher to tackle
salient and hot political issues framed in a religious context and gleaned from the
tradition of the Prophet and his companions and the ensuing Islamic history, but
without necessarily expecting the preacher to prescribe realpolitik or solutions
which fall within the purview of experienced polities.
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3.2.4. Economic Content
The Researcher sets forth the operational definition for economic content as that
which includes economic factors that directly influence the living standard of the
people, namely the rising prices, poverty and unemployment. The latter is not
being mentioned in any sermon (although an apparent imbalance in the economy
of Jordan145 with serious social implications), while poverty is included even when
framed in a religious construct.
The least in the listed sermon themes [only seven percent] is the economy and its
main parameter, price increase. Probably the issue of the rising prices is
mentioned among the plights that invoke the worshippers to plea Allah to save
Muslims from,
“Oh Allah, protect us from the high prices and plague, usury, adultery,
earthquakes and tribulations, bad temptations both obvious and hidden...”
In Arabic language, both the high cost of living (ghala’) and plague (waba’) ryme
well in du’a, and the same goes with usury (riba) and adultery (zina), while
unemployment (bataalah) does not dwell in the historic tradition of religious
supplication.
The time of this data goes back to summer 2008 when the spillover of the Global
Financial Crisis has not yet hit Jordan’s economy. When placed in comparison to
the context of the worshippers’ views (Questionnaire- Chapter Seven conducted
during summer 2013 at the hiatus of the Syrian refugee crisis), economy came
second in important issues to tackle in Friday sermons, and adjacent in rating to
the Syrian crisis, presumably a cause for the price increase, at least in the felt
realm of Jordanians.
145 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS
accessed on August 22nd, 2015.
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Economic indicators depict that the aggregate impact of the refugee influx on
Jordan has been contained, with some positive signs of boosting certain sectors of
the economy. As for employment opportunities, the direct impact has been
negative but mainly among non-Jordanians (Egyptian labor force)146. Economist
Yusuf Mansur147 indicates a positive spillover of the refugee crisis on the
Jordanian economy,
“the slight improvements in growth and even the decrease in unemployment
were due to this ‘regional disaster’. The influx of Syrians increased demand,
supplied the labour force with the missing middle- and semi-skilled workers
we always needed”.
For the worshipper, the priority of price hike and its next precedence, the Syrian
crisis, are closely related. However, given economic figures do not portray a
drastic impact on the economy, the impact is more psychological than a felt one,
or a felt impact but not yet fully reflective of the gradual degradation in the quality
of public services offered to Jordanian citizens at that time, mainly education and
healthcare.
The supra comparison between the two distant eras (2008 and 2013) speaks of
the salience and importance of economic issues to the Jordanian worshipper,
hence for the preacher, in times of crisis and its regression when the economy is
well and stable. This conclusion does not necessarily imply the worshippers
expect the panacea for the economic hardships to proceed out the mouth of the
mosque preacher, given the majority of the sample worshippers feel bored when
listening to sermons which tackle economical issues, as evident in the supra
Questionnaire. Antoun (1989:231) citing Bloch (1975:15) argues that,
146 Source: The World Bank- Jordan Economy Monitor, spring 2013 (p. 14)
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/Jordan_EM_Spring_2013.pdf
accessed on July 11th, 2014.
147 Source: http://m.jordantimes.com/cost-of-syrian-conflict
accessed on May 28th, 2015.
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“the effect of always comparing particular events to the same general
illustrations reduces the specificity of utterances so that all events are made
to appear as though they were alike”,
The writer adds that this fusing of events,
“transforms the dangerous and uncertain present into the fixed eternal and
orderly past” (Ibid).
For Bloch (Ibid), the paradoxical effect of the juxtaposition of events that are
variant in their historicity and context on the audiences is to strengthen a sense of
unison and camaraderie, not merely with their past, but with one another in their
present life. A study on the Jordanian mosque by Al-Rousan (p.146) brings to light
the conclusion that the emerging economic function of the mosque comes after the
religious function, however, this function is not being expressed in the religious
speech per se, but of which the mosque constitutes a platform for social
connectedness on an individual and collective level (mosque as a public space
where economic interaction thrives and social interaction might enhance business-
related activities).
Sermon content related to the economy is presented in a religious frame rather
than a cause-and-effect rationale, but still within the holistic approach of the
Islamic view in the metaphysical scope of faith. This is apparent in preachers
attributing the economic hardships to divine castigation against iniquity by people
[high prices, plagues and hardships are the consequences of wrongdoings by
Muslims; night clubs, music festivals, alcoholic beverages are all signs of
wickedness therefore Allah reacted by causing the prices to go up; the rising
prices are a sign of punishment by Allah].148 The worshippers on one hand need to
quench their feeling of frustration, and possibly the preacher on the other hand
148 In his similar but timely variant study, Antoun (1989:196) citing Munson (house of St Abd Allah,
17ff), states that “in recent Muslim history the dominance of infidels (European colonialists and in
the latest historical incidence, the State of Israel) is regarded as God’s punishment for immoral
behavior, heedlessness, and the repudiation of Scripture”.
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wants to send an indirect and taciturn message on behalf of the worshippers to the
government that the economy is of prime concern and people are not feeling well,
therefore functioning as the spokesperson of the umma at large.
Tackling issues pertaining to the economy might imply that the preacher gets
involved in complicated official policies of which he is not savvy, such as calling
upon the government to work out structural economic solutions which in the
common sense might require lifting off the price subsidies, a policy probably
deemed by the public as tantamount to hegemonic and imperialistic pressure by
the World Bank. A way out of this conundrum is to attenuate this topic by timid
reference to price increase and to interpret the cause-effect factor in the
metaphysical realm (iniquity in society therefore Allah reacted by letting the prices
go up), while the panacea lies in calling upon Allah to save Muslims from the rising
prices by simply enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong, or commissioning the
promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice. This is also the case in other parts
of the sermon as mentioning price increase in the final supplication (du’a) is more
salient when compared to other issues. From the worshippers’ perspective,
participant observation indicates causal interpretation that is not congruent to a
logical cause-and-effect relationship.
3.2.5. Instigation toward the Other
The Researcher takes account of speech that stigmatizes adherents to other
religious or ethnic groups, including other schools of thought within Islam. This
speech is being given a separate cohort given its salience in the media coverage
and the participant observation chapters, and the notion that the State had
endorsed the 2006 Amendment to the Law in order to purportedly address hate
speech, a tactic deemed as a pretext to control the religious sphere as shown in
the several interviews conducted with concerned configures of the Muslim
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Brotherhood movement (see Chapter Six), let alone other citations by different
writers as posed in Chapter Two.
The operational definition of this content refers to the negative or antagonistic
rhetoric uttered against the other, be this other the enemies of Islam and Muslims,
Jews, Americans, crusaders, Christians, or nasara [Arab Christians] mentioned
either directly or indirectly by reference to ahl al-kitab [people of the scripture]. It
also includes adherents to other Islamic schools of thought such as the Shiites or
quraniyoun. In this domain, the Researcher does not include references to Jews
and Christians in al-fatiha (the opening surah of the Quran), although this surah
refers to both groups in negative stereotypes149. The reason is that although this
dictum is repetitive in Friday sermons, it does not constitute a subjective verbatim
by the preacher, but a generic ritual prayer based on direct quotation from the
Quran, notwithstanding its potential impact on the worshippers.
It is notable that eleven out of the 24 sermons (46 percent) embed content that
negatively stigmatize followers of other Islamic sects, other religions and ethnic
groups, or kuffar (infidels/disbelievers) in general. Reportedly, this speech traces
back to the 1960s when Antoun (1989) documented content of sermons by a
Jordanian rural preacher who injected in his preaching messages used by
doctrinaires of fundamentalist and radical Islam in Egypt where he had received
his academic qualification in shari’a and Islamic studies.
Part of the content in this cohort is framed by ascribing wrongdoings to
disbelievers (kuffar), or socially ostracizing them by urging the worshippers not to
take them as allies based on a direct quotation from a verse in the Quran, or even
by restricting the blessings of Allah upon Muslims. The pun here is that around
three percent of Jordanians are not Muslims. The ascription of this guidance to a
149 “The path of those upon whom You have bestowed favour, not of those who have evoked [Your]
anger or of those who are astray.”
Source: http://quran.com/1
accessed on June 15th, 2014.
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divine writ clashes with the constitution150, laws and traditions of the country, and
the Amman Message151 launched by the king and endorsed by most of the world
Islamic schools of thought and coined as the mantle of tolerance in Islam.
It is also noted that when the preacher denounces adherents of other faith groups
in society or abroad, the sermon concludes with du’a that bestows blessings upon
the king, or praises the role of the king’s ancestors in safeguarding al-Aqsa
Mosque. The Researcher views that this kind of speech functions as an appeasing
strategy to gain the worshippers’ applause by stressing a communal loyalty to
umma, yet this discourse is being presented in a religious framework as a hedge
against official answerability by the State in light of the regulations endorsed in
2006.
The following table classifies referent stereotypes:
Group Name Recurrence Percentage
Shiites 1 7%
Quraniyoun 1 7%
Ahl Al Kitab (Jews & Christians) 1 7%
Enemies of Islam, Arabs or non-Arabs 1 7%
Jews 2 13%
150 Article (2) of Jordan Constitution stipulates that “Islam is the religion of the State”, but Article 24
says (i) “The Nation is the source of all powers”, and as per Article (1), Jordan’s (system of
government is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy).
151 Jordan King Abdullah II said “The biggest concern we have is the enrooted negative perception
of isolation between the followers of religions, what leads to fragmentation of the social fabric. This
requires all of us to focus on the theme of education and upbringing for the protection of future
generations, and this is the responsibility of the family and other educational institutions, as well as
mosques and churches… Arab Christians are the closest to understand Islam and its real values”,
while Prince Ghazi bin Mohammad, Chief Advisor to King Abdullah II for Religious and Cultural
Affairs, maintained that “Christians were in this region before Muslims... They are suffering
…merely because they are Christians” (Transliteration from the original Arabic text by the
Researcher).
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ci8ngU5nAXk#t=22
accessed on September 28th, 2014
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Jews and Nasara 4 27%
Jews and crusaders 1 7%
Jews and Americans 1 7%
Jews and disbelievers 1 7%
Call for the use of force to curb wickedness 2 13%
Total 15
Apparently, Jews top the list of anathematized groups (73 percent in total),
whether referred to alone or together with other groups. This stigma in the
religious discourse should be viewed in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict, but
also engrained in religious teachings that People of the Book had deliberately
distorted their Holy Scriptures, henceforth borne the consequences of this act
against themselves and their progeny152.
The highest rate in referring to Jews came not in conjunction with the Americans,
Israel’s foremost political ally, or even with the historically political term of
“crusaders”, but to nasara, an idiom in the Quran which includes Arab Christians,
who in no way are viewed as enemies of Islam or allies to Israel. On the contrary,
the Arab and Palestinian struggle against Israel is replete with Christian persona
who spearheaded the cultural and armed struggle against Israel.
Although one preacher attributed this seemingly hate speech to a timely-driven
necessity to let the worshippers, by proxy of the minbar, fret about their frustration
against Christians and Jews in concurrence with the Western and Israeli
aggression against the Muslim nation, one term being used to describe the
Christians is “nasara”, a connotation to Arab Christians, including Jordanians.
152 Adang, Camilla P. "Torah" Encyclopaedia of the Qurān. General Editor: Jane Dammen
McAuliffe, Georgetown University, Washington DC, Brill, 2010, Brill Online, University of
Pennsylvania (18 October 2010, pp. 3 & 4).
Source: http://brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=q3_COM-00206
accessed on January 08th, 2015.
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This speech also defies the pretext posed by the government and legislators for
endorsing the 2006 Amendment to the Law; that is, to combat hate speech, and
the fact that Jordan had signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994 endorsed by
then sitting parliament, and the fact that many Jordanians adhere to the Christian
faith while a smaller portion belongs to the Shiite sect and the Quraniyoun. This
framing for the use of force (by calling Allah to grant Muslims victory against these
groups) is being used by the same preacher whose pretext for saying this is “to let
the worshippers fret about their frustration”.
In this regard, it is worth pinpointing to a concomitant survey153 which shows that
96 percent of Jordanians expressed an “unfavorable” view of Jews, while 73
percent expressed a “favorable” view towards Christians. Given the view toward
Christians in the general sense is reasonably favorable, it is unlikely that
Jordanians hold an unfavorable stance toward Jordanian Christians (nasara).
Antoun (1989) however recounts a rather negative view towards Christians and
Jews upheld by a Jordanian villager in the 1960s who believes these two groups
had distorted their holy books, and more importantly Christians who had
committed the unpardonable blasphemy of polytheism, therefore a deterrent to
give them Muslim girls in marriage. Therefore, it is more likely that the preachers
refer to Western Christians when they call upon Allah to curse Nasara, even when
the term itself pinpoints to local Christians, let alone the fact that Nasara is a
generic term used by the Quran in reference to ahl al-kitab, that is, Jews, and,
Nasara [all those who have the Christian Scriptures]. Add to this the notion that the
gradual increase in the “favorable” views and a gradual decrease in the
“unfavorable” views from 2005 up to 2008 is a sign that the Jordanian preachers
refer more to Western Christians, given the time proximity of the earlier survey to
the Western war against Iraq in 2003. The gradual increase in the “favorable” ratio
applies also to Jews, although in minimal margins, which explains that people’s
153 Source: http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/09/17/chapter-1-views-of-religious-groups/
accessed on July 12th, 2014.
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marginal propensity to express negative perceptions about the “other” tends to
decline as they move away from the bellicose points in history.
Antoun (p.237) citing Munson (1984:19) maintains that for the fundamentalists154,
moral choice, such as choice between God and Satan, is essential, but in the
Islamic sense what drives fundamentalism is the rage against Western
colonialism, especially the invasive and subtle cultural and economic penetration
which even surpasses political repression. In this purview fundamentalists
comprehend domination by foreign powers as an indication of anger by Allah, and
emancipation can only be attained by firm adherence to principles of the Quran.
The Researcher on his part did not sense any sort of exclusionism by the
worshippers whom he joined in their Friday prayers and socialized with during the
second half of 2008. None of the three Informants in the observation part of the
study conducted in the first half of 2011 denied alliance with a non-Muslim, at least
not with a Christian (the Researcher), as one of them has also had a Christian
superior staff at work, while another called the Jews “our cousins”. The third
Participant, a mosque preacher who was being banned from delivering sermons
for calling upon the audience not to greet Nasara on their religious holidays, sent
the Researcher a  Short Message Service in December 2014 saying “wishing you
a blessed eid [holiday]”.
Another stereotype being noticed, although in a minimal rate, is attacking Shiite
Islam by slamming their religious symbols such as Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-
general of Hezbollah, who at times gained popular support in the Arab world,
including Jordan155, especially following the 2006 war of attrition with Israel.
Besides, Shiites claim they were the descendants of Prophet Mohammad, or ahl
154 Munson (1984: 19) defines fundamentalism as “the belief that a specific set of sacred scriptures
are the divine and inerrant word of God and that all believers must conform to the literal text of
these scriptures in their everyday lives…”
155 Source:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2008/4/14%20middle%20east/0414_middle_east_telham
i.pdf   accessed on September 27th, 2014.
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al-bayt156, therefore contesting the Hashemite claim to this prophetic pedigree. To
turn a blind eye to this anti-Shiite rhetoric in the mosques goes in tandem with
Jordan’s foreign policy concerning the evolving “Shiite Crescent” which King
Abdullah II had first coined in 2004157. As the King was using a political term to
insinuate a religious sectarian threat to Jordan in addressing the Western media,
public diplomacy at home needs a religious mantle via minbar to stress both
dimensions, political and religious, henceforth engendering a homogenous Sunni
Islam which should stand aloof of any infiltration by the rival Shiite political-Islam
that is rife in Iran, Iraq [thousands of Iraqi refugees live in Jordan], Lebanon, and
Syria.
Another religious recipe for dealing with wickedness in society is the following,
Messenger of Allah (Peace be upon him) said, "Whoever amongst you sees
an evil, he must change it with his hand; if he is unable to do so, then with
his tongue; and if he is unable to do so, then with his heart; and that is the
weakest form of Faith", [narrated by Muslim].158
This induction embeds a framing on how to straighten society; to object iniquity if
not workable by hand then by word and heart. This decree for the use of force
(hand) to deter wickedness (although another preacher restricted the use of force
to scholars and the pious), is entwined in the same sermon by cursing the
“enemies of Islam, whether Arabs or non-Arabs”, hence indirectly pinpointing to
Jews and Christians, and probably to the Shiites. In a civic state which does not




accessed on September 27th, 2014.
157 Source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/26/worlddispatch.ianblack
accessed on September 27th, 2014.
158 Source: http://sunnah.com/riyadussaliheen/1/184 accessed on August 22nd, 2015.
من رأى منكم منكرا فلیغیره بیده، فإن لم یستطع : (سمعت رسول هللا صلى هللا علیھ وسلم یقول: عن أبي سعید الخدري رضي هللا عنھ قال"
."رواه مسلم) فبلسانھ، فإن لم یستطع فبقلبھ، وذلك أضعف اإلیمان
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rule of law to deter wickedness. This encroachment on the social contract by the
preacher is being indirectly given legitimacy by a policy of turning a blind eye by
the State. On the other hand, the impact of this speech on the worshippers is
unlikely to bear hostile actions on the ground in the short run, although in the long
run it may cultivate an increased propensity to resort to violence in case the State
has failed to monopolize the use of force in a tense and volatile region. Sheikh
Wael Battiri agrees that,
“such an impact on the worshipper is negligible given the majority of the
worshippers pray only on Friday and listen to the sermon whereas the mind
is dormant, and they do so only to stave off social answerability about
fulfilling this main religious duty, unlike other pious worshippers (a minority)
who pray and listen to the sermon as a guidance to their mundane life”159.
A concurrent event to some of the subject sermons was Muslims commemorating
the incineration of al-Aqsa Mosque160 in Jerusalem. Jarrar stated that,
“…the state even after tightening its control does not enjoy complete
hegemony over the mosque and its religious space. Critical Imams refer to
the use of religious symbols and analogies from Quran to discuss political
topics and mobilize opposition as a legal “loophole” in which the
government cannot contradict or punish for”. (p.51)
While interviewed deputy Maayah views that,
159 This opoinion by Battiri was gleaned in a telephone conversation with the Researcher on August
22nd, 2015.
160 In Islam, al-Aqsa mosque (al-Masjid al-Aqsa) is the second oldest, after Al-Ka'ba mosque in
Mecca, and the third most holy and important in Sunni Islam after the Mecca and Medina
mosques. In 1969, arson by a non-Jewish Australian tourist “destroyed a priceless one-
thousand-year-old wood and ivory pulpit (minbar) that had been sent from Aleppo by Saladin.
Damage to the mosque later was restored by contributions from Jordan at a cost of about
$US9 million’.
Source: http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_alaqsa_fire_1969.php
accessed on October 21st, 2010.
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"the Amendment to the Law has managed to control these issues [through]
establishing preconceived conditions for him [the preacher] so that only an
authorized person can speak out".
Apparently, the 2006 amendment has failed to curtail hate speech, but one can
also infer that the State did not intend to strictly apply pertinent penalties as the
change in relevant legislations was initially meant to deal with a political contingent
situation related to the war against terrorism and the local need to curb the
influence of Muslim Brotherhood movement which who opposed the 1994 peace
treaty with Israel and boycotted several parliamentary elections.
In an interview with former deputy Hamza Mansour, this Muslim Brotherhood
leading figure said he was banned from delivering sermons in 1993 following the
western invasion of Baghdad, then allowed back for a short period before being
banned again in 2008. Mansour depicts "cracking down on officials" and "always
talking about Palestine and the Jews" as the pretexts which officials had drawn to
proscribe him. Another preacher in Aqaba, former deputy Bader Saleh Riati, said,
"I started preaching in 1972 until 1994 when I became a candidate
[parliament]. Throughout this period I was banned from preaching three
times for a period of two years, and the reason was that I tackled the
reconciliation with the Jews, the Camp David treaty and the Arab leaders'
dash to peace".
Riati alluded to speech targeting Jews as hate speech which the state bans
following the peace treaty with Israel in 1994. This view is further corroborated by
former deputy and Muslim Brotherhood hardliner Dr. Mohammad Abu Fares, who
said,
"since 1993 I was banned from delivering sermons that is 16 years. That
was after meetings with the minister [of awqaf] who would say: you speak
and aim at spreading awareness among people by infusing the spirit of fight
and attacking the enemies of Allah... with whom we have the Araba peace
treaty... You in fact warn people against the danger of this treaty".
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Thus, a reading of this policy is that the State, having achieved its goal of stripping
the Islamic movement of one of its main platforms used to enlist public support, is
not now keen to fully enforce the Law given it has already fulfilled the purpose
behind endorsing the Amendment to the Law.
Jarrar (2009) contends that the State policy in countering radical Islamic
opposition focuses on a sense of balance between curbing radical ideology (which
utilizes instrumental political objectives to recruit supporters and radicalize the
people), and marginalizing oppositional dissent without turning it into a
fundamentalist opposition that solicits sympathy by the public, inspire pious
indoctrination and a resulting resort to violent behavior. Act 19 of Article 13 of the
Political Parties law of the year 2007 reads,
“a. Parties are entitled to use the state’s public facilities after taking a prior
permission from the Minister and in coordination with the concerned
authority, b. the funds, equipment, venues of professional associations,
charitable societies, religious institutions for the interest shall not be used
by and for the purposes of any partisan organization, c. premises and
buildings of religious institutions and mosques shall not be used for any
partisan activity.”161
Jarrar (2009) adds that one of the main aims of radical Islamists is to provoke the
State into espousing security measures that expose the limits of the rule of law.
Nonetheless, the State will fall to radicals’ strategy if it fails to make a distinction
between political actors (i.e. Muslim Brotherhood movement which vocally shuns
violence as its policy and abide by democratic means), and other Islamist
movements who resort to violence as their modus operandi such as the jihadists,
beside the fact that this approach is inefficient in preventing the extremists from
spreading their thought through the mosque as their informal ground to recruit
people.
161 Source: http://www.nchr.org.jo/english/Publications/AnnualReports.aspx
accessed on July 22nd, 2011.
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The Researcher views that although most of the mosques are being purged of
radical orators, whether jihadists or those who belong to Muslim Brotherhood,
persistent hate speech and the call for violence are signs that this speech still
appeals to the public (or at least during certain but cyclic situations such as the
Western war on terrorism or al-Aqsa mosque memorial). As such, some preachers
who do not belong to either group (Muslim Brotherhood or the jihadist salafi
thought) would push the envelope furthermore by enforcing people’s established
attitudes through generating messages that support these attitudes and ideologies
that sustain them. The State162 uses this clemency as a mantle to unravel
preachers who sympathize with these two groups and become possible recruits
who might embrace their narrative and modus operandi. By doing this the State
can build its counter policy and discourse. This policy views a controllable
presence of jihadists and radical Muslim Brotherhood members in Jordan as a
necessary antidote to preempt and deter their external threat, without which the
internal threat would remain clandestine and obscure.
3.2.6. Du’a (Supplication to Allah):
If we exclude religious content of ritualistic formula in du’a, supplication that
concludes the Friday congregational sermon mostly falls within the rubric of
political content, nevertheless, the Researcher opts to assign it a separate
category given this component comes after the preacher has finished addressing
the prime sermon topic, but uses du’a in order to frame and pass on certain
explicit and tacit messages.
Du’a contains almost the same religious wording repeated in every sermon, mainly
bestowing divine prayer and blessings upon Prophet Mohammad, his household
and companions, and the Muslim nation at large, reminiscent to Allah’s blessings
162 An interview with an anonymous State security brass conducted as part of a separate study the
Researcher conducted in March 2015.
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upon Ibrahim (Prophet Abraham). Otherwise, most salient and important in du’a is
when the preacher alludes to the Muslim ruler either by totally ignoring the King
(whether mentioning his name in different formula or ignoring it), or invoking the
king/ruler to “rule according to the Quran and sunna instead of unjust manmade
laws”, therefore a frame that construes an exhortation to bring the regime closer to
an Islamic state. This disparity between a Western-style State (whose religion is
Islam but Quran is not the source of legislation) and a state whose shari’a is the
law (as invoked by the preachers) is apparent as some of the Informants in the
“participant observation” part agree with the preacher not ascribing honorific title to
the king while at the same time they collaborate with the security apparatus.
Only one third of Jordanians view that Islam currently plays a large role in the
political life of the country163, two thirds deem this role as “small” while eight-in-ten
view this “small role” as “negative” for Jordan. It is therefore expectable of the
worshippers to listen to the preacher invoking the king to rule according to Islam.
On his side, the preacher presumably knows these expectations do exist in the
mindset of a highly religious audience, therefore the need to axiomatically nourish
their expectations with this connotation in his supplication, a proposition also
posed by Pederson (1950) who, cited in Antoun (1989), views that the preacher
constantly speaks on behalf of the people.
These considerations delineate the limits of the religious speech presented in a
political framework; actually a prosaic content with no impact on the ground except
that of letting the audience express their fretfulness by proxy, especially in time
when the political atmosphere is heightened, a trend which ultimately serves
certain interests of the State.
Following is the as in the 24 attended sermons:
163 Source: A survey by Pew Global Attitudes Project conducted in Jordan during spring 2008.
Sample size (national): 1,000; Margin of error: three percent; Mode: face-to-face.
Source: http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/chapter-3-role-of-islam-in-politics/
accessed on July 11th, 2014.
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Total Du’a = 24
Du’a for
the king











3 21 17 10 7 8
13% 87% 81% 59% 41% 47%
The above table shows that 21 out of the 24 preachers bring the sermon to a
classification of du’a close with du’a that exceeds the customary sheer religious
supplication [du’a+ in the table]. Seventeen sermons out of these 21 (81 percent)
include a certain du’a for the king, among them 10 sermons (59 percent) embed
calls for the king to rule according to the Quran, including two preachers who
called upon the king to stay away from hypocrisy and not to rule according to
“unjust manmade laws”. It is worthy to note that these two preachers had also
propagated instigating speech against Christians and/or Jews, adding a call for
Muslims to support the mujahedeen worldwide.
Seven preachers (41 percent) called for Allah to bless the king (grant him victory,
wisdom, protection, guidance, and an entourage of devout people), among them
only two who called upon the king to “rule according to Quran”.
Ten of the 17 preachers who mentioned the king addressed him merely as “al-
malik” [the king], or, “malik al-bilad” [king of the homeland]; another two called him
“raa’i al-bilad” [shepherd of the homeland], while the remaining three called him by
his name, King Abdullah, but none of these five preachers called upon the king to
rule according to the Quran.
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Apparently, to rule according to the Quran should not be in contrast with the claim
to prophetic lineage by the Hashemite dynasty164. The State is tolerant to a
rhetoric which engenders a symbolic Islamic identity as long as this speech does
not instigate anti-regime sentiments. On the contrary, the regime uses this policy
as a modus vivendi to endure. Accordingly, the Jordanian regime and its extended
arm in society employs the religious space and its pertinent regulations as a
muzzle to curb the Islamic opposition, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood movement,
and strip it from this platform to contest the State in shaping the public mood
(Jarrar p. 47). In the same vein, the regime opens up for an alternative speech to
fill in the vacuum in the religious space in concordance with the dominant ideology
and society’s tendency for increased religiosity. Dietram et al cited Morgan &
Signorelli (1990) states that,
“Cultivation means that dominant modes of cultural production tend to
generate messages and representations that nourish and sustain the
dominant ideologies, world views, perspectives and practices of the
institutions and cultural contexts from which they arise”.
The Researcher interprets the one fifth of sermons avoiding any citation to the king
as a tacit undermining to the monarchy by some preachers who, albeit have no
allegiance with the Muslim Brotherhood movement or other fundamentalist
streams, they still carry a dose of religiosity that is at odds with the semi-secular
nature of the State. By doing so, these preachers avoid being at odds with the
Islamic teaching if they pay homage to the ruler/caliphate and avert direct clash
with the security apparatus. One inference is that these preachers (in addition to
the other two who did mention the king, urged him to rule according to the Quran
but also hinted to hypocrisy and manmade laws) try to obliquely water down the
prophetic pedigree acclaimed by the king. One example is former preacher Wael
Battiri who says that awqaf officials would summon him and urge him not to
discuss politics in his sermons, but require him to include du’a for “King Abdullah”.
164 Shteiwi (1996) viewed that in Jordan “The State derives its religious legitimacy by declaring
Islam as the official religion of the State and by tracing the origin of the Royal family back to the
Hashemite family of the Prophet.”
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Battiri would pay a lip service by calling upon all Muslim rulers to abide by shari’a,
bless them if they adhere to shari’a and beseech Allah to correct their path of they
did not. If official pressure intensifies, this once banned preacher would frame the
message by merely mentioning malik al-bilad [king of the homeland]. As for
politics, Battiri would frame the message by talking about certain religious topics
which already embed political significance wherein the audience has enough wit to
read between the lines and unearth the preacher’s encoded message. One
example is surah (4:59) which says,
“O you, who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those
in authority among you…”
Although this verse ostensibly invokes the Muslim believers to obey their Muslim
ruler, Battiri puts forth a condition for this act of obedience, that the ruler himself
ought to be obedient to Allah and his Messenger, otherwise he is not worthy of the
people’s obedience.
This kind of speech uttered by dissonant preachers functions as a frame to abate
the regime’s claim of prophetic pedigree given the government does not apply
shari’a as the law, therefore a tactic by the preacher to come to a middle ground
with the officialdom. Another notice that sustains this conclusion is the ten
preachers who, through du’a, they send messages invoking the regime to rule
according to the Quran but without ascribing any honorific title to the king, nor
would they cajole the regime by even mentioning the king’s name!
The fact the State is keen that preachers do mention the king’s name in du’a is
view upheld by Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, the renowned jihadist doctrinaire
whose interview on February 15th, 2010 reveals the salafi recruits were being
interrogated by the security apparatus who reprimanded them for not mentioning
the king by his name and bestow blessings upon him in their sermons. In addition,
interviewee Emad Maayah (a former high ranking brass and Head of the National
Steering Committee in parliament who described the Committee's role as "active
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role in articulating the Amendment to the Law"), included "supplication to his
majesty the king" among the basic roles of the mosque.
On the other hand, only two of the seven preachers who blessed the king, and
none of the five who expressed some revere to his name, urged him to rule
according to the Quran.
The concordance of a pro-regime speech which avoids an invocation to instil a yet
more religious foundation for the State is a framing praxis which some preachers
resort to in order to back the regime’s legitimacy. The Researcher views that what
enhances the preponderance of this speech is the evolving legal environment
which necessarily brings into play a type of discourse that sends the State and the
public eclectic messages while still working within the confines of pertinent
regulations. The legitimate platform for this speech is the du’a which ought to stay
aloof of political essence165, but is being employed as a conduit to pass on desired
structures of meaning by different actors when loading the sermon with this
speech might be difficult.
Eight sermons ended with du’a to bless the mujahedeen, mostly citing jihadists in
Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Somalia, Iraq and Chechnya. Although in Islam
jihad in the broader sense entails spiritual discipline and the pursuit of personal
piousness to attain virtue166, preachers limit their supplication to bellicose jihad,
mostly in countries where al-Qaeda jihadists thrive. Half of these sermons contain
speech which embeds instigation against the “enemies of Islam”, disbelievers,
Jews, Christians or a combination of these groups. Worth mentioning here that
most of the jihadist doctrinaires are Jordanians of Palestinian origin who had
165 Sheikh Wael Battiri explained to the Researcher that du’a was not part of the sermon in the
earlier Muslim era, but was introduced into Friday sermon during the Umayyad caliphate when the
religious space was being used to prop up the legitimacy of the successive caliphs.
166 Jihad is defined as “a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; a personal struggle
in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline”.
Source: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jihad
accessed on October 03rd, 2014.
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furnished for the ideological foundation of belligerent jihad, namely Abdullah Yusuf
Azzam, Abu Anas Al-Shami, Abu Mohammad Al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada Al-
Filistini. Therefore, in times when “aggression against Islam and Muslims” makes
the news, a common denominator for the preachers is to follow suit and nourish
the audience with rhetoric that appeals to the masses, at least half of whom are
Jordanians of Palestinian origin, some Iraqis and Egyptians or even Jordanians
with strong affinity to the issue of Palestine and the defense of Islam.
Other du’a calls upon Allah to safeguard Muslims from price hike (four sermons),
send rain (two sermons); heal the sick (one sermon); safety for Jordan (one
sermon); restoring al-Aqsa mosque (one sermon); other appeals of mere religious
nature (four sermons). Again, all of these supplications mentioned “Muslims” as
the recipients of Allah’s blessings. For the worshipper, this kind of discourse might
not seem exclusionary towards the “other” citizen or seeding bigotry in society, as
86 percent of the responding worshippers (Questionnaire- Chapter Seven) did not
sense a call for extremism or negative perceptions by the preacher. The supra
survey which denotes how Jordanians perceive Christians in general and the
inference from the participant observation part uphold this conclusion.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS OF THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF ISSUES RELATED TO FRIDAY
SERMON AND THE MOSQUE SETTING
FROM 2007 TILL 2010
4.1. Methodology
The aim of this part of the study is to categorize and analyze the main issues
covered in the local press and online journalism, in addition to readers’ interaction
with the pertinent news and reports. Throughout four years of sporadic observation
(2007 – 2010), the study will provide us with insight on what the daily newspapers
and news websites published of news related to Friday sermon and its communal
context in the mosque, and how do comments and reactions by the readers/users
developed regarding these news, namely State interference in the religious sphere
in the aftermath of enacting the 2006 regulations targeting the mosque speech.
This is being done in an a posteriori approach, that is, allowing the media content
to guide the Researcher in categorizing the content and therefore in the direction
of analysis.
The Researcher tracked down news and comments by readers published in
Jordan’s five main daily newspapers (print and online), Petra news agency website
(official) and several electronic (news) websites. The aim is to view how much
salient news and comments by the readers and pertinent actors corroborate with
other research findings in the analysis parts of each chapter. After reading the
news and comments by online readers, a comparison is drawn on how the
opinions of officials and those of the readers developed throughout the years.
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4.2. Categorization/ Reading of the Data
The following chart depicts change in the quantity of news and comments





















2007 3 10% 2 1% 0 0% 1 5% 6 2%
2008 4 14% 4 3% 0 0% 4 21% 12 5%
2009 11 38% 4 3% 0 0% 4 21% 19 7%
2010 11 38% 139 93% 63 100% 10 53% 223 86%
Total/
Percentage
29 11% 149 57% 63 24% 19 7% 260 100%
The above table shows a gradual rise in the four categories (news about sermon
content, news about state interference, and readers/users’ reaction whether pro or
con), but on the other hand, a sudden preponderance of relevant news and
comments in the year 2010 (86%). Noteworthy to say that from 2007 to 2010,
internet penetration by Jordanians has almost doubled167, yet readers tend to
comment more via news websites than through online newspapers, most of which
have an editorial tradition not to publish readers’ comments, if any. Apparently, it
took the readers/users a few years to feel the newly introduced State intervention
and its impact on the quality of sermons. This period also witnessed a heated
climate between the State and Muslim Brotherhood movement.
News about State interference and news concerning sermon content raise
167 Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/jo.htm
accessed on March 29th, 2014.
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perpetually, therefore a correlation between the two categories, which reflects in
the readers being sharply divided with regard to State intervention, a telltale that
although people prefer quality sermons, one third of the commentators in 2010 (63
pro vs. 139 con) can unravel the political motives that drove the State to enact the
new regulations, therefore their backing to the government whose motive was to
target the Muslim Brotherhood movement and not to curtail religiosity per se in
society. This pro-State ratio, although a minority, speaks of politicized worshippers
who deem the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement with political motives than of
pure religious dawa message.
Online interaction related to the religious sphere, especially the resulting
gravitation between the State and Islamists, is of apparent concern by people
given the number of worshippers who attend and listen to the weekly Friday
sermons addressing life-felt issues and political occurring at homeland and the
volatile region around. One news report generated 119 comments, half of which
were posted on Saturday, a weekend holiday for the public and private sector
employees who enjoy relative access to the Internet at work168. Nevertheless, their
active engagement in commenting on this news on their day-off is a sign of
substantial access to the Internet at home or elsewhere169, and a high concern
about the subject issue. On the other hand, this policy to ostracize the movement’s
preachers, in addition to curtailing the reach of mosque microphones, among other
procedures, has consequently left its footprint on the content and reach of Friday
sermons. This could be the motive behind the majority of comments by readers
and worshippers who disavow and vocally object State intervention in Friday
sermons, as their rate outnumber those who condone it (approx. 70 percent and
30 percent respectively).
168 Approximately 99 percent of public sector facilities and 74 percent of private sector facilities
have access to the Internet. Source: Survey of the Use of Information and Communications
Technology inside Facilities, 2010, Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.
169 Proportion of computer use for personal purposes in 2010 is 91.1 percent; for work purposes
16.9 percent; and for learning and practicing 56.3 percent.
Source: Selected Communications and Information Indicators, Department of Statistics 2010-2012.
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Following the Amendment to the Law 2006, preachers affiliated with Muslim
Motherhood are being banned from delivering Friday sermons at mosques, and by
2010, the result of this policy has become evident. As stated in the interviews
section, both the movement’s figures and State officials attest to the fact that
unqualified preachers occupy the mosque podiums. In spite of attempts by
ministry of awqaf to qualify a number of Imams and preachers, the ubiquitous
presence of mosques in the Kingdom and a low pay rate for this job rendered this
profession unappealing for most of the shari’a graduates, with a resulting shortage
in their cadre that has become a tedious issue for the government to resolve170,
and eventually limited improvement in this situation.
The political context of this situation was such that in 2009, King Abdullah II
dissolved parliament, halfway before the maturity of its four-year mandate, on the
basis the House had passed unprofessional legislations and failed to tackle
poverty and unemployment. The pertinent electoral law was a one-man-one-vote
system, which limits the reach of Islamist candidates to the favor of tribal figures.
The Islamic Action Front decided to boycott the upcoming elections, whose
discourse is counteracted by a ‘civil state’ discourse by the king, with no
alternative agency to fill in the gap in a highly religious society. As evident in some
news items (see Annex# Three), the government resorted to mosque preachers to
encourage voting and tackle mundane issues (whilst politics-savvy preachers were
being ousted), but the result was counter-effective as seen in the commentary of
an academia,
"Friday sermon has become habitual, boring and without arousing
sentiments of devotion within the devout, after those who now stand up the
podiums are the unqualified in education, culture and eloquence"171.
170 In March 2014, the government decided to hire Imams and mosque servants from Egypt to
cover the shortage in staff.
171 Dr. Mohammad Oqla, Dean of Faculty of Shari'a at Yarmouk University, Al Ghad Newspaper, p.
15 (07/04/2010).
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Also, observing the behavior of the Informants (Participant Observation- Chapter
Five) shows that even pro-State worshippers disavow the preacher/Imam if they
feel his religious injunctions and edicts are being tainted by State intervention, no
matter whether this guidance by the preacher agrees with the tenets of Islam or
not.
One salient issue which has borne dynamic comments by the readers is a decree
announced by the government in September 2009 limiting the use of mosque
microphones to exclusively broadcast the call for prayer and the following prayers,
but not Friday sermon. The vast majority of the readers objected this decision by-
refuting its justification by the government which on the other hand shrugs off
noise caused by weddings and pubs; attributing it to State’s affinity to the West
and USA; deeming this decree a gradual attempt by the government to ban other
Islamic manifestations in a presumably Islamic country. On the other hand, worth
mentioning here that in September 2009, Muslim Brotherhood hardliner leader
Hamza Mansour agreed with this official decree172, and justified it as,
“Reading Quran and delivering Friday sermons through microphones is
unnecessary for the Muslim to heed prayer time, because Friday sermon is
merely for the sake of those inside the mosque, not for those outside. In
addition, mosques are ubiquitous in every district and broadcasting al-
adhan [call for prayer] via microphones is to alert the negligent to come to
pray… Quran should be revered even when listening to it…”
On April 02nd, 2014, the Researcher interviewed Mansour again on this issue173
who gave the same justification, saying the movement’s opposition to State
decisions is not a blanket one, but limited to “erroneous legislations and policies”.
The Researcher views that three years after the 2006 Amendment, whence the
172 Source: http://www.assawsana.com/portal/newsshow.aspx?id=35867
accessed on September 01st, 2010.
173 Interview audio-recorded and was conducted at Mansour’s office at the Islamic Action Front in
Amman.
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movement members are being sacked off this vital means of communication with
its grassroots and the public at large, the movement has become indifferent to it,
or even prefers to see this ban apply also to non-Muslim Brotherhood preachers
(especially the salafis)174, therefore its blithely reaction to this additional decree of
State censorship. In the supra mentioned interview, Mansour did not even
remember the 2006 Amendment to the law, although he had then (2007-2011)
chaired the Islamist parliamentary bloc, and even back in the 1993 parliament, the
then deputy had argued that,
“We were under intense pressure in the pulpits and mosques”.175
This oblivion by a top Islamist figure to an important legislation signifies that eight
years after the new regulation which ousted the movement’s preachers and limited
their reach to the worshippers, the Amendment per se is no more an earmark in
the political reminiscence of this Islamic leader; that the Islamic movement has
acquired alternative means of communication to influence the public opinion; or
the movement has adapted to the new reality after the Law has taken its toll on the
religious sphere. Another possible explanation is a gesture questioning the
importance of the Amendment to the law, or that Mansour really does not
remember this regulatory change given his reportedly ailing health condition at the
time of the interview176.
Most covered issues are news about the worshippers complaining from the
shortage in mosque Imams and preachers, therefore leaving it for the unqualified
to deliver sermons and causing disruptions among the pious. The Ministry of
174 In July 2015, former preacher Wael Battiri attested to the Researcher the preponderance of the
salafi preachers in fiqh issues as compared to the Muslim Brotherhood preachers whose
excellence lies in their capacity to organize well and to stir political emotions of the worshippers.
175 Source: http://www.al-sijill.com/sijill_items/sitem5331.htm
accessed on April 11th, 2014 (Transliteration from the original Arabic text by the Researcher).
176 Source http://www.jordanews.com/jordan/25817.html
accessed on December 29th, 2014.
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Awqaf attributed the shortage in its cadre to the fact that people abstain from
assuming this underpaid job with its preconditions, while analyst Mohammad Abu
Rumman177 opines that,
"...State preachers and orators are often void of a balanced and coherent
vision on fiqh, especially after the Ministry of Awqaf has excluded most of
the Muslim Brotherhood movement preachers who - politics aside- are the
most capable, trained, and qualified to deliver intellectual fiqh [Islamic
jurisprudence] discourse".
This view is conforming to the way Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including those
who assumed official positions, interpret the appropriation of Imamate and
preaching posts by the State and the exclusion of the movement’s sheikhs from
these positions. Minister of Awqaf admits to the shortage in Imams, but asserts
that all mosques are manned with qualified preachers178. This political bureaucrat
counted 2,500 preachers who hold a university degree, which leaves more than
3,500 mosques of the approximately 5,500 mosques in the Kingdom179 with
preachers of either middle college degree, higher school degree or even a lesser
educational qualification. Whereas the Department of Statistics records 909 male
preachers in 2008180, among them 500 university graduates and 409 non-
university graduates, serving 4,962 operating mosques in the kingdom. The pun
here is that the minister might have also counted the Imams (2,386 Imams in
2008) whose primary task does not include delivering sermons, which explains the
discrepancy in his alleged numbers.
177 Source: http://www.alghad.com/index.php?article=7889&searchFor= السجون"\وعاظ في  \ published
on Al Ghad newspaper (06/01/2008). See Annex I, p.31 (translation by the Researcher).
178 Al Rai newspaper, (30/10/2010), See Annex I, p.1.
179 Source: Minsitry of Awqaf website http://www.awqaf.gov.jo/pages.php?menu_id=90
accessed on November 18th, 2010.
180 Including speakers from outside the ministry.
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The following chart shows the number of mosques and preachers181 in each














1 Amman 2,367,000 39% 1406 27% 165 18% 1,683
5 Irbid 1,088,100 18% 868 16% 228 25% 1,254
2 Zarqa 910,800 15% 615 8% 83 9% 1,481
4 Balqa 409,500 7% 347 7% 126 14% 1,180
6 Mafraq 287,300 5% 659 12% 78 8% 436
9 Karak 238,400 4% 394 7% 38 4% 605
8 Jarash 183,400 3% 214 4% 44 5% 857
3 Madaba 152,900 3% 168 3% 37 4% 910
7 Ajloun 140,600 2% 138 3% 50 5% 1,019
12 Aqaba 133,200 2% 90 2% 3 0.3% 1,480
11 Maan 116,200 2% 208 4% 28 3% 559
10 Tafilah 85,600 1% 170 3% 47 5% 504
Total/
Percentage
6,113,000 100% 5277 100% 927 100%
181 Source: http://awqaf.gov.jo/uploaded/pdfs/al-nasharah%20al-e7sa2eyah.pdf
accessed on May 02nd, 2014.
182 Researcher grouped different directorates to their governorate for easy match (Irbid governorate
includes Ramtha, Al-Koura and Northern Aghwar directorates; and Zarqa governorates includes
Rusaifa directorate)
183 Source: http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_a/jorfig/2010/3_1.pdf
accessed on May 02nd, 2014.
184 Not on the payroll of ministry of awqaf.
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The above chart depicts a relatively proportionate distribution of mosques to
citizens in the four densest governorates, namely Amman, Irbid, Zarqa and Balqa,
but an uneven manning of mosques with preachers. Albeit a stronghold for the
Muslim Brotherhood movement, Irbid is a tribal governorate that has a higher
percentage of preachers when compared to Zarqa, the main stronghold for the
movement and highly populated with Jordanians of Palestinian origin and jihadist
salafis, therefore a lesser tendency by the government to have preachers on its
payroll from this city.
A chart185 showing the change in the number of new established mosques
demonstrates a gradual decrease in the years 2007 and 2008, namely 175 and
149 mosques, after it was 348 mosques in 2006. One logical explanation is the
need to man these mosques with preachers after the number of available
preachers has dropped down following the 2006 Amendment to the Law of
preaching, therefore a drop in the propensity to license the new mosques in order
to mitigate and obfuscate the impact of the new regulation which has resulted in
the layout and banning of several preachers.
To further inquire on this issue the Researcher interviewed by a telephone call on
May 08th, 2014 Abdul’ilah al-Takhayneh, legal advisor of the Ministry of Awqaf. al-
Takhayneh disagrees with the Researcher’s explanation and attributes this “timely”
decrease to the natural increase in population and the resulting need to decide
whether to construct new mosques or not, therefore mosques being constructed to
meet the emerging need, then this process would stop if the need recedes back.
Besides, mosques are being built by charity donors among the people then
relegated to the ministry to oversee by law.
News coverage and respective comments by the readers depict the government
being active in having Imams and preachers undergo training on life-felt issues
185 Source: http://awqaf.gov.jo/uploaded/pdfs/al-nasharah%20al-e7sa2eyah.pdf
accessed on May 02nd, 2014.
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(i.e. corruption, social security, parental life, partum health, drugs, traffic
accidents), but leaving the majority of the mosques with preachers unqualified to
tackle these themes.
This is a telltale sign that the official policy to control the religious space deprived
most of the mosques in the kingdom of their qualified preachers, or manned them
with preachers unqualified to deliver convincing and nourishing content to the
public. This policy has aggravated the situation as compared to the era prior to the
2006 law Amendment, whence the Muslim Brotherhood movement had managed
to amass public support through its eloquent and well-paid cadre of preachers.
When compared to the movement’s preachers backed by the movement, less
qualified preachers on payroll by the government have a lesser chance to secure
jobs elsewhere, therefore their being keen to heed the social and official redlines
and deliver sermons that do not enlist public support to the movement. Whether
they deliver quality sermons or not, or whether they tackle life-felt issues in
concordance with the public mood, are issues irrelevant directly to their job
security, although the Researcher based on direct observation to sermons views
that preachers sometimes do address issues that appeal to public sentiments such
as foreign attack on Islamic symbols. Participant observation by the Researcher
denotes the worshipper being inclined to change the mosque he regularly goes to,
usually the closest to his house, if he feels the preacher is influenced by the State
or the group of worshippers he joins are subject to state security surveillance.
Apparently, when the government orchestrated the new regulations on mosques,
the ramifications of the resulting shortage in preachers would weigh less than the
cost of leaving the hand of the Muslim Brotherhood movement free to control the
religious fora. Interviewed General Secretary of the movement, Sheikh Hamza
Mansour, said that,
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"Ulama [scholars] and Du'at [preachers] well experienced in khitaba
[sermonizing] and teaching were being ousted... and replaced by people
who would not trespass the official stance outlined by Ministry of Awqaf".
Former deputy and Islamist figure Taysir Fityani posed a similar explanation,
"Through inquiries posed to Ministry [of Awqaf], we came to know that after
the Law was endorsed, 1300 khatibs [preachers] were graduates of high
school or less and are not holders of a Shari'a certificate. How come the
unqualified are allowed to practice one of the most important and
dangerous professions! ... This is a venue for extremism and placing the
wrong man in the right place".
Another former deputy and Islamist figure in Aqaba, Sheikh Bader Saleh al-Riati,
who was banned several times, describes his own experience as,
"I was not allowed again until 2008, but this time the ban took place via
phone call by the director of Awqaf saying (you are banned until a further
notice). That was in May 2009; why? I do not know!"
Press coverage, interviews and thematic analysis to sermons demonstrate that the
worshippers do complain about the low quality of State-assigned preachers,
influential preachers being banned (often without justification); sermons still embed
hate speech and condone violence. These observations defy the official
justification behind endorsing the 2006 Amendment and the guiding principles of
the Amman Message the king had launched in 2004. However, field participant
observation by the Researcher does not depict a translation of this antagonistic
speech into physical act on the ground or even social exclusion, except with
regard to the Shiite sect of Islam in tandem with the rise of political dissent
between Sunni and Shiite Islam in the region.
Criticism by the worshippers to consecutive governments does not necessarily
reflect in a blanket support for the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Comments by
the readers indicate that when it comes to the movement backing certain State
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policies (i.e. limiting the use of microphones to the mosque’s inner hall)186, the
majority of comments rebuffed justifications posed by both State and the
movement. In addition, complaints by the worshippers go beyond the Imam's
credentials in oratory and religious jurisprudence to pinpoint to his reported
behavior in the mosque (i.e. malfunction of finances, lack of social interaction with
the mosque community). The State's grip on the religious communal space and its
parallel appropriation of the movement’s main source of finance, namely the
Islamic Center Society, illustrates the movement's inability to man mosques with
influential and committed preachers, therefore the resulting bemoan by the online
users.
Both newspapers and online websites depict very limited interaction between the
readers and Ministry of Awqaf, especially on its own website or on local news
websites. There is no online ombudsman or even counter comments by the
ministry to these complaints. Even in the local press, a lack of transparency and
accountability by the ministry is apparent. Dissatisfied by a mainstream newspaper
which published an article written by a female reader (who complained against a
Friday sermon which propagated incitement targeting women), the ministry
spokesperson reproved the newspaper for not referring to the ministry for
opinion187 before publishing this comment. This is stark example of a policy of
obfuscation and censorship by the government to sermon-related issues published
in mainstream press.
186 Sources:
- http://www.assawsana.com/portal/newsshow.aspx?id=35865  (01/09/2010);
http://www.assawsana.com/portal/newsshow.aspx?id=35867 (01/09/2010);
http://ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNo=70290 (28/09/2010);
- Ad-dustour newspaper (09/03/2008);
- Al Ghad newspaper (26/08/2009).
See Annex I.
187 Al Rai newspaper, (30/10/2010). See Annex I, p.1. The government has more than a 60 percent
share in the capital of Al Rai, the largest newspaper in Jordan.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
The Researcher employed ‘participant observation’ in as much as the available
resources allowed (three collaborators/Informants for a six months period from
January 2011 till July 2011). Therefore this tool does not amount to full-fledge
cultural immersion in an ethnography approach, but a close eye on the sermon,
the preacher, the worshippers and the context given that frames in rhetorical
communication affect all of these actors. The aim is to describe the basis unit
(individual participation and views), which should serve as an inductive tool to
measure a social order that is more collective as shown in the interviews with the
concerned actors (Chapter Six).
Herewith is a typology of the observations which emerged in an a posteriori mode,
that is, grouping the observations after the period of study has come to an end,
therefore letting the final product of this field study guide the Researcher in
discovering and demystifying which issues became salient throughout this
interaction. These angles are: the Informant’s choice of the mosque; Informant’s
association with fellow worshippers; Informant’s association with friends and family
members; State and the mosque; Informant’s personal behaviour; Informant’s
authority reference. As for the Informants’ attitudes toward the Researcher, they
are embedded in Chapter One for relevance purposes.
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5.1. Analysis of the Research
5.1.1. Choice of the Mosque
Mosques are ubiquitous in Jordan (more than six thousand mosques catering to
four million citizens and seven million expats188) making it easy for the worshippers
to access a worship place to perform their due prayers and rituals. The Ministry of
Awqaf has a special directorate with the mandate of maintaining existing mosques,
forming committees and commissions to establish and run additional mosques,
maintaining their contents, overseeing their libraries and developing mosques to
serve local communities189.
By observing the behavior of the three Informants, the only common factor
regarding the decision where to pray on Friday is nearness of the mosque to one’s
residence. As for Informant SJ, this condition would change if the preacher did not
relate the sermon to the political occurring. The vicinity factor would also change if
the sermon was lengthy; limited to pure religious substance that lacks dealing with
life-felt issues; preacher did not resemble a role model for the worshipper (i.e.
because of his political stance, something the neighborhood deems as a flattery
and sycophancy to the regime). As for AA, a minor nuisance in choosing where to
pray at the nearest mosque was not finding a parking lot in case a vehicle is used
to commute to the mosque.
This concludes that a worshipper chooses o pray at a mosque close to his
residence where he can socialize with acquaintances and relatives, therefore
enhancing a Muslim’s sense of affinity to umma, especially if the mosque is
hosting a mass congregation therefore inducing divine blessings. A similar notion
188 Census source: http://www.maqar.com/?id=87830
accessed on August 17th, 2015.
189 Mosque numbers surpass those in Arab and Muslim countries.
Source http://ar.ammannet.net/?p=85497
accessed on September 23rd, 2011.
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is posed by MA, who attends salat at'tarawih prayer during the fasting month of
Ramadan when, as more people attend the mosque a stronger feeling of
communal adherence to faith is enhanced. MA also maintains that since 2006, the
State security has propped up it surveillance on a mosque fundraising committee
he was part of, therefore his inclination to avoid association with such groups and
their choice of the mosque.
The foregoing citations may draw the conclusion that a worshipper’s decision to
engage in a religious obligation is far more than merely occupying his share of the
religious space, as this decision is communal before being individual- either
seeking the company of a friend or a kin, or a multitude of unknown worshippers
for a sense of commonality that supplants the individual.
Therefore, in case the sermon was not up to expectations, a worshipper’s reaction
is to recline and surrender to the choice of the congregation rather than risk
leaving the mosque alone, given the decision to attend the sermon was to fulfill a
communal religious duty in the first place. Thereafter, the worshipper may explicitly
react to the sermon by means of the virtual sphere (i.e. social media), choose to
change the mosque the following week, or perform certain religious gimmicks
during the sermon (i.e. salat al-Istikhara190, as in the case of SJ).
The choice of whether to keep going to the same mosque is also influenced by
State interference, whether through content censorship (the congregation feeling
the preacher cajoles the regime), or direct security surveillance (avoiding
association with both security cadre inside the mosque and dawa operatives), as
the supra case of MA denotes).
190 Salat al-Istikhara is a special prayer to beseech divine goodness and wisdom if the worshipper
was not sure about his actions.
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5.1.2. Association with Fellow Worshippers
Two Informants went to the mosque accompanied by an acquaintance or to meet
a relative there. In the case of SJ, this camaraderie sparked conversation about
the "political context" outside the mosque, but no discussion about the sermon
itself when the street is politically hyper. Therefore, the mosque should serves as a
launching platform to ignite the street with sermons calibrated to the political
occurring.
One observation regarding MA was that inviting other worshippers191 to
accompany him to the mosque was a religious obligation, but when this invitation
entailed possible misconceptions by the preacher and the congregation about his
association with State security personnel (he happened to be in their office), MA
decided to avoid the company192. MA also decided not to self-associate with
groups who gather at the mosques after religious lessons and try to formulate
clandestine dawa teams. Albeit this restriction, this Informant would visits friends,
or friends of friends, and encourage them to go to the mosque to pray, but would
only do it with dawa friends whom he trusts.
These observations confirm what the previous section denotes regarding the
communal nature of prayer- a worshipper prefers to accompany others or invite
them for prayer; a duty which does not stop at listening to the sermon or urging
fellow Muslims to attend it, but goes further as to safeguard the sermon from State
interference, given the notion that the worshipper embodies not only himself but
the collective conscience of umma. In addition, although prayer is a religious duty
191 MA happened to be at a police station when he encouraged a security man to go and pray with
him.
192 This came in the aftermath of the 2005 bomb attacks against hotels in Amman and the 2006
Amendment to the law whence the security apparatus had tightened its grip on mosques and dawa
groups who preach around and urge the residents to attend the mosque. These groups were
banned since then except in al-Hujjaj mosque in the outskirts of Amman, a hotbed for the
extremists.
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and one of the main pillars of Islam, when the political environment is dynamic, the
impact of the genre content of the sermon (religious content) on the fellow
worshippers is overwhelmed by the political occurring (although religious duty, not
politics, is the main drive behind performing the prayer) except when the sermon
identifies with the political ambiance outside the mosque. This is because, for a
Muslim, the mosque exceeds the role designated to it by the State and preacher,
and that communal fellowship strengthens the collective structure of meaning
especially when the sermon lacks content germane to the political context.
This notion speaks of the worshippers viewing the mosque (and Friday sermon as
its locus) as an institution which exceeds the mere concept of a “religious place”; a
setting which ought to resemble the original status and function the mosque used
to occupy during the early Islamic era, whence the collective affairs of umma were
being tackled, something the current religious establishment [ministry of awqaf]
has failed to sustain. Therefore, to the worshippers, social interaction in the
religious fora is not primarily a matter of permission or proscription, but a cognitive
state of the mind that the sacralized message of the mosque is life-relevant,
communal and interactive.
Put Friday in a comparative perspective, performing prayers in the mosque during
weekdays seems less crowded, worshippers are mostly elders, and interaction
between the pious and Imam during the religious lesson is negligible, albeit
permissible. Informant MA bears witness that when contested with mundane
activities of non-religious nature, the mosque is less popular to the worshippers
who are more concerned with the duty of performing Friday congregational prayer
than attending the religious lesson that precedes.193
193 On Monday January 17th, 2011, MA told the Researcher that when Bab al-Hara was debut (a
popular Syrian television drama series in 2010), people would limit their raka'at (prostration during
prayer) to the minimum so they can rush home and watch the drama.
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Another contestant to the sermon content is the religious setting. Informant MA
told the Researcher that he went to Mecca to perform hajj, and was chosen by the
commuters as the "pilgrimage emir" to guide them through; a must for three or
more pilgrims according to sunna. At the pilgrimage site, MA was highly influenced
by the prevalence of the spiritual ambiance and the interaction with fellow
worshippers. Upon his return from hajj, most of MA's talk centered on the rituals
that he and his companions performed rather than on what the preacher has said.
At the pilgrimage site, and unlike when this Informant prays at Jordanian mosques,
MA was totally immersed in the surrounding ambiance and forgot anything to do
with family concerns or pressures back at home, save for du’a to bless his family
and friends, including the Researcher.
The aforementioned cases indicate that the mosque resembles more than a
‘public religious space’, but less than a ‘public sphere’. However, this geophysical
feature of the mosque transforms into a ‘public sphere’ when khutba becomes part
of the socio-political setting that takes place outside the mosque, and when the
hierarchical and patri-oriented structure of the religious space is disarmed via
group discussions outside the mosque or through the media. The more enhanced
the feeling of communal religiosity, and the more sacralized the setting is, the
more the worshippers move away from the direct impact of the sermon content to
the ritualistic impact of the communal sphere. On the other hand, the more
dynamic the political setting is, the more the worshippers shift their attention from
the ‘religious space’ setting (having already performed their religious duty) to the
public sphere where they become the main actor, albeit still in a religious
framework given the notion that this interaction between khutba and the mosque’s
setting is the historically accepted genre role of the mosque. This role is what the
State is keen to control via regulations and security control to rule out political
contestants.
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5.1.3 Association with Friends and Family Members
Most of the encounters with the three Informants took place inside mosques or
cafés, away from family settings. Whenever invited to their houses, mingling with
family members of the Informants is restricted to junior male siblings. This is due
to the conservative nature of the Jordanian society in general, especially with
devoted Muslims who believe in gender separation in public as evident with the
three Informants. Nevertheless, one Informant would divulge something about his
private life. A glimpse of this is what MA shares about his wife, an active dawa
preacher, about whom this Informant expressed disguise due to her excessive
involvement in mosque-related events and activities; an exaggerated chastity. This
case of MA shows that this concealed role of the mother is disliked by her
husband if she crosses the boundary and becomes hyperactive in mosque-related
activities, ultimately inflicting on her husband’s prerogatives. Therefore mosque
intrusion to socially accepted norms (male dominance) is a source of nuisance for
the worshipper. This norm (in our case, conjugal duties by the wife toward her
husband) is driven by social values, but in order for the male worshipper to justify
it, he interprets it in a religious context; conjugal relationship being a right
enshrined in religious teachings.
MA also highlights the role of the mother at home as that of behind-the-door
inspirer. This Informant elucidated the difference between men and women's
status during Friday sermons - while men should hearken to the sermon and if
they mutter their prayer is void, women at musalla [females’ section of the
mosque] listen to religious lessons delivered by a dawa woman who can only
recite verses from the Quran, or listen to the sermon through loudspeakers.
Women are not allowed to speak out about societal issues or discuss life-felt
issues in public at the mosque, because according to MA who was speaking about
the case of the nearby al-Hijra mosque, women can discuss these issues with their
husbands thereafter. MA added that women seem to be more of a reference for
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family members than their spouses194, and their viewpoints tend to be more
influential than the father who spends most of the day at work, therefore inapt to
tackle minute mundane issues of their sons and daughters, let alone the more
affectionate nature of the mother.
The other encounter with a family member was when the Researcher
accompanied MA to an evening religious lesson at a mosque in eastern Amman.
As his daughter's fiancé attended the same mosque, MA had told his kin he would
come accompanied by a "non-Muslim who is searching for the truth”, so as to
avoid social answerability by a family member, although the Researcher had
accompanied MA to other mosques in the neighborhood without noticing this overt
cautiousness. This is probably because, unlike in Friday sermon when the
worshippers leave en masse, religious lessons entail more personal scrutiny about
the social setting and less about the content, given the message inside is more
personalized than in khutba where the message is public and a more communal
sense of umma is present.
MA seems to be influenced by his fellow worshippers (regardless of whether he
knows them or not) with whom he would sometimes discuss issues highlighted in
the sermon on their way out of the mosque; these deliberations bearing more
influence on him than the impact of the religious lesson that precedes prayer, the
sermon or the preacher himself. During the fasting month of Ramadan, when
observance to religious directives tends to be stronger, MA conveys
admonishments by the mosque preachers to his friends to abide by.
As a reporter, SJ is keen to cover public protests by the jihadist salafi movement
and be present in post-prayer gatherings, therefore going to the mosque
194 This leverage for women is further elucidated in the study of Antoun (1989) who depicts that in
the studied village women are banned from entering the mosque by tradition, yet their dominant
presence is proven as they constitute a significant reference group for the preacher who urges the
audience to inform them of the sermon themes.
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accompanied by his friends rather than with family members;  a guise needed to
stay close to the group he sympathizes with, although not ostensibly.
SJ's referent to the neighborhood Imam and to his family is apparent following an
advice by the Imam not to leave his parents and go to work in Saudi Arabia; an act
considered uqouq [ingratitude to parents] in Islam. Although this kinship affinity is
calibrated by what the Imam decrees, it does not constitute blanket consent to
family pressure regarding association with what the parents consider a
controversial religious group (jihadists). In this regard, SJ did not feel he should
refer to the Imam for opinion given his breadwinner status, let alone his own
experience as a previously banned preacher, and the fact that his profession as a
reporter gives him a leeway to stay close to relevant events.
Above citations conclude that a worshipper is keen to discuss the sermon’s
content with his closest surroundings (as shown in Chapter Seven, where two
thirds of the sample worshippers believe the sermon has brought about an
outstanding subject that deserves public dissemination). This does not necessarily
translate into the worshipper being the sole source for guidance at home, given
the veiled role of the woman/mother. However, a worshipper does not allow the
religious reference to encroach on his basic rights enshrined in the Quran and
Hadith (i.e. association with religious groups, conjugal rights, or job security).
The delineation of the border line between the religious sphere and the social
sphere is a product of acknowledgement and adherence to religious teachings and
social values constructed only partly through reference to the religious agency,
while other considerations include the family, job and peers’ effect.
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5.1.4. State and the Mosque
On February 08th, 2011 (at the onset of the Arab Spring), Informant MA noticed
that Friday sermons have recently started focusing on calming down the
worshippers, calling upon them to be patient and obedient to ouli al-amr [Muslim
rulers] as the Quran prescribes. The Imam where MA prays said he had received
a circulation by Department of Preaching and Guidance/ Ministry of Awqaf urging
him and other preachers to heed official guidelines to instill calmness among the
worshippers. The Imam also stressed the importance of national unity and
avoiding dissent among Muslims in the homeland. One example is when MA went
to pray at Salem bin Harb Mosque on January 10th, 2011,
“There, the sermon was unusually very short (nine minutes, while sermons
usually last for 20 to 40 minutes). When I protested and asked the Imam
why, he said this was due to the ongoing protests against the government,
and his obligation was to water down the worshippers’ sentiments and
diffuse any potential for communal protests after dismissal”.
Whereas in a different setting like Ruseifeh (near Amman; a shantytown and
hotbed for radical Islamists and Palestinian refugees), Informant AA, who prays at
ar-Ruhman Mosque, said that on Tuesday March 08th, 2011, Imam Abulhayja
stressed in his latest sermons that unjust rulers must be ousted and disobeyed by
Muslims. This blanket description of “unjust rulers” may construe the jihadist
doctrine of hakimiyyah, which designates the ruler as kafer [apostate] and should
be uprooted if he did not rule according to shari’a; a possible reference to King
Abdullah II in this area where the jihadists thrive. Noteworthy to say that this Friday
had witnessed nationwide protests against the deteriorating living conditions with
calls for the cabinet to step down195. In this context, preachers proclaimed different
messages to the worshippers, each according to his own perception of where the
195 The Muslim Brotherhood movement did not participate. On November 19th the Researcher
inquired the case with Ali Abusokkar, Chairman of the Shura Council of IAF, who said the
movement was engaged with another activity that very day, and denied a speculation that this was
the product of a gentleman agreement between the movement and government so as to ease
tension around mosques.
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redline stands in light of the changing political ambiance, even with regard to
doctrinal issues such as submission to the Muslim ruler.
In addition to circulations for preachers and Imams, the State uses the media as a
channel for pro-State religious speech parallel to speech delivered in the
mosques. Issues of political nature (the Arab Spring, reform, protests) are being
invoked in sermons more than the norm before the outbreak of protests, but only
in concordance with the government’s policy so as to suppress public calls for its
resignation. On March 28th, 2011, Informant MA told the Researcher the following
observation as both were on their way to the mosque,
“as a taxi driver who always listens to radio, for the past three weeks State-
oriented radio stations were for the first time broadcasting religious lessons
prior to dhuhr [noon] prayer on Fridays out of the three mainstream
mosques in Amman […] wherefrom preachers would urge the worshippers
to go home after prayer and refrain from enjoining street protests. Friday
sermons have lately concentrated on political issues not dealt with before,
including the current protests. I would have accepted this rhetoric had it
been the norm before, but given they only came to address a timely issue, I
do not accept them as religious guidance, and in this regard the mosque
has no influence on me, unless the preacher talks about sheer fiqh and
sunna”.
The State also practices ‘soft containment’ against the media in order to censor
anti-State discourse, as this encounter with SJ on Saturday April 23rd, 2011
denotes,
“Covering a post-prayer sit-in organized by the salafi jihadist movement in
Zarqa a week ago when the police cracked down on protesters who were
purportedly were carrying white arms to defend themselves against pro-
regime thugs, the newspaper where I work declined to publish my report,
and after uploading it on my face book page I received several
condemnations, including a threat, apparently from the secret police, and I
expect more pressure in the coming days”.
The fact that this internal censorship is practiced by an Islamic newspaper
(considered the mouthpiece of the Muslim Brotherhood movement) is an indication
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the movement reckons the extent to which the State is sensitive and alert
regarding the usage of mosques to diffuse anti-State speech in society. Besides, a
new actor (in this case, the salafi jihadist movement) is now contesting both
Muslim Brotherhood and the State in a quest to permeate the religious sphere,
both sides being cautious about the influence that this new player may wield on
the worshippers.
In other Friday sermons, preachers received official instructions not to include
political issues in their sermons; an indication the State is redrawing the limits of
the religious speech in tandem with the shift in the political context. A way out of
this official pressure is for the preacher to redefine political terms and frame
ongoing events in a religious context that appeals to both State and the
worshippers, a tactic that requires some wit as in the following case,
“On Friday March 25th, the Researcher went with SJ and another friend of
his to perform Friday prayer at Masjid Aljami'a Al Urdiniya [The University of
Jordan mosque]196. After performing the opening prayer [salute of the
mosque], the preacher talked about the ongoing protests in different Arab
countries and ensuing calls for reform, defining "reform" as adherence to
Quran and sunna and enacting shari'a laws, concluding his sermon with
du’a for Allah to grant “the king of the homeland a clout of good advisors,
guidance and provision”, but without calling the king by his name (Abdullah
II bin Al Hussein)]”.
In this example, the preacher resorted to framing by imbuing a religious attribute
for reform, and by wielding to official pressure to bless the king but without
mentioning his official name at this heightened time, therefore appeasing to both
the public and officialdom.
As for the impact of State directives, more often than not do Imams and preachers
concede to pertinent regulations, whereas others try to find a way to reconcile their
196 The University of Jordan is a state university established in 1962, the oldest in the Kingdom. On
that day, sit-ins and demonstrations by youth-oriented movements and opposition parties, including
Islamic movements, would ratchet up their demands for reform including a constitutional monarchy.
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conscience as men of faith and principle on the one hand, while warding off official
pressure on the other. MA contended that on January 06th, 2010,
“during the campaign for parliamentary elections slated for November 2010,
most of the visited mosques were urging the pious to participate in the
elections, including Imam al-Awaysheh of al-Hijra mosque, who, if asked to
deliver a State-friendly sermon, he would delegate another knowledgeable
man to do it, thereby avoiding the pangs of his own conscience if he did and
possible inquiry by the awqaf officials if he refused”.
Other preachers embed their sermons implicit messages by the State, such as
tolerance and moderation in accordance with Amman Message, or a religious fiat
to the peace treaty with Israel- a target of condemnation by street protesters,
especially the Islamists. This speech resembles a counter-discourse by the State
to public calls (especially by Muslim Brotherhood) to annul the treaty which Jordan
had signed with Israel in 1994. It also implicitly promotes for the Amman Message
which calls for moderation, as the following case depicts,
“On Friday January 21sty, 2011 the Researcher went with Informant AA to
perform Friday prayer at al-Birr wal-Ihsan mosque in Tabarbour, north of
Amman. The preacher commanded the worshippers not to inflict harm on
other Muslims, adding that this duty also includes ahl al-kitab197 who live
amongst us. The preacher also urged the worshippers to honor their pacts
by following the footsteps of Prophet Mohammad, saying it is permissible
for the Muslim state to forge agreements and pacts with non-Muslim
countries. Following the prayer, AA commented “the preacher must have
been guided by awqaf to tackle this issue in light of the current
circumstances198”.
In this sermon the preacher is framing two messages- by propagating tolerance
with non-Muslims he paves the way for the second tacit frame ‘peace with the
197 People of the Book, meaning Christians and Jews, but in the Jordanian context, the term refers
more to Christian Jordanians.
198 The context was nationwide demonstrations following Friday sermons calling for resignation of
the government, the repeal of Wadi Araba accord; the peace treaty Jordan had forged with Israel in
1994.
Page 161 of 299
enemies’ by implicitly including Jews among ahl al-Kitab, as no Jews live in
Jordan.
Other preachers would implicitly criticize the State, back the State, and infringe the
law by uttering ‘hate speech’, all in one sermon. One can infer that these
preachers reckon where the red lines are now being redrawn, and where the
State’s tolerance stands. More than written laws, a preacher’s reference in such a
case is practice and urf [custom and traditions compatible with shari’a law]. One
example is the following,
“On April 01st, 2011 the Researcher went with MA to perform Friday prayer
at thu-noorayn mosque in downtown Amman, adjacent to Amman
Municipality, given news that harakat 24 azhar (March 24th movement)  will
hold a demonstration there […] The preacher started the sermon by
asserting that Islah [reform] is well vetted in Islam, condemned the killing of
Muslims without legitimate reasons such as kufr [apostasy] or shirk
[associating false deities with Allah], the punishment of which can only be
inflicted by the ascribed authorities199. The preacher then called on the
worshippers to line up behind the leader of the homeland, His Majesty King
Abdullah, beseeching Allah to grant victory to the jihadists in Palestine,
Afghanistan, Chechnya and elsewhere, and concluded the sermon by
cursing the Jews and beseeching Allah to humiliate them”.
The above citation suggests that State interference in sermon content is selective
and multifarious, but not imposed on preachers as blanket must-do given that the
preachers may yield to State pressure each according to his personal conviction
and in variant degrees, as part of this subordination is self-censorship. As for the
law enforcement, it seems that what matters for the government is not an equal
and fair enforcement of the law, but selective enactment depending on the
changing political scenario; as long as the preachers who contest the State in
occupying the religious sphere are being banned, breaking pertinent laws can be
overlooked. The interpretation to this is that the government would pass laws that
199 During the previous week, protests two protestors were killed and the authorities strived to prove
their death was natural.
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regulate the religious speech in order to tackle contingent political and security
challenges it is facing. The following case is a vivid example,
“On Monday, March 14th 2011, Informant MA told the Researcher that last
Friday he had gone to Ashab Ar-Rasul mosque in Marka al-Janoubia in
eastern Amman. There the preacher condemned three ousted Arab leaders
(Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Zeinul Abidin Ben Ali of Tunis, and Moammar
Qaddafi of Libya), all being rejected by their people, calling them unjust
leaders and cursing them. Then the preacher urged the worshippers to
preserve national unity in Jordan, obey the king, and refrain from going out
in demonstrations or protests as some "outlawed" people would do. MA
views that the preacher has acted against Jordanian law, which bans
slander against leaders of Arab countries, and against shari'a code which
bans gossip and slander in general. MA felt the preacher has heightened
his diatribe to arouse the emotions of the worshippers on the foreign front
then quenched their sentiments when it came to homeland issues”.
State interference in sermon content is also noticeable as sermons tend to be
brief. Sermons do relate to the political environment, the Arab Spring, as
preachers tend to re-brand/frame this term so as to deflate anti-State sentiments,
and supplication for King Abdullah II is intensified but without mentioning his name
(although the security would sometimes pressure defiant Imams to do so200).
Worshippers’ response in “Amen” to this du’a is rather reduced when they feel it is
pre-orchestrated and exaggerated, and when the overall atmosphere is on the
edge. One example is the following,
“On April 29th, 2011 the Researcher went with Informant SJ to perform
Friday prayer at al-Kitab wa-Sunnah Mosque in Mgablein area, southeast of
Amman. We noticed some security presence around the mosque and the
atmosphere inside and outside has been tense given the ongoing protests.
The Imam demanded all Arab regimes to heed demands for freedom by
their peoples, and concluded the sermon by the usual du’a to bless “the
king” but without mentioning his name. I could see SJ responding with
“Amen” to all the supplications save this one201”.
200 See the interview with Mohammad Al Maqdisi in Annex Five.
201 A grim appearance on worshippers’ faces was later confirmed by one worshipper in his blog
http://www.assabeel.net/local-news/ الجھادیین-عن-باإلفراج-تطالب-وعشائریة-وطنیة-شخصیات-38992/حارتنا .html
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This mosque (al-Kitab wa-Sunnah) is located in a tribal district, and east Jordanian
tribes are known as the backbone for the Jordanian regime. The security had
arrested a member of the Huneiti clan, Dr. Sa’ad Al-Huneiti202 who is an outspoken
figure of the salafi jihadist movement which was organizing a sit-in nearby,
therefore the heated pro-State speech by the preacher. The clan was divided-
some backing the regime while others were sympathetic to their detained son.
Right after the prayer, a group of the clan prevented the jihadist protesters from
entering the mosque to announce the sit-in, and the preacher was urging the
worshippers to attack the jihadists. This was followed by a street show off, with
both sides standing parallel to each other- a verbose sit-in in a nearby tent by the
jihadists and other sympathizers, including some members of the clan, and a
demonstration by pro-State clan members. The police was neutral; blocking the
path between both sides and preserving security in spite of speeches antagonistic
to the regime by some opposition figures [tribal sheikhs and leftists who
sympathize with the jihadists].
This event demonstrates that given the tribal sensitivity, a clamp down by the
State against the jihadists is being conducted by proxy; that is, surrogated to thugs
who attempted to contain anti-State speech inside the mosque and its vicinity by
delivering a parallel speech. The result was the security forces preventing the new
contesting actors [jihadists and their supporters] from assuming full control over
the public space adjacent to the mosque, while securing control over the mosque
podium by marching the support of a preacher who is beholden to the State and
the clan.
A ‘soft containment’ policy by the State to lèse-majesté in mosque speech was
preceded by ‘hard containment’ in the wake of the enforcement of the 2006
Amendment to the Law of Preaching and Guidance at Mosques. The Arab Spring
and anti-State protests in Jordan targeting both the government and the secret
202 Source: http://ar.ammannet.net/?p=106096
accessed on October 13th, 2015.
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security apparatus (mukhabarat) brought about unprecedented assault on King
Abdullah II and Queen Rania, with the latter complaining about “rumors that
touched my integrity… without any shred of truth”203. This transformation in
delineating the red lines is reflected in a diluted State sensitivity to the King’s
status in sermons. One analogy which serves to compare the actual State
tolerance with past incidents is the following,
“On Tuesday March 08th, 2011 the Researcher met with Informant AA for
two hours and a half at a café […]. AA also mentioned that some four or five
years ago another young Imam delivered a speech at the same mosque
calling for Muslims to disavow King (Abdullah II) as a disbeliever and enact
jihad to establish a state based on shari'a. Right after the prayer and
dismissal of the worshippers, AA saw the Imam being handcuffed and
arrested by [security] men clad in civil attire. The Researcher asked AA
whether this incident occurred before or after the Amendment to the Law of
Preaching and Guidance in 2006; AA answered it took place in the wake of
that Amendment”.
In the context of local protests and the Arab Spring, where new actors (namely the
salafi jihadists and tahrir party gained access to and managed to intrude the
religious space to propagate their cause, the Imam would tacitly pave the way for
their involvement by a deliberate lack of action, as this field observation denotes,
“On Friday, April 29th, 2011 the Researcher went on to pick up Informant SJ
and headed to al-Kitab wa'Ssunnah Mosque in Mgablein area, south east of
Amman […] The mosque was fully packed (some 500 people). After the
sermon a young bearded man entered the hall and invited the worshippers
to a sit-in organized by the salafi movement to demand the release of
jihadist detainees. Unlike bombastic invitations in previous occasions, this
one came so calm and composed following the clampdown by the State
against jihadists by means of tightened security measures and the media.
As a journalist, SJ wanted to scan the area around the mosque before
heading to the sit-in tent. We noticed some security presence around the
mosque although not quite visible from the nearby tent […] SJ indicated the
Imam had "paved the way for the speaker" by warning all the Arab leaders
(which the audience deem as including Jordan) and that a prearrangement
203 Interview with Al Arabiya, Part 4, See minute 02:10.
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcMvPpl6e_Y
accessed on August 23rd, 2014
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between the Imam and the jihadist intruder ought to have taken place the
day before.”
Another case was when an outlawed party stormed the prayer hall in a mosque
that serves a State university. The Imam and preacher abstained from banning the
intruder and disappeared from the scene so as not to associate with the banned
group, nor to appear as opponent to their call,
“On Friday March 25th, the Islamic movement held an open sit-in at the
northern entrance of Amman, a replica to the Tahrir Square sit-in which
took place in Cairo in February 2011. The State took this as a clear
defiance and change in its traditional relationship with the Muslim
Brotherhood movement. Chants were defiant and degrading to the secret
police, and for the first time, slogans were calling for a constitutional
monarchy. On that day, the Researcher went with Informant SJ and a friend
of his to perform Friday prayer at Masjid Aljami'a Al Urdiniya […] SJ had
informed the Researcher he is choosing this mosque because the tahrir
party is planning for a demonstration inside the mosque right after the
prayer. On our way to the mosque, SJ (as a reporter) took photos of the
gendarme vehicles and some vans manned with secret police clad in civil
uniform and stationed some 500 meters away from the mosque entrance.
Seeing SJ taking photos with his digital camera, those men shut the window
curtains to conceal their faces. SJ said the State is perplexed regarding the
ongoing protests but more so in places close to mosques. The Researcher
asked SJ whether this mosque belongs to any particular group; SJ denied
saying "not at all, especially with this mosque" […] Right after the closing
prayer, a group of men stormed the prayer hall chanting Islamic slogan
(Allahu Akbar, bayan min hizbu’ttahrir, or, God is greatest, a communiqué
by hizbu'ttahrir) while some youth held black banners with verses from
Quran. An old man delivered a ten minutes statement saying that khilafah
(Islamic Caliphate rule) will definitely be established. His companions were
interrupting his verbose speech with Islamic chants, all this to the applause
of his companions, but also by a considerable number of the worshippers,
while a few others, including the Imam and the preacher, left the mosque as
soon as this disrupt started”.
Outside the mosque, a friend of the Researcher introduced him to two of the
secret security men of the university who were watching the hizbu’ttahrir
demonstration. On their way back home, the Researcher, SJ and his friend saw
the police blocking the road between this mosque and another demonstration
taking place at the northern entrance of Amman. This mosque is adjacent to a
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State university where security presence is tight. Although not up on the podium,
yet this banned movement (hizbu’ttahrir) managed to grasp the moment and utilize
the changing political atmosphere in the public sphere to intrude the religious
sphere.
The conclusion one can infer is that the closer the mosque is to State control, the
more subservient the preacher is, the more alert the State is to potential
disruptions, and the less it is inclined to visibly entangle with anti-State discourse
as long as it does not spill over into the public space outside the mosque and
contest State presence and influence.
Noteworthy to say that in the wake of the Arab Spring and ensuing local protests,
the jihadist speech (ubiquitous in makeshift mosques due to security pressure on
the jihadist salafi movement) has for the first time returned to the traditional
mosque as a platform to diffuse its discourse. In another occasion, the jihadists
managed to enlist support by anti-State groups [tribal figures as in a previous
observation] who would gather in nearby sit-in tents or houses following Friday
prayers. State control over the mosque has somehow retrieved so as to deal with
the core issue taking place in the public space. It should be noted that this did not
come as a direct result of the changing legislations (such as the Law of Preaching
and Guidance at Mosques) but in response to socio-political changes in the local
and regional arena. In concordance, the jihadist speech has also changed. The
jihadists’ spokesperson Wesam Al- Omoush (aka, Abu Obaida), told the
Researcher that,
“This strategic change in the movement’s ethos has lately surfaced in light
of the Arab Spring and the movement discovering that change can be
effected through peaceful means without unnecessary bloodshed against
Muslim souls”.
An Informant’s impression is that in such cases the preacher tends to tailor his
sermon in order to flatter the State if he noticed the security presence is obvious
Page 167 of 299
inside the mosque, as in the aforementioned case of MA (section 6.1.2.,
Association with Fellow Worshippers).
The supra observations notwithstanding, the State is selective in demanding the
preachers to abide by the law. This is obvious when a preacher breaches the law,
or ascribes shari'a code as superior to civic laws in contradiction to pertinent laws
and the constitution. This is also noticeable when a sermon embeds defamation,
hate speech, implicit criticism to State security, or invoking jihad in countries where
Jordan sends troops to quell jihad such as Afghanistan. This turn-a-blind-eye
policy suggests that the State it is unworried about religious speech to which the
worshippers are accustomed during heightened political circumstances, as it tends
to invest this discourse to let people fret their frustration, especially when anti-
State or anti-West sentiments are heightened. This same conclusion was
conveyed to the Researcher by the Imam of Zaytounah mosque in southern
Amman on August 22nd, 2008 following his anti-Jewish sermon (commemorating
the incineration of al-Aqsa mosque in 1969).
As the pace of the protests escalates, State scrutiny over the mosque becomes
more lenient in terms of using the mosque to contain public dissent, but more
stringent in terms of curtailing the spill-over effect of the mosque speech into
society. The fact that outlawed Islamic movements are allowed to use the mosque
as a platform to diffuse their propaganda is a telltale the State is keen to let people
fret their frustration as long as what goes inside the mosque does not spill over
into wider uncontrollable or open protests outside the mosque. Another possible
interpretation to this policy is a security-driven tactic to expose and demystify the
modus operandi of some banned Islamic groups who were used to work
underground and in makeshift mosques.
Mosques’ coming under security surveillance is also apparent as some
worshippers would shun certain Islamic groups who are active in and around the
mosque for fear of being associated with such groups (see MA’s observation in
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section 6.1.2., Association with Fellow Worshippers). This state of fear is
substantiated by Al-Rousan (2009) who explains that,
“The experience of the mosque being active in political work carried with it a
lot of conflicts resolved by the state often to its own advantage, which
explains the continuing political and intellectual attraction among many
sectors of society with respect to the functions of the mosque, and also
explains the state of general abstinence from participating in activities
carried out by the mosque, albeit far from politics, for fear of being carried
out by the Muslim Brotherhood, or for fear of being considered as in favor of
the opposition, thereby subject to scrutiny by the security apparatus”.204
Worshippers would commend the preacher if the sermon was brief and relevant to
their life-felt issues. However, this ‘relevance’ becomes counterproductive if the
pious deemed the sermon premeditated to appease the State, or manipulated by
the State to quell public dissent. Sermons tend to appeal to the worshippers’
opinion and that of the mosque’s vicinity, and the discourse embeds elements
which inculcate positions already cultivated in people’s minds. This notion was
confirmed by one Imam who had slammed USA, as the following case with
Informant SJ depicts,
“The Researcher met with SJ on Friday March 11th, 2011 […] SJ and the
researcher headed to A'ssalam mosque in Jabal A'nnasr in eastern Amman
[…] The two performed prayer and listened to the sermon which centered
on the ongoing revolts in some Arab countries […] The preacher also
slammed USA and cursed it for its inconsistent position towards the
"revolution" in Egypt; for condemning the killing of civilians by Arab leaders
while backing Israel in its "carnage" against Gaza and Jenin […] Regarding
the sermon, SJ thinks the preacher failed to convey his message to the
pious by not linking well between Friday in Arab revolts and the concept of
Friday as a day of worship, adding that the preacher's harsh criticism to
USA inculcates an already existing anti-American sentiments among
Muslims. SJ attributed these sentiments among Jordanians to the heavy
Palestinian presence in Jordan and the eminence of the Palestinian cause
in Islamic rhetoric whether among Jordanians of Palestinian origin beholden
to the rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, or among Jordanian
tribes by the emerging jihadist salafi thought”.
204 Text is transliterated by the Researcher from the original Arabic text.
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In an open marketplace to gain loyalties, contesting actors allow each other to
redefine his borders and use unconventional tools to gauge the extent to which the
new discourse can change reality on the ground, therefore the ability to shape the
mindset of the people.
5.1.5. Informant’s Personal Behavior
MA is an active worshipper and regular mosque visitor, a devout Muslim who
strives to nourish himself with religious teaching and rituals during the day; a
media activist who earns his living as a taxi driver,
“I asked MA what he listens to while driving his taxi. MA said he wakes up
at 04:15 every morning to perform salat al fajr (dawn prayer) at the mosque
in his vicinity, then from 06:00 till 06:50 he listens to Quran recital on Radio
Al-Quran Al-Karim, tunes in to Hayat FM (an Islamic moderate radio station)
for additional verses and religious nourishment, then the "morning show" on
a local station, and during the day he tunes in to Quran recital with each
following prayer”.
This behavior heeds the teachings of Islam and social norms, something apparent
in MA’s chastity, passion to reconstruct the mosques, compassion and meekness
in asking for forgiveness,
“On one occasion, MA suggested that we pray in the mosque yard adjacent
to the women's musalla (prayer chamber). MA did not look at the women
passing by but kept his head down while listening to the remainder of the
religious lesson and adhan [call to prayer]”.
“MA said the mosque was built mostly by citizens’ donations and he was
part of the fundraising committee”.
“Upon leaving the mosque, MA gave a ride to an ailing old man and his
grandson”.
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“Before his onset to Mecca, MA called the Researcher asking to clear
himself of any moral debt or hurt he might have caused, adding he has
asked the same from other friends so as to fulfill a clean duty according to
Islam”.
“When asked why his car is void of Islamic posters and stickers, as other
taxi drivers do, MA said this is against the traffic law which only sanctions
medal-like Quran or writing its verses on the car tableau.”
Above citations draw the conclusion that, notwithstanding preachers’ calls for the
worshippers to adhere to shari’a and not to positive law as reference, for MA
(purportedly worked as a State security collaborator205 for over three decades)
observance to religious duties is entwined with abiding by State laws and
regulations, even on minor issues such as having religious ornamentals in his car.
This duality gives MA the plasticity to be in sync with his religio-legal environment,
and the clemency to discern how to behave in matters of indistinct nature. It
should be noted that this Informant discerns that when a preacher contests the
regime over the podium, he is doing so because the State is turning a blind eye to
this eccentric speech, therefore it is up for the worshipper to delineate the limits
between what the State and the mosque each variably call for in the religio-spacial
domain. This is evident in MA’s ability to reconcile between injunctions of shari’a
and the requisites of mundane life (resorting to his reasoning as adjudicator on
issue of indistinct nature), an observation also evident in section 5.1.6.
(Informant’s Authority Reference).
As for AA, a 51 years old regular worshipper and taxi driver who lives in the
outskirts of Amman, he enjoined the Researcher through his friend MA who
justified this Informants’ need to refer back to the State security (for whom he also
worked as a collaborator) for permission to engage in this “unprecedented study”.
AA also showed zealousness towards the mosque and his faith,
205 MA stated that his collaboration with the State as informant was limited to things which might
pose potential threat to the country, but has nothing to do what people opine about the regime.
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“Before entering the mosque, AA picked up a paper from the street, folded it
up and placed it into the street fence. When the Researcher inquired "why",
AA replied the paper includes letters in Arabic, the honorable language of
Quran which ought to be revered”.
“Upon leaving the mosque, AA described a group of female beggars, who
were collecting money from the worshippers, at the doorstep of the
mosque, allegedly for the sick, as mere liars”.
Both MA and AA would call the Researcher and express their good wishes on
religious holidays (Christmas and Easter), in contrary to SJ who had been banned
from preaching for calling on the worshippers not to salute Christians on their
feasts206. SJ explained this attitude as an obligation to fully adhere to his faith,
given the disparity about how Islam and Christians view Allah (monotheism).
However, this seemingly intolerant approach did not translate into cautiousness or
suspicion toward the Researcher all through the study. On the contrary, SJ would
consult the Researcher on issues pertaining to the salafi jihadist movement and
their closed group’s deliberations he was part of, and amicably greet the
Researcher with a hug and kiss (customary among males in Jordan).
One can infer that the mosque speech does not necessarily translate into hostile
behavior by the worshippers when it comes to their view of the “other” citizen.
What appears to be “hate speech” by State lexicon is being used as a mantle to
justify an official policy of curtailing the opposition’s ability to enlist public support,
and to contest the Islamic movements’ domain over the religio-spacial domain.
Other aspects of the sermon with injunctions for good deeds do translate into a
day-to-day behavior by the worshippers, which validates an a priori disposition by
the Researcher that the worshipper goes to the mosque primarily to perform a
religious obligation that also guides his behavior (orthopraxy), than to receive
political orientation by the preacher.
206 In December 2014, SJ sent the Researcher a message with his Christmas wishes, a telltale of a
change in his perception of the jihadist worldview, and distance from his once prescriptive teaching
as Imam and preacher.
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5.1.6. Informant’s Authority Reference
In a sermon which the Researcher and SJ attended on Friday, April 29th, 2011, the
preacher urged the worshippers to take ulama [Islamic scholars] as their
reference; attributing the degrading status of the Muslims to the fact that umma is
not taking ulama as the reference. On Thursday night, May 05th, 2011 the Imam of
Abu Alanda al-Kabir mosque talked about the Quran as the reference for Muslims.
On April 08th, 2011 Sheikh Ra'ed, preacher of al-Qawasimi mosque, called the
worshippers to abide by Quran and sunna (the way of life of Prophet Mohammad
and his companions). These calls constitute, in their totality, a gamut of
“reference(s)”, starting from the Quran, to sunna (as in hadith), to ulama (Muslim
scholars who reinterpret tradition through both Quran and hadith). Therefore, Islam
is about how each society interprets it as evident in the historical corpus of Islamic
tradition and schools of thought. Informants would also refer to their own
reasoning in undecided matters based on the hadith207 “consult your heart, even if
people issued you a fatwa”.
Also embedded in this speech (though unintentionally) is the notion that there is no
generic Islam, but a symbolic explanatory format that renders Islam a religious
speech, or more aptly, a cultural product subject to maneuvering in the religio-
political sphere. This speech gives the State the right to give its own interpretation
of Islam and disarm any other actor which might attempt to “hijack”208 Islam,
especially the Muslim Brotherhood, therefore a legitimacy contestation issue.
Although bypassing the constitution, laws and tradition, sermons do not
207 In Arabic - اْسَتْفِت َقْلَبكَ " "إِْن أَْفَتاَك اْلُمْفُتونَ 
Source: http://www.qaradawi.net/new/all-fatawa/5379-2011-09-29-15-13-36
accessed on August 12th, 2015.
208 “Hijack” is the term used by King Abdullah to accuse the Muslim Brotherhood movement with
regard to the Arab Spring http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/150061/jordanian-king-says-
brotherhood-hijacked-Arab-spring and the “terrorists” regarding “our faith”.
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necessarily imply collision with the State given that Islam is the State religion
according to the constitution; laws are derived from the constitution and embed
Islamic jurisprudence, and urf (the prevalent tradition) should not be trespassed in
several constitutional items and laws. On the contrary, these calls fulfill the
regime’s need for religion to engender its legitimacy. This is the case as long as
these calls do not indicate an either/or option for the audience [such as the
hakimiyya tenet by the jihadist salafi current, also embedded in the writings of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian doctrinaire Sayyid Qutb209]. Although some
preachers are exhaustive in their calls to apply shari’a and not man-made laws,
the State is inclined to turn a blind eye to this seemingly fundamentalist approach
as long as the preacher did not directly attack the Jordanian constitution or the
king.
This conclusion is corroborated by the notion that a vast majority of the sample
worshippers did not sense a call for extremism or negative perceptions by the
preacher (as evident in Chapter Seven, 7.1) is a sign the religious sphere
constitutes a melting pot for both the pious public and the State which seeks out
their loyalty. The Researcher however views that the accretion of this speech will
in the long run inculcate a culture that renders the officially assigned preacher (as
the ‘cultural broker’ who, by proxy, interprets Islam and reinterprets tradition)
sandwiched between the perceptions and expectations of the congregation of
worshippers and the regulatory confines of the official religious establishment,
ultimately limiting the State’s maneuverability to enact modernism and reform in
religious speech towards a modernized society.
With respect to the worshipper’s personal behavior (choice and preference
regarding attire, smoking, aesthetic expressions, relationship with parents)
Informants refer to the religious authority for opinion, be it the mosque preacher,
Imam or mufti as the case of AA depicts in the previous section (5.1.6). The
209 Source: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714004475#.VcHvHfmqqko
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mosque preacher is also the reference for AA when it comes to business
transactions,
“On Friday January 21sty, 2011, upon AA's suggestion we headed to al-Birr
wal-Ihsan mosque in Tabarbour, Amman; his second time there […] The
preacher talked about the need to embrace a comprehensive approach to
human security in the country, and this can be achieved by referring to
shari'a as legislation instead of laws that emulate the blasphemous (kafer)
West […]. Upon dismissal, the Researcher accompanied the guest (AA) to
his car down the street, and there the talk about car buying alluded to bank
loans. AA explained that he has bought his own car thanks to a shari’a
compliant loan even though better offers were at hand but involve riba. He
referred his attitude to teaching by mosque preachers”.
MA mentioned riba as the first haram (prohibition) the Imam should shun so that
the clergy exemplify good example for the pious. However, MA justifies picking up
commuters to banks by referring to muftis and Imams who condone this behavior
given this time is different than the era of the companions of Prophet Mohammad,
therefore each time has its own sunna.
As for SJ, the sheikh210 of the mosque is his reference regarding family related
issues (as shown in section 5.1.6), whereas the mufti is assigned by the
government and therefore bound to its directives.
On issues of lesser impact upon one’s own life, a worshipper refers to both the
mufti and Imam to justify his behavior,
“The Researcher met with Informant MA at a café in Amman following the
latter's return from umra211 […] Unlike pilgrims who come back from hajj
wearing Islamic rope or hat, MA's dress was normal and his beard wasn't
extraordinarily long (as sunna prescribes). MA explained that although
210 The term sheikh is used to describe a person who volunteers to conduct Imamate and/or
preaching therefore not necessarily fully subdued to the officialdom.
211 Not a compulsory but highly commendable pilgrimage to Mecca that can be performed anytime
during the year.
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these things constitute sunna, muftis and Imams say our generation is
different than the Prophet’s era, therefore religious directives are subject to
changing customs and traditions”.
Although, in deciding whether a religious obligation is time-sensitive or not,
Informant MA refers more to the mufti212, given his higher knowledge compared to
the preacher or Imam,
“On Sunday January 16th, 2011 the Researcher met with MA for about two
hours at a café in Amman and took a drive with him in his own taxi cab […]
MA contended that although he strives to abide by his faith, he cannot fully
do so given the day is different from the time of the Prophet, accordingly,
religious guidelines should condone these differences. MA gave the
example of his profession as a taxi driver where women ride in without their
mahram (husband or a sibling). When asked wherefrom did he get this fiat,
MA answered: “mostly from the Mufti”; and on why not the Imam or
preacher, MA answered- “they are not as knowledgeable as they should
be””.
This is not always the case, as Informants sometimes refer directly to the Quran
even when the religious authority holds a different opinion. This is especially the
case when the worshipper feels the preacher has acted based on State influence
that contradicts with the Quran, as in the following example,
“On Friday, April 01st, 2011 the Researcher went with MA to perform Friday
prayer. The Researcher had suggested thu-noorayn mosque in downtown
Amman (adjacent to the Municipality) to pray in given news about harakat
24 a’dhar (March 24th movement) holding a demonstration there [...] As the
Researcher gave a ride to MA back to his home, he asked him what he
thinks of [the preacher] ascribing majesty to King Abdullah II; MA said this is
against Islam. When asked about his reference on this issue, MA
answered: “the Quran, given it is clear on this issue”, and that although the
General Mufti had issued a fatwa (religious ruling) permitting this attribute to
the king, MA still adheres to what the Quran says”.
Neither the Imam nor the mosque is referred to by SJ when reporting on public
protests that took place around the mosque as the previously mentioned case in
section 5.1.4. (State and the Mosque) shows.
212 Mufti is the person who gives a fatwā.
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A reference that at times supersedes the religious directives is the worshipper’s
self conviction and reasoning, given that Islam allows the Muslim to consult his
own intuition on uncertain issues. A worshipper’s personal belief besides logic and
reason stands as reference even higher to orientation given by the religious
authority,
“On Tuesday January 04th, 2011 the Researcher met with Informant MA for
three hours at a café in Amman. I asked MA: on what grounds you decided
to quit smoking? MA said that although the Friday preacher prohibits
smoking, his decision did not stem from there but was based on the fact
that smoking depletes his budget, which could otherwise be spent on other
beneficial things; knowing to do good and not doing it is an evil habit a
Muslim should avoid”.
Another case is by AA who, with regards to issues of uncertain nature, refers to
the mufti and Imam for opinion, but on other issues he would rely on his own
instinct as reference,
“On Tuesday March 08th, 2011 the Researcher met with AA for two hours
and a half in a café in Amman […]. AA said he has read the Bible in Arabic
but could not understand it, and that he believes the Bible was distorted.
The Researcher asked AA whether he went back to the Imam to check
whether it was permissible to read the Bible. AA said he would only consult
the Imam or a mufti on issues with no precedence, otherwise he relies on
his own instinct and ability to reason, and even if he has erred, his good
intention clears him out”.
Yet in certain settings (performing hajj with a team of worshippers, including
females), MA adheres more to customs and tradition, even when the religious fiat
is less restrictive,
“The Researcher met with MA at a café in Amman following the latter's
return from umra […] As for the way MA co-existed with his Jordanian
fellow pilgrims at their residence in Saudi Arabia, MA said that based on his
cultural upbringing he would cover up his body even more than what sunna
sanctions (sunna according to MA requires Muslim men to cover body from
knee up to navel).”
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Religious lessons and their timing also stand as reference. The influence of
communal worship and an active religious setting increases the worshipper’s
inclination to take them as reference, as the following case with MA shows,
“On Monday, March 14th 2011 the Researcher met with MA for 90 minutes
at a friend's office. In his talk with a third friend MA said he won't bet; betting
being forbidden in Islam. I asked MA: on what basis do you build this
conviction? MA said that his reference is the lessons he listens to after
a'tarawih prayers during the fasting month of Ramadan; a prayer that
follows the evening iftar [breakfast], when Muslims attend religious lessons
and pray the four raka'ats (prostrations). These lessons are more influential
on MA given they are held during Ramadan when divine wage is doubled,
and the fact that more people attend the mosque, therefore a stronger
feeling of communal adherence to faith by umma”.
This is further confirmed where a completely religious environment wields
increased impact on MA,
"At the pilgrimage site [Mecca], and unlike the case in Jordanian mosques, I
find myself totally immersed in the surrounding ambiance, leaving behind all
my family concerns and pressures at home".
A worshipper’s own interpretation to the Imam's speech also stands as reference
ground for him; not an either/or choice, but both/and. One example is when civic
laws alongside shari'a code are referred to when the Imam attacks Arab leaders
as the supra case in section 5.1.6. (Informant’s Authority Reference) denotes.
Religious doctrine is the reference when scientific evidence contests the sanctity
of religious symbols (i.e. holy sites), as Informant MA denotes upon his return from
the hajj journey to Mecca,
“MA explained the various tales about the holy sites, including a mountain
which had split into two in the time of the Prophet, or the fact that Zamzam
water cannot be pumped out through pipes onto other Saudi cities save by
water trucks. The Researcher faced MA with a report on BBC that Zamzam
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water contains arsenic substance, a cause for cancer; MA replied that he
accepts religious tales per se no matter what scientific proof says”.
Even when the religious authority figures stand as reference for the worshipper,
the mother/wife at home also has a say, as in the following observation,
“On Sunday January 16th, 2011, the Researcher met with MA for about two
hours […] Another point of religiosity was paintings at home, which, after
attending the religious lesson, MA was convinced to take off any pictures
from the wall, and when visiting his close friends he would urge them to do
the same, so one friend called his wife and behind the curtain he conveyed
to her his consent to this opinion by MA”.
This notion is further corroborated by an undisclosed survey conducted for a State
entity in 2007 which shows the mother being a reference for children more than
the father or even the Imam, a status also stipulated in hadith “paradise lies under
the feet of mothers”213.
Peers’ effect on the worshipper is evident through mutual engagement in religious
activities, joint discussion about the sermon, and the exchange of recorded
sermons. These behaviors are common with accompanying friends, taxi
commuters or any other worshipper. The influence is more of assurance or denial
to certain parts of the sermon as both parties try to sustain their opinions with
verses from Quran or hadith as the following encounter depicts,
“Upon leaving the mosque, MA gave a ride to an ailing old man, and his
grandson, who criticized the preacher saying he must have received 15
dinars by Ministry of Awqaf to say such things in his sermon”.
In addition to the following case,
“At the pilgrimage site […] MA is more affected by his fellow worshippers
(regardless of whether he knows them or not) with whom he would discuss
213 Source: http://www.onislam.net/english/ask-the-scholar/muslim-creed/muslim-belief/169127-
does-paradise-lie-under-the-feet-of-a-non-muslim-mother.html
accessed on May 22nd, 2015.
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the sermon content on their way out of the mosque; this encounter wielding
more influence on him than the preacher, the religious lesson that
precedes, or the sermon”.
“MA showed the Researcher his Bluetooth-equipped mobile phone which
includes footage of some Friday sermons sent to him as MMS by some of
his friends (including sermons delivered to salafi worshippers in Ma'an). In
one of the recordings, MA cited a verse quoted by the preacher which
according to him does not fit with the sermon theme”.
However, when a certain practice contradicts with the civic law, MA observes and
adheres more to pertinent laws, as the following two examples demonstrate,
“On Monday January 17th, 2011 the Researcher accompanied Informant
MA to an evening religious lesson at a mosque in Marka al-Janoubiya in
eastern Amman [...] MA said the mosque was built thanks mostly to
donations by the neighbors, and that he was part of the fundraising
committee. However, he would not join them again due to the security grip
and surveillance on these committees since 2006”.
“On Thursday January 06th, 2010 the Researcher met with MA in his taxi
cab for around 90 minutes […] When asked why his cab was void of Islamic
posters and stickers as other taxi drivers do, MA said this is against traffic
law which allows drivers to hang a medal-like Quran or write its verses on
the tableau”
Also, MA himself is referred to by his peers,
“After returning home, MA received an SMS from one of his female fellow
pilgrims asking him further questions on fiqh [things they were discussing in
Mecca]”.
A worshipper’s previous expectations about the sermon affect his convictions
afterwards,
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“In Mecca, an infamous preacher (al-Sodais) talked for 21 minutes urging
Muslims to obey their rulers and not to pursue fitnah [internal strife]. After
the prayer, MA complained about the sermon theme for a nearby mufti
based on the fact the preacher did not bestow Allah's mercy upon the
"martyrs" who died during the uprising in Syria and other Arab countries.
The mufti declined to comment saying the sermon was necessary to avert
fitnah. The sermon theme was further discussed by MA and his bus
companions for two hours, and most of them opposed it. On the other hand,
the sermon in Medina, which took 17 minutes, tackled the issue of
preserving the holy sites of Muslims, but the bus group spent less time
discussing it. MA explained that his previous expectations about the sermon
theme have a great effect upon him afterwards; if the theme comes contrary
to his expectations, his receptiveness to the sermon is equally affected”.
Religious lessons that precede Friday sermons or during salat al-maghrib (sunset
prayer), in addition to MA's knowledge of hadith, stand as reference and
motivation to encourage others to attend mosque prayers, but this is contingent to
MA being confident of the worshippers therefore staying aloof of security
surveillance.
Another factor that stands as reference for the worshipper is the media (daily
listening to Quran recital, and occasionally to religious lessons on public
broadcasters), but this is conditional on the speech being the norm and not a pre-
orchestrated agenda by the State to influence the worshippers.
Informant SJ refers to a communiqué by the jihadist movement, not the media, to
confirm news about the killing of Osama Bin Laden, a jihadist role model for him,
“On Thursday night, May 05th, 2011 SJ (a journalist) called the Researcher
and asked if he would accompany him to a post-prayer demonstration the
following day. On Friday the two headed to Abu Alanda al-Kabir mosque
southeast of Amman, where the Popular Committee to Defend the Rights of
Political Prisoners (composed of jihadist salafi and other activists) was
organizing a sit-in. SJ visited this mosque once before. On our way most of
the talk centered on the killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, and
the fact the jihadist salafi movement would not open a wake until al-Qaeda
has officially mourned its leader. This news came to SJ as we were leaving
the mosque, and SJ was apparently sad to hear it. SJ told the Researcher
how it all started with Bin Laden- when he was visited by the deceased
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jihadist mentor Abdullah Azzam to raise funds for the mujahedeen in
Afghanistan, and to their surprise Bin laden handed them over a one million
dollar check”.
The Imam is also seen as reference when the worshipper invites others to
embrace Islam, an act that also reflects the worshipper’s own inclination, as the
following case with MA shows. This was the only invitation by an Informant to the
Researcher, as MA used to be a dawa activist, whereas other informants who
come from more radical schools of thought in Islam, such as SJ, never offered this
invitation,
“The Researcher and MA went to Thu-noorayn Mosque in downtown
Amman. Upon entering the mosque MA said his duty was to invite me to
embrace Islam. I asked if this invitation was driven by his conviction or as
an urge by the Imam, MA replied: "both".”
Tafsir books [hermeneutics] are reference for the worshipper on prayer,
“On Friday March 11th, 2011 the Researcher met with SJ […] and headed to
A'ssalam mosque in Jabal A'nnasr in eastern Amman […]. The two
performed prayer and listened to the sermon which centered on the
ongoing revolts in Arab countries […] After the last prayer, the preacher
called for another prayer- Al Asr [afternoon] prayer which follows Ad-duhr
Prayer. However, SJ asked the Researcher that both should leave the
mosque. Both put on their shoes and headed to the Researcher's car, and
when asked why leave before the prayer, SJ answered that although the
worshippers are accustomed to joining the performance of the prayers, this
step is most probably sanctioned by the Imam who had received a hint from
the preacher, whereas it should be the Imam who performs the Iqama
[calling for prayer] and not the preacher, and that a rainy day does not
constitute an excuse sufficient to combine the two prayers together. Asked
how did he came to build this conviction, SJ answered he had researched
about the issue in tafsir books instead of seeking the Imam’s opinion as
reference”.
Worshippers would also refer to tafsir books concerning other Muslim sects. In the
following example, Informant AA accused the preacher of being guided by State
officials given his over-pacific sermon. Where the preacher urged the worshippers
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to take shari’a as their reference and follow the footsteps of Prophet Mohammad,
he also slammed the civil laws of Jordan which emulate Western laws. Yet this
apparently anti-State speech did not deter AA from accusing the preacher of
succumbing to State pressure given his extra-tolerant stance in general,
“On Friday January 21st, 2011 the Researcher met with AA […] Upon AA's
suggestion we headed to al-Bir wal Ihsan mosque in Tabarbour, north of
Amman; his second time there […], the Researcher and AA performed
prayer together. The preacher talked about the need to embrace a
comprehensive approach to human security in the country, and this can be
achieved by referring to shari'a as legislation instead of laws that emulate
the blasphemous (kafer) West, giving the example of demands to abolish
the death penalty in Jordan214, and calling for iqamat al hadd [enforcing
punishments according to shari'a]. The preacher commanded Muslims not
to cause harm to other Muslims, as this duty also includes ahl al kitab
[people of the Book- meaning Christians and Jews] who live among us, and
urged the Muslims to honor their pacts following the footsteps of Prophet
Mohammad, saying it is permissible for Muslim states to forge agreements
and pacts with non-Muslim countries. AA said the preacher has been
guided by the Ministry of Awqaf to tackle this issue in light of the current
circumstances (post-sermon nationwide demonstrations which call for the
resignation of the government and the revocation of the peace treaty with
Israel)”.
The Researcher then invited AA to his house for a cup of coffee. The talk alluded
to other sects such as the Baha'i whom AA described as pseudo-Muslims, and
Shiites whom he cursed. The Researcher asked AA how come he commends
Christians but curses the Shiites, who are fellow Muslims. AA replied that Shiites
doubt prophesy of Mohammad by Jibril [the archangel said to bore revelations
from Allah to Prophet Mohammad]. When asked about his reference, AA said he
reads tarsi books.
In another sermon with AA on April 08th, 2011 at al-Qawasimi mosque near the
Ministry of Interior, the Researcher asked AA about the thing that mostly touched
him and would remain in his mind throughout the week. AA replied- the preacher's
admonition for the worshippers to beware of cults, mainly the Shiites, labeling
214 Although Jordan did not abolish the death penalty yet, this issue was discussed in parliament.
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them kuffar [disbelievers]. AA attributed this to the way the preacher addressed
the subject in his rhetoric, Quran citations and body language, adding he still
remembers a similar sermon he attended at a mosque in Saudi Arabia in 1988.
Noteworthy to say that AA did not refer to the preacher who had slammed the
Shiites, but to tafsir books, probably due to his suspicions regarding the preacher.
Whenever a religious authority succumbs to State authority, his role model is
tarnished and his reference is belittled.
Mosques in the plural sense are not what affect MA's choices, but a particular
mosque which he regularly attends. This is more evident during Ramadan when
discussions with peers abound, but this does not imply that everything MA hears is
taken for granted, as he sometimes argues certain points of the sermon with the
Imam.
As for AA, he mentions the mosque he usually attends in the neighborhood, giving
his opinion about the political context (anti-State discourse came out of the same
mosque). SJ refers to the Imam of the mosque in his vicinity when he seeks
advice or fatwa on family concerns. Regular attendance to a particular mosque,
more often than not in his surrounding area, builds a trust relationship between the
worshipper and the Imam who becomes one of his references on controversial
issues.
As for the Imam designating majestic preface to King Abdullah II, MA believes that
Quran and not the Imam stands as reference regarding this practice,
notwithstanding MA’s loyalty to the regime. As for his stance regarding a State-
friendly speech, MA rejects the sermon as reference (except for content which
represents untainted fiqh) if the official religious establishment appears to have
manipulated it to influence public opinion.
In the case of SJ, the Imam's supplication is condoned save that which is not in
agreement with his religious convictions (attributing majestic title to the king). With
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reference to pro-State sermons, SJ does not mention it while talking with his fellow
worshippers after the prayer, but highlights anti-State speech as an occurrence
which has intruded the mainstream sermon. Pro-State sermon is disguised by SJ
who reacts by performing rak’at (prayer) during the sermon,
“On Thursday night, May 05th, 2011 […] du'a for the king received dim
reaction by the worshippers, in spite of their big number. The reaction on SJ
was to stand up and perform a rak'a, and then look at the Researcher
upset. Following the sermon and the last prayer, and upon dismissal, SJ
slammed the Imam and cursed him, saying he is "trivial... may Allah curse
him; he is a typical Awqaf Ministry official; I was about to stand up and
object him". I asked SJ why he stood up and perform the rak'a, SJ said: to
fret out my anger and not to burst in anger”215
For Informants MA and SJ (both at odds regarding their view of the king and State)
they reject State interference in sermons, in which case the Quran becomes a
reference refuge for them, although each one expresses his disagreement in a
different manner, but they also single out pure religious content from the sermon
they repudiate. When the State meddles in the religious speech, the Quran
becomes the worshippers’ sole reference, and when no religious authority is
available to discern the differences, the worshippers reconcile this by referring
each to his own intuition and reasoning backed by verses of Quran.
215 Later on, a blogger (http://www.7iber.com/2011/05/abu-alanda/) described what happened as
"inside Abu Alanda mosque faces were unusually pale, giving the impression an odd mood prevails
in the area”.
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CHAPTER SIX: INTERVIEWS
VIEWS OF THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL ACTORS ON REGULATING THE
MOSQUE DISCOURSE
6.1. Interview Methodology
The Researcher interviewed a group of figures directly related to the endorsement
and the execution of the 1986 Law and its 2006 Amendment. They are:
- Three Imams (licensed and banned, whether sermonizing at mosques or
other informal venues)
- Four government officials (previous and actual ministers of awqaf and their
advisors)
- Seven members of parliament (including one senator, and deputies
representing both pro-regime figures and the Muslim Brotherhood
movement)
In total, fourteen interviewees are being selected and interviewed based on their
involvement and aptitude to shed light on the subject issues, their geographical
locations- mainly in the Amman and Zarqa areas which constitute 55 percent of
the population, and their stance vis-à-vis the State. Only one target interviewee
(Ahmad Hlayel – Imam of the Royal Hashemite Court) did not respond to
telephone calls and a facsimile by the Researcher, therefore abstained after
having verbally accepted a written request by the Researcher.
Some of the interviewees held more than one position at different times, therefore
the relevance of their position and timeliness to the period of investigation is
considered. Interviews were scheduled and organized so that each interviewee
would give his input based on his remit of responsibility and personal experience,
thereby giving room for the following interviewee to contest his predispositions,
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analysis and information. Interviews are being conducted after the Researcher and
a group of collaborators had visited and recorded a total of 24 Friday sermons in
24 different mosques in the Kingdom from the period of June till December 2008.
The content of these sermons are being used to challenge some of the answers
by the interviewees, especially State officials.
The span of the Islamic movements involved in this study includes:
- The Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan216 and its political arm, the Islamic
Action Front (IAF), the largest political actor which overtly and steadily
participates in public and political life through municipal and parliamentary
elections217, trade unions and other forms of civil life. Abu Rumman
(2007:16&29) describes IAF as,
“the only Islamic party which legitimately participates in public political life
and plays a main role in the power and strength of the opposition… with a
very strong influence on Jordanian public opinion”
While interviewee Hamza Mansour (former MP and member of IAF)
describes the movement’s ideology and modus operandi as,
216 The Muslim Brotherhood define themselves as “A group of Muslims, calling to govern according
to the law of Allah, and live in the shadow of Islam as descended upon the Prophet of Allah (Peace
Be Upon Him- PBUH) and according to what the good salaf [the righteous forebears] had called
for, acted upon and for… The basis of teachings, concepts, ethics, virtues, laws, structures,
guarantees, regulations and reforms is the book of Allah, and his Prophet’s sunna [way of the
Prophet’s life and his companions] which if the umma abides by it will never go astray… it is a Sufi
fact, as they acknowledge the basis of goodness is the purity of soul, the cleanness of heart, the
peacefulness of bosom, the hard work, shunning people and love to Allah and brotherhood in him
(blessed be him), and they are a political body which demands reform in governance, revision in
the relationship of the umma with other nations, and nurturing the people on self-pride and dignity”
(Source: Website of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan).
217 The IAF participated in the 2007 parliamentary elections but decided to boycott the following
elections in 2010 after polling its grassroots and leaders who overwhelmingly opted to boycott in
protest of the electoral fraud in the 2007 elections and the elections law which limits the popularity
of political parties in favor of tribal allegiances.
Source: http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/10/20/jordan-s-parliamentary-elections-and-islamist-
boycott/b3mo
accessed on January 02nd, 2015.
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“Jihad is a fundamental component of Islamic Sufism […], a principal
component of khutba […]. Work should start with the human soul
[…]. After I shape the individual character I move on to the family,
the neighbor etc then the wider Jordanian circle”.
- The traditional salafi movement, whose policy is not to shun participation in
political life218. Boukhars (2006:4) defines their modus operandi as,
“through networks of storefront or makeshift mosques, they
consolidated their ability to disseminate their ideas and operate in
the shantytowns of the major cities in the Kingdom”
- The jihadist salafi movement, whose progress and ideology, as per Abu
Rumman & Abu Hanieh (2009:59), is still evidently breeding across the
country in spite of the jihadists’ recent setback resulting from crackdowns
by the regime. Wiktorowicz (2000:233) contends that their salafi thought is
propagated through means ingrained in informal networks such as mosque-
related activities, informal teacher-student interaction, and home meetings
and publications. The objective of the salafi movement is to,
“institute religious behavior and practices that capture the purity of
Islam, as understood by the salaf (early Companions of the Prophet
Mohammad). Salafis believe that because the salaf learned about
Islam directly from the Prophet or those who knew him, they
commanded a pure understanding of the religion. All decisions in life
must therefore be based upon evidence from the Quran and Sunna
[the Prophet’s way of life], as recorded in authentic sayings (hadiths)
by the salaf”. (Ibid p: 221)
All interviews were conducted face-to-face, except with Bader Saleh al-Riati, MP
and member of IAF who lives in Aqaba (340 KM from Amman), hence the
facsimile medium. All interviews were requested through direct telephone calls,
except with Minister of Awqaf, and his legal advisor, who pre-required a written
request.
218 Ibid (p. 15)
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The Researcher faced the obstacle of conducting the interview with the Minister,
and it took six months to interview relevant members of the IAF whom were active
in successive sessions of then sitting parliament. Main points are being
handwritten and interviews carried out in Arabic then transcribed by the
Researcher into English. Contacts are being carried out through telephone or
mobile calls (often preceded by SMS), facsimile (with Ministry of Awqaf, upon their
request; and with Imams living afar). Interviews are mostly conducted at the
interviewees’ offices or in their houses (as with the jihadist salafi doctrinaire Issam
al-Barqawi, alias Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi). Middlemen are being been sought
to conduct some of the interviews, especially with the jihadist salafis (given their
illegal status), and with some Imams so as to familiarize the Researcher (a
Jordanian Christian) with the unfamiliar setting of attending and recording Friday
prayers.
At an initial stage, a prior consent of some Imams to attend their Friday sermons
was being sought through acquaintances. The Researcher did not face any
objection or problem thereof except a warning by then Minister of Awqaf,
Abdulfattah Salah, and a remark by former Minister of Awqaf Ali Al-Faqir.
The Researcher always proposed ‘academic research’ as the objective behind
these appointments, and discussion topics were pre-prepared but posed in an
open-ended fashion. Answers were analyzed on a case-by-case approach, and
then based on questions in mind; specific patterns were assessed to corroborate
certain conclusions in other parts of the study.
Interviews were carried out during the period of December 2008 – March 2010; a
relatively long span of time due to red tape involved in interviewing government
officials and parliamentarians, and the fact that one interview would open up and
lead the Researcher to interview other relevant actors.
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6.2. Interviews, Salient Themes of Investigation and Ensuing Conclusions
The Researcher interviewed 14 figures directly related to the endorsement and
enactment of the Law to figure out their perceptions regarding the following six
issues:
- The role of the mosque
- The context which engulfed the endorsement of the Law and the 2006
Amendment
- The motives behind endorsing the Law and the 2006 Amendment
- The role of State and non-State actors in enacting the Law and the 2006
Amendment
- The fate of the pre-Amendment discourse at the mosque
- The impact of enacting the 2006 Amendment to the Law
These issues were not posed in the same sequence, but in an open-ended fashion
allowing the interviewees to allude to them without persistence by the Researcher.
The following chart depicts the different stances of the 14 different actors on these
issues:
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6.2.1. The Role of the Mosque
The chart shows that 79 percent of the interviewees view that the politics fall within
the purview of the mosque message, while the rest (21 percent) are mostly State
officials and one Christian deputy (a former high ranking military officer) oppose
this role. Three preachers of different schools of thought, all banned from
preaching, agree that by default the mosque has a political mandate. Wael Battiri,
close to the jihadist salafi movement and a journalist with As’Sabeel newspaper
(Muslim Brotherhood), views that,
“Friday sermon is where Muslims get together on a weekly basis to discuss
mutual concerns and find solutions for their problems. Therefore, the
mosque is directly related to their lives and should impact the political
arena, but all this under the condition that the State adheres to Islamic
shari’a. Those who deny the mosque its political role do not understand
their religion. The mosque should not be used by the government to impact
politics unless it applies shari’a”.
Mohammad al-Maqdisi, doctrinaire of the jihadist salafi stream, considers that not
the mosque but hyperspace and the public space are the prime platforms to
address the worshippers. al-Maqdisi requests his right to deliver sheer fiqh
(doctrine) as he recounts the last time he delivered a sermon in 1994 whence he
attacked the legitimacy of the regime and the parliamentary elections, to be jailed
afterwards. Therefore, this jihadist reference takes the religious essence of the
sermon as a frame to delegitimize the ruler. In 2014, a state security officer told
the Researcher that al-Maqdisi would spend the rest of his life in and out of prison
due to his “dangerous thoughts”.
While, Dr. Ali al-Faqir219, former minister of awqaf and a banned preacher inclined
to Sufism, describes the mosque message as “serious” and its role as,
219 Mufti of The Jordan Armed Forces in 1987, Minister of Awqaf in 1989, Deputy 1989-1993,
currently a merchant.
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“Creating awareness among Muslims after the polity have failed; preparing
the conscience of the umma to what will follow”.
Mohammad Shaqra is a leading figure of the reformist Salafi stream who, unlike
most members of the other Salafi groups (jihadist), condones working with the
regime and through its institutions (Wiktorowicz, 2000). Shaqra contends that in
his sermons he would not allude to politics because this talk is “useless”, and
when once mentioned the peace treaty with Israel in his sermons he did not go as
far as disavowing the State or cursing Jews.
Given that these banned preachers (two who are close to the jihadist salafi
movement, and a Sufi and former government and army official) all believe that by
definition political discourse falls within the purview of the mosque mandate, it
follows that the State is weary and intolerant towards preachers who embrace this
point of view. The fact that these preachers were banned from preaching in the
1990s is an indication this policy of proscription was engrained in the State’s
mindset even before the Amendment was endorsed in 2006.
Deputy Emad Maayah220 holds a counterargument as he views the main role of
the mosque as “not political” except if it condones the official policies of the State,
“the role of the mosque is spiritual and that of moral upbringing; enhancing
love to the homeland which stems out of the love for God; supplication
[du’a] to His Majesty the King, to consecutive governments of Jordan and to
high ranking officials… This [politics] isn’t the role of the mosque. But I do
not say the mosque should be void of this content. The role of the mosque,
especially in times of crisis and wars, is a positively active role”.
A yet more restrictive disposition (cultural and spiritual/soteriological) is that of
Minister of Awqaf, Abdulfattah Salah, who views the role of the mosque as,
220 A retired Assistant Commander-in-Chief of Jordan Armed Forces; former MP [Christian seat of
Madaba city]; head of the National Steering Committee [NSC] which deliberated the 2006
Amendment.
Page 193 of 299
“An educating role; guiding the people to what is good in this life and the
hereafter”
Embedded in how the ministry’s legal advisor Mohammad Mobaidin describes the
law and its Amendment is the perception that, although politics are not part of the
mosque’s message, preachers do address these themes, but it is the State’s duty
to clean up the mosque of any chaos or dispute, therefore the need for the Law
Amendment.
The political component of the sermon is advocated by all interviewed figures of
the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Dr. Tayseer Fityani221 considers the role of
the mosque as,
“An all-purpose one – political, economic, social, cultural and religious, an
integrated role”
Zaki Bani Ersheid222, Secretary General of IAF and protagonist of an IAF stream
close to Hamas223 (Abu Rumman 2007: 42), views that the mosque has two
mandates; firstly to proclaim the stance of the Islamic state throughout Friday
sermons, and secondly, the mosque is the best forum where people’s needs are
being exposed and addressed,
“as governments acknowledged this role they wanted to relegate this role
to the State… the mosque’s congregation holds no opposition as they come
ready to listen and behave accordingly, and this is where the role of the
mosque in shaping public opinion resides, whether through the Imam or in
sessions afterwards when people come and leave. The minister of awqaf
knows well the role of the mosque is far more important than most of the
existing media outlets…”
221 Fityani is an academic, former member of parliament (2003-2007), and a prominent figure of the
Muslim Brotherhood movement.
222 Abu Rumman (2007) contended that being close to Hamas, Bani Ershid’s nomination to assume
the post of Secretary General of IAF provoked the regime and centrist Islamists (p.42).
223 HAMAS- a Palestinian Islamist armed political group banned by the Jordanian government.
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Another hawkish figure, Mohammad Abu Fares, recounts several political issues in
his sermons, for which he was banned from preaching since 1993; a sign that
politics is not only part of the sermon theme, but something one has to pay a price
for.
Hamza Mansour (Bani Ersheid’s predecessor), described the mosque (and the
school) as the focus of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan which,
“was a factor of acumen in this country and played a significant role… in
averting the country the plight of extremism”.
Mansour recounts when he was summoned by minister of awqaf who admonished
him for always bringing in the issue of Palestine and Jews. Likewise, former
deputy Badr al-Riati of the Muslim Brotherhood movement said he was banned
from preaching because he had tackled political issues, namely the peace treaties
between the Arabs and Israel.
Former independent Islamist deputy, Layth Shbeilat, views that the role of the
mosque has changed because of the change that occurred in the stance of the
Islamist leaders who now fear the government, yet when they are strong no one
can prevent them from defending the homeland through their rhetoric, but now
there is a legal impediment.
Senator Abdulmajid Zuneibat (pro-regime Muslim Brotherhood figure) contends
that the mosque is the prime shaper of public opinion, especially through
preachers of the Islamic movement who discuss political issues and criticize
policies of the government.
The vast majority of the interviewees agree the mosque should speak politics
which comes at the core of defining its historical role and status in the Islamic
nation, focusing mostly on Friday sermon as the main function of the mosque.
Opposition figures (mainly hawks of the Muslim Brotherhood movement) do stress
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the preeminence of this role, whereas State figures shun or deny this role
ascribing the mosque an educational and moral duty, and if by any means the
preacher should speak politics it should be State-friendly. In this domain, State
figures do not prescribe politics as an integral part of the sermon, but while
admitting that politics is inevitable, they conditionally sanction it. On the other
hand, Islamist scholars and preachers who strictly adhere to Islamic shari’a but still
work within the purview of State interests do establish this task of the mosque, but
they handle it without political agendas used to shore up anti-State sentiments as
they acknowledge where to delineate the redlines with the regime.
The foremost powerful and well organized political party, the Muslim Brotherhood
movement, takes the mosque as the ideal platform to diffuse its thoughts and
garner public support given the religious content of the sermon frame their political
stances and give them authenticity. Its members, many who served as deputies,
insist the mosque has a political role to play in shaping public opinion. This stance
is not confined to the movement as indicated in the viewpoints of the two Salafi
preachers (who adhere to the teaching of Prophet Mohammad and his direct
companions), or the Sufi Imam who had also assumed official posts; all asserting
this role though from a different approach. The Muslim Brotherhood movement is
keen to use the mosque to contest the government and oppose its policies,
especially the peace treaty with Israel. They do so relying on their grassroots base
composed mainly of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, especially in their stronghold
of Zarqa city.
Perceiving the worshipper as a passive receiver influenced by the preacher’s
directives, the government and its supporters in parliament, such as Maayah,
conditionally sanction this political role but only if the sermon’s content is ‘positive’
in order to deactivate this important tool used by the Islamic movement to contest
State influence in the religious sphere; religiosity being employed as a tool to
shore up the legitimacy of the Hashemite regime. In addition, the mosque
inculcates extremist beliefs and anti-governmental sentiments ready to be used as
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ammunition by the Islamic opposition once the governmental policies have failed;
a “lie and wait” policy to establish their ultimate goal of shari’a-compliant society
according to their doctrine.
State officials tend to shrug off dissonant political content in the sermon as long as
it does not contest strategic State policies such as the peace treaty with Israel, or
cause social unrest. Therefore, politics in the sermon is not a taboo per se, given
that political topics at times might serve as panacea to allow people to fret their
frustration, or can even be used to back governmental policies or State
strategies224. One possible way is to use the extremist discourse as a scarecrow to
bedevil the Islamic movement and rein in the opposition. Thus far, politics
constitute a taboo if used as a tool to contest States control over the public and
religious space. Price (1994:677) contends that,
“The function of the government in a market for loyalties ordinarily goes far
beyond its role as regulator and enforcer for a cartel of identity
producers…Not only have governments sought to exclude a range of
destabilizing narratives, they have also sought to ensure that a sense of
national identity is available and, if possible, prevails”.
Al-Rousan (2010: 246-247) attributes the receding political role of the mosque,
though still embedded in its discourse, to the rising political awareness in society.
This awareness came alongside the educational and upbringing renaissance
which has caused the educational and social role of the mosque to ebb. Another
reason for the declining educational role is the low level of preachers and
pressures on them by the State. Al-Rousan adds that the prime role of the mosque
is religious, but even this role is incapable of influencing people’s attitudes and
behavior given the parallel influence by other alternative means such as religious
lessons on satellite televisions and other societal institutions, beside the fact that
the mosque’s speech is void, old fashioned and non-interactive. One function of
the mosque which Al-Rousan (p. 146) highlights as the most important conclusion
224 Jarrar (2009:46) points out that at one point the Jordanian security apparatus used state-run
mosques to mobilize young Jordanians to go and fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.
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in his study is the emerging economic function which comes after the religious
function. This function is not being expressed in the religious speech itself, but of
which the mosque constitutes a linkage on the individual and collective level. This
notion by Al-Rousan, that the economic role is not salient in the mosque speech,
agrees with the ensuing conclusions in this study (worshippers in Friday
congregational prayer feel bored from listening to economic themes in the
sermon).
6.2.2. The Context which Engulfed the Endorsement of the Law and its
2006 Amendment
Except the two officials of Ministry of Awqaf who referred the context and motives
behind the Amendment to mere directorial matters, all interviewees, including
Maayah and Zunaibat, linked the motives to the political environment, whether
local or regional, but mostly regional as per the Muslim Brotherhood figures.
Minister Salah refused to answer this question, a sign this issue being sensitive to
high ranking officials and requires self censorship.
The fact that deputy Maayah is affirmative regarding the political context, but
defiant to politics being part of the mosque message, indicates an official
containment policy by proxy, and a conviction to officially besiege the mosque
from its dynamic environment. Likewise, the salafi Imam Muhammad Shaqra,
close to the State but revered as a referential scholar even by extremist Islamists,
referred the enactment of consecutive laws of Awqaf to certain conditions Jordan
has been going through and not according to the personal whims of concerned
parties.
The notion that official denial to relate the Amendment to the political context is
limited to State officials in office yet vocal among State cronies is a sign of self
censorship and a security-driven policy by the regime. This course of action by the
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officialdom has marred the reign of King Abdullah II vis-à-vis the approach
adopted by his predecessor, King Hussein bin Talal, who used to personally
handle this once “political” dossier until his demise in 1999 (Abu Rumman
2007:24).
Viewpoints mentioned here below denote that the perspective within which the
Law and its Amendment were being endorsed is mostly related to curbing the
opposition (mainly the Muslim Brotherhood movement; vocal at mosques), thereby
safeguarding the national interest, and to squelch public dissent against foreign
policy concerning the regime’s pro-Western role in the region, mainly regarding
Israel and Iraq. This comes in the context of mounting public dissent against
Western policies condoned by the regime which drove the latter to control religious
discourse in the religious space, thereby thwarting the use of the mosque platform
by the Islamic opposition as a means to rally public sentiments against
governmental policies. This containment policy goes in tandem with what most of
the interviewees think of politics as an integral part of the mosque message, vis-à-
vis the counter stance by State allies and officials who limit the scope of this role to
mere ritualistic religiosity and moral upbringing of the people, or politics which
comply with State policies at the best.
A breakdown of the priorities declared by the Islamic Action Front in communiqués
published on its website between 2005 and 2007 depicts little attention given to
economic issues, least attention to social issues, major concern to regional or
Arab issues, and political reform rating second to regional or Arab issues.
Apparently, internal affairs have not been of high concern to the party vis-à-vis
regional affairs, mainly Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian issues (Abu
Rumman 2007:50). It is worth noting that the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood
movement through its political arm has by and large been political in nature and
provocative to the regime (whether regional, or political reform at home), thereby
shaping the milieu according to which the government would later on delineate the
religious sphere.
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Jarrar (2009:29) denoted the “terrorist” bomb attacks which took place in Amman
in 2005 as the spark which drove the State to espouse an “anti-terrorist approach”
to curb Islamic extremism. This includes the enactment of anti-terrorism laws to
deter the recruitment of zealous fanatics, control over religious activities through
regulating the religious sphere, and exposing mainstream Islamists through
controlling social platforms. Among the basket of legislations the State enacted to
retaliate against the 11/9 attacks in Amman225 was the endorsement of The Law of
Preaching, Guidance and Teaching in Mosques no. 59 of 2006 (Amending law no.
7 of 1986). In addition, the State grew anxious of the electoral success of the
Islamists in the legislative elections of the Palestinian Territories and in Egypt in
2005 and 2006 successively. The government feared that Jordanian Islamists
would use their foreign allegiance to shore up popularity and mobilize a radical
religious and political opposition at home. Recognizing the influence of the
mosque in disseminating extremist Islamic ideology and mobilizing dissent and
anti-regime collective action, the State was keen to hold its grip on informal
religious platforms226. As a preventive measure, in 2008 the State resorted to
amend the Law of Public Assembly by redefining “public meetings” in a way that
would curtail public opposition to its policies (Ibid, p.46&61). This is apparent in
Maayah’s inkling that,
“there are other matters which affect the Law of Preaching and Guidance at
mosques such as the Law of Public Assembly which prohibits any
gatherings unlicensed by Ministry of Interior. If gatherings took place in
unlicensed places or during unsafe events in a way that does not serve the
national interests of Jordan, the authorities should then interfere to stop
these practices through peaceful means”.
225 Three hotels were attacked by Al Qaeda suicide bombers on November 09th, 2005 resulting in
the killing of 63 people.
226 The Pew Research Global Attitudes Project published survey figures in July 2005 that nearly 60
percent of Jordanians justified suicide bombings against civilian targets in defence of Islam.
Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, Islamic Extremism.
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Abdul Majeed Zuneibat, actual Senator227 and former General Monitor of the
Muslim Brotherhood (Doves’ stream) views that the Amendment,
“has come in the context of the States direct supervision over the mosque,
and to regulate religious discourse so as to condone its general policy in
light of criticism and objections against certain governmental policies
whether in the local or external arenas, especially with regard to the
relationship with the Zionist enemy. In addition, it came to contain the rising
religious aggrandizement, especially the active role of the Islamic
movement in Jordan, hence the Ministry of Awqaf banning several
preachers who belong to the Islamic movement, in tandem with the political
stances of consecutive governments”.
Wael Battiri, referred the context which engulfed the 2006 Amendment to,
“the Gulf War, I guess, and its repercussions as international coalitions and
US have become the sole polar, thereby Jordan becoming subject to
pressures by the US in the first place. These laws can be looked at in the
light of Western and US-based dictations”.
Zaki Bani Ershead, contends that,
“Jordan was subject to pressures to carry out certain roles that would result
in besieging the Islamic movement in Jordan’’.
Apparently,, the longstanding relationship between the regime and the Muslim
Brotherhood movement started taking a downward spiral by the mid 1980s
onwards, and the context was both regional such as the dispute with neighboring
Syria in 1982, the rise of HAMAS in 1987, and the peace treaty with Israel in 1994
in addition to local factors such as the resumption of democratic life in 1989, the
new era of King Abdullah II in 1999, and the new elections law in 1993.
Hamza Mansour, referred the enactment of the law to,
227 Abu Rumman (2007) cited that Zuneibat had expressed his stance that “the reality today is the
modern civil state system and not an Islamic State of the Caliphate” (p.48).
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“the Wadi Araba Peace Treaty with Israel, [and] US interventions especially
during the period when the Christian right wing was dominant in USA”.
This is further corroborated by analyst of Islamic movements, Mohammed Abu
Rumman (2007:12), who maintained that,
“The 1990s … witnessed a great transformation in policy symbolized by
Jordan’s decision to enter into peace talks with Israel. Much legislation
would be passed restricting civic action and the opposition’s ability to
mobilize”.
Mohammad Abu Fares, a radical Muslim Brotherhood member and prominent
figure of the hawks’ stream, referred the Law back to the time of the British
mandate over Jordan,
“the Law was meant to control preachers and ulama [religious scholars] of
the Islamic Movement who would slam the British occupation to Jordan”.
This view is corroborated by historian Boulby (1999:63) who states that monitoring
the mosque preachers was a policy which the British had encouraged228.
Deputy and banned preacher of the IAF in Aqaba, Bader Saleh al-Riati229, referred
the law to the resumption of democratic life in Jordan in 1989,
“when people chose candidates from the Islamic and pan-Arab streams,
decision makers and enemies of our umma in the West did not like it,
therefore study centers rushed to deliver opinions, advices, directions and
recommendations, amongst which was… to expel the Islamic movement
228 Boulby (Ibid) quotes a “confidential memo from Mr. Wikeley in Jerusalem to Foreign office, OF
371 121464, January 3, 1956 (no. 494) stated: “A strike has been declared for tomorrow and the
Governor of Jerusalem is nervous of more trouble. I have suggested to him that as it is obligatory
day for Muslims he should do what he can to ensure that preachers in the Mosques do not inflame
reactionary Moslem feelings.”
229 Assyjill monthly magazine reported in its January, 2009 issue that “… an official objection being
issued against the content of sermons delivered by two of the movement’s sheikhs; Hamza
Mansour in Amman, and Badr Al Riati in Aqaba. Mansour and Al Riati were among 20 orators of
the Muslim Brotherhood allowed by the government to ascend mosque podiums during last year’s
autumn, ending a two years ban on them”.
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[Muslim Brotherhood] from podiums of guidance and influence, including
the mosques”.
Most of the interviewees herewith pinpointed to external pressures over Jordan,
State allegiance to the West, the resumption of democratic life and the consequent
rise of the Islamic movement, which weigh the political leverage over the technical
context espoused by State officials.
In the first two supra issues, all interviewees, including some State affiliates but
not State officials, agree that politics is a main ingredient of the mosque discourse,
and that in a marketplace of contested loyalties between the regime and the
opposition, politics constitute the environment which drives the State to control the
religious sphere. This does not imply that the State wants to ferret out politics from
Friday sermon, the main component of the mosque discourse, but that the regime
is keen to shape the religious discourse in such a way as to ossify its legitimacy
and sway public opinion to its side. More so when democratic life is resumed and
politics becomes the legitimate battlefield between the Islamic opposition, whose
discourse capitalizes on hot regional issues (mainly the Palestinian issue) to
appeal to the masses and cultivate public support that atones for its impotence in
tackling economic and social issues which require genuine programs often
debated in the interactive public sphere rather than the non-interactive patriarchic
religious space.
6.2.3. Motives behind Endorsing the Law and the 2006 Amendment
The motivation that drove the State to endorse the Law and its 2006 Amendment
cannot be separated from the aforesaid context, primarily the political milieu
whether in the local or regional sphere. The regulation of the religious sphere goes
back to the time of the British mandate which ended with the independence of the
Kingdom in 1946, but had yet left its print on pertinent laws even after the
Arabization of the Jordanian army in 1956. This is evident with the endorsement of
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the anti-communist law of 1948, amended in 1953, and cancelled in 1990.
Mohammad Abu Fares points out that the Law of Preaching and Guidance at
Mosques,
“was meant to control the preachers and ulama [scholars] of the Islamic
movement who would slam the British mandate over Jordan. This law was
thereafter enacted with yet more strictness and control. By then, a man
would be summoned and questioned, but the actual law enacted a penal
sentence of imprisonment and fine. The aim behind it is still to confine
mosque preachers to those loyal to the regime and the consecutive
governments”.
Likewise is the stance of former Islamist deputy Layth Shbeilat, critical to both the
Muslim Brotherhood movement and the regime, who views the law as similar in its
motives to the anti-communism law which targeted any resistance to colonialism
during the British mandate to Jordan and the post-colonialism period when the
leftist and pan-Arab parties thrived in the Arab world.
Zaki Bani Ersheid views that as the government acknowledged the role of the
mosque, the Amendment constitutes,
“ ...the appropriation of the mosque’s task in preaching the people and
shaping public opinion. Minister of Awqaf knew well the role of the mosque
was far more important than most of the existing media outlets. The
philosophy behind this law was such that only the government’s official
stance is proclaimed throughout the mosques, whereas other opinions are
besieged”.
Emad Maayah correlated the law with the Law of Public Assembly which,
“prohibits any gathering unlicensed by Ministry of Interior”
This former deputy and top brass contends that the mosque has often trespassed
its basic role, and justified the 2006 Amendment by the need to confine the
mosque mandate to its religious role, to sanction who is and who is not qualified to
preach, and to curb preachers who propagate hate speech.
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Maayah’s fellow NSC member and IAF figure Taysir Fityani described the Law as,
“politically driven before being thought driven, because authorities were
weary of ideological streams that would guide society to its public
good…The Law was the first episode in banning IAF members, but there
were still chances to teach and counsel at mosques, and penalties were still
limited”.
Hamza Mansour calls the law a “backward” and the government wanted to “dwarf
the message of the mosque” and to “drain off the resources of the Islamic
movement” by banning its preachers, adding that the justification behind it was the
government’s need to silence voices opposed to the peace treaty with Israel, and
to dilute public opposition against its policies regarding the elections law which
curtailed the Islamists’ presence in parliament. Senator Zuneibat contends that the
Law came to contain the rising religious expansion, especially the active role of the
Islamic movement in Jordan.
On February 15th, 2010 the Researcher also interviewed Abu Mohammad al-
Maqdisi230, doctrinaire of the jihadist salafi movement, at his house in Rusaifah
and asked him to comment on the State’s pretext to endorse the 2006 Amendment
to the Law, namely, that the mosque podium is being used to transmit political
agendas and takfiri thought,
“Well, you can prevent ikhwan [the Muslim Brotherhood] from propagating
for the elections…but the issue does not stop here… a preacher who is not
in their [government] pocket will be cornered ….Therefore he [the Imam]
becomes under pressure and eventually quits sermonizing under pressure,
or else they make him quit. … even if you do not talk against them or slam
them; unless you abide by their viewpoint you are doomed to become
banned”.
230 When the Researcher asked the interviewee about what to record and what not to record
(audio), the interviewee (Al Maqdisi) said the secret police (al-mukhabarat) had asked him that day
“what does Madanat want from you!”; a sign of their former knowledge about the meeting.
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MP and banned preacher of IAF in Aqaba, Bader Saleh al-Riati, views that the
Amendment was drafted so that,
“The Ministry of Awqaf is directed to expel influential preachers albeit their
high academic qualifications, and ban lessons and lectures at mosques
unless they are pre-licensed by the minister”.
Minister of Awqaf, Abdulfattah Salah, refused to answer the Researcher’s question
on “What were the motives which drove the State to draft the Amendment to the
Law of Preaching and Guidance in 2006 and present it to Parliament for
endorsement?” saying,
“The Law has already been endorsed and there is no point of discussing it
herewith”,
While the minister’s legal advisor, Mohammad Mobaidin, contended that,
“the law was endorsed in 1986 with the aim of organizing the sermons and
guidance issues, and formulating a council entitled to establish a policy for
sermonizing and guidance in the kingdom. Regarding the latest
Amendment endorsed in 2006, it was a slight Amendment to the Law which
stipulated that any person who delivers sermons and guidance at mosques
should be pre-commissioned to do so by Minister of Awqaf, and be qualified
to do so… Although the previous law had stipulated this, it was actually
subject to different interpretations... In the past, this context was embedded
but now it has become forthright... Its aim was to clean up the mosques of
any chaos or dispute.”
Salafi Imam Shaqra gives a similar justification saying the regulations (law and
Amendments) are akin to administrative guidance (warning of mistakes which
might cause internal strife) but have nothing to do with the content being said in
the sermon. Another ministry official, al-Takhaineh, views that,
“The number of mosques in the Kingdom has tripled since 1990 due mainly
to higher birth rates, migration to the Kingdom and an increased religious
awareness amongst the people. Qualified people were reluctant to work for
Ministry of Awqaf because of the long commitment conditions and low
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salaries, so they were replaced by high-school graduates, more or less, and
new programs were incepted to qualify them”.
The policy of restraining hate speech and dwarfing the capability of the Muslim
Brotherhood movement to attack pro-peace stances cannot be isolated from
politics as it has become a consistent official policy following the peace treaty with
Israel and the war against terrorism which proceeded apace and Jordan has
become party to in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 09/11 in USA and 11/09 in
Jordan.
The aforementioned viewpoints show that ascribing political motives to the
endorsement of the original law and its Amendment (through a parliament almost
void of Islamist presence) is common among the Muslim Brotherhood movement
(both State-friendly figures and opponents), salafis and a pro-state Islamist deputy.
However, on the government’s side, there seems to be a tendency to either shun
the disclosure of the real motives behind endorsing the Amendment or water down
any political intentions behind regulating the religious speech as this falls outside
the purview of the officialdom, or else one might construe the government is in a
contest to control the religious sphere which used to be co-opted with the
Islamists.
For a government to regulate the religious sphere, this is something
comprehensible and justified in Muslim countries. The inception of the law in 1986
coincided with the start of the rift between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood
movement in Jordan. Until then, disputes between both sides were harmoniously
solved given the co-optation policy embraced by the regime which used the
Islamists as a mantle to curb the influence of leftists and pan-Arab opposition, in
addition to the regime’s need to use religion as a pillar to brace its legitimacy.
None of the Islamist commentators above had slammed the regime during this
period, save a few who blamed the British. But when religiosity expands in society
(as the ministry official explained) and actors active outside the purview of full
regime control invest in the religious sphere in order to penetrate and control the
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public sphere (therefore contesting the State’s ability to shape public opinion) then
it is the State’s obligation to wrest momentum back from the Islamic movement
lest the public opinion gravitates towards the well organized Islamic movement
and oppose governmental policies.
From the supra viewpoints it can be inferred that members of IAF refer the 2006
Amendment to politically driven motives, mainly regional conflicts and their
repercussions on Jordan, and a subsequent attempt by the regime to limit the
Muslim Brotherhood movement’s ability to utilize the mosque as a platform to
amass public support. While State officials and State-friendly figures do not refer
the Amendment to political factors, their answers embed a justification for official
attempts to curb public gatherings by the opposition.
As for the jihadist salafis, the issue is to be or not to be under control by the
security apparatus given their ideology of disavowing the regime as apostate and
ignoramus and its ruler as taghout [tyrant]. According to this group, any walk-away
from full submission to the regime by the mosque preacher brings about imminent
ban and clamp down by the security apparatus. Apparently, members of the
Muslim Brotherhood movement would not ostensibly go that far given their non-
takfiri stance towards the regime, although both schools of thought (jihadists and
Muslim Brotherhood) adhere to the writings of the jihadist theorist Sayyid Qutb.
The takfiri roots in the ideology of these two groups is apparent for the State which
strives to curtail the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda to Islamize society through their
Friday diatribes and eventually debilitate the regime’s religious legitimacy. The
State is also keen to incapacitate the jihadists, but not to the extent of diminishing
them. This policy is meant to prevent their recruits from adhering to external
doctrinaires, and their discourse and modus operandi exposed to the security
apparatus to demystify.
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6.2.4. The Role of State and Non-State Actors in Enacting and
Enforcing the Law and the 2006 Amendment
Maayah described his chairmanship to NSC as one of the “very important
committees in parliament” which played active role in articulating the Law after
being referred to the House Speaker by The Bureau of Legislation at the Prime
Ministry. This deputy also denies any contact or pressure mounted on him during
the parliamentary deliberations of the Amendment, whether by State figures or the
palace, but assures that each sermon is being passed on to the security
apparatus.
The monitoring of the mosque speech by the State is further confirmed by
Mohammad Abu Fares, who views that,
“it is well known that they [State security] do monitor the preachers, and in
every mosque they place more than one snitch who would write them a
report […] If a preacher attacked Jews and called for fighting and jihad, he
is summoned either by the director of awqaf, or if he is a grand scholar the
minister himself would call him in, blame him and hold him responsible, or
he might even be threatened […] Sometimes I talk and the governor would
summon me and interrogate me […] After I became a deputy in 1994 the
administrative governor of Amman, Nawayseh, ordered my imprisonment in
the police prison with all the sexual aggressors and drug addicts because I
was teaching in the mosque. One day I was told by an official not to recite
al-fatiha231 in the mosques. I refused this request and went back from the
Intelligence Department to tell people what happened to me and that now I
keep delivering religious lessons to you in spite of everything”.
The repercussions of State control over the religious space beget self-censorship
by the salafi Imams who work within the regime’s circle. Mohammad Shaqra
describes his Imamate since the early seventies to the mid nineties as staying
away from politics and tackling only Fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence], given that
engagement in politics is not beneficial to the people. This policy has enabled
Shaqra (a traditional salafi) to avoid being banned from guidance and Imamate
231 Al-Fatiha is The Opening; the first chapter of Quran. It has an essential role in the daily prayers.
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throughout his service. As to whether the Imams are subject to pressure by the
ministry of awqaf, Shaqra contended,
“in general, I never felt strictness or severe pressure …If the ministry of
awqaf wanted me to focus on a certain political issue, this guidance was not
compelling; they would just write down some non-mandatory general
guidelines to the preachers. The Law was a kind of administrative guidance
without inflicting on the content of the sermon. For example, preachers
would tackle the public expenditure issue, which was a taboo theme, but
the issue is how to tackle it. I mentioned the Wadi Araba Peace Treaty [with
Israel] but I never cursed the State or Jews”.
This statement by Shaqra testifies that preachers apply self-censorship as
acknowledgment to where the State delineates redlines which, if tackled, they
ought to be observed with utmost discretion. This inference is further corroborated
by Ali al-Faqir, former deputy and minister of awqaf in 1990,232 and currently a
banned preacher, who contended,
“the State would send me some signals which I could understand, although
these were not mandatory”.
Apparently, the element of self-censorship is evident in the two interviews by
Imams Shaqra and al-Faqir, who alongside their task as Imams and preachers
they also served as high ranking government officials.
The Researcher asked Senator Zuneibat - what, if any, was the role of civil
society, foreign sides, or influential State institutions in steering local policy to push
for the Amendment and secure its endorsement? Zuneibat answered,
“No doubt there have been internal and external motives behind the
endorsement of these Amendments which came in compliance with the
American dominance over the region, because the religious discourse
focuses on opposing the American role in the region”.
232 Boulby (1999:142) states that the Muslim Brotherhood’s interest in assuming the portfolio of the
Ministry of Awqaf’s, amongst other portfolios, was “not only because of its major concern with such
issues as religious affairs and education, but because they would allow its deputies greater access
to mobilizing its grass-roots networks”.
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In March 2010, the Researcher asked Zuneibat about the role of Lower House of
Parliament (especially the NSC) in deliberating and endorsing the Amendment.
Zuneibat answered,
“By endorsing the amended Law of Preaching and Guidance, the Lower
House of Parliament played a role in supporting the governmental tendency
to regulate and steer religious discourse at mosques”.
In 2004, two years before the Amendment, Zuneibat had posited that,
“We requested that the Law of Preaching and Guidance should be
activated, but we were deprived of this, and now we suffer from the
consequences...the whole issue [banning the Islamic Movement’s orators
from using the mosque podiums] is politically driven and comes in the
context of targeting the Islamic Movement… our orators are being banned
since the 1994’s Wadi Araba Treaty”233.
Two years after the Amendment was endorsed, it was apparent the government
was persistent in guiding the Imams on what they should or should not say. Al
Ghad newspaper issue of March 03rd, 2008 reported the governor of al-Zarqa (a
hotbed for the Islamists) urging the mosque Imams to speak about issues of drugs
and traffic accidents234.
As for al-Maqdisi, neither the law nor the Amendment is of any importance to the
jihadist movement, given that jihadist operatives are already targeted by the State
security, and their religious space is different [makeshift mosques]. This jihadist
doctrinaire did not even hear about the Amendment!
Islamist activist Shbeilat, critical to the Muslim Brotherhood though appreciative of
their honest feelings, blames their figures for not being serious in their opposition
233 Source: http://www.alarabiya.net/save_print.php?save=1&cont_id=7208
accessed on May 15th, 2010.
234 See Annex I, p.6.
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to State policies, especially the peace treaty with Israel, and the fact that the Law
and its Amendment targeted any segment of society that yearns to fight
colonialism and occupation. This former deputy also mentioned that the Islamist
movement should have boycotted the elections and used its tools to stir the street.
Implied in this opinion is the movement’s ability to actively use the mosque
podium, a sign that the official clamp down was a containment policy to pass on
the peace treaty with Israel through the sitting parliament, and that the Islamic
movement was not bereft of necessary tools to oppose State policies.
Therefore, mosque regulations were enacted with yet more strictness in 2006 as
the movement has no longer become a permanent fixture in the parliament.
Bani Ershead says the government uses some other Islamic streams to pressure
the Muslim Brotherhood so as to disrupt its role and defame it. This leading
Islamist figure did not give any account of his own experience or that of his
companions, although he mentions that there still exist some preachers who carry
out their role qualifiedly, whether in mosques or elsewhere.
Mansour says he was first banned from preaching in1993 all through 2008 when
the director of the Intelligence Department promised to sanction the banned
preachers, who were lately ousted again. As for the difference between how the
State enacted the Law, Mansour posits that,
“the Law stipulates that any preacher who trespasses the law should be
warned, then sent to court for breaking the law. Now [with the Amendment]
any governor can call you saying you should not deliver speeches, and he
would have you sign a commitment that in case you preach again, deliver a
speech or teach you will be subject to penalties”.
Implied in this statement is the notion that instead of judiciary measures by the
general prosecutor, the government’s hand is now stretched out to pre-empt any
violation to the law by intimidating the preachers beforehand.
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The Researcher interviewed Ministry of Awqaf official, Abdullah al-Takhaineh (who
asked the interview be handwritten and not recorded). al-Takhaineh
stated that the ministry had suggested yet more strict measures in its proposed
Amendment, such as longer jail sentences and a written commitment by the
banned preacher not to recur his ‘violation’, but these suggestions were not
endorsed by the parliament. This suggests that the government through the
ministry of awqaf was inclined to endorse tighter control and regulations over the
mosques and the preachers who mostly belong to the Muslim Brotherhood
movement.
Mobaidin explains that after the Amendment was proposed by the government,
parliament referred it to NSC which tackles laws pertaining to public opinion, and
that he was present in the deliberations with this committee but did not have any
say in it as this was the sole role of the minister.
The Researcher views that this course of action between NSC and the
government is unfamiliar, given the fact that parliamentary committees do consult
official experts on contentious issues, but having discussed the Amendment solely
with the minister is a sign this was not a technical issue but a purely political
agenda guided by a security agenda.
Salah says the ministry has its own and private criteria in licensing preachers
(although he refused to divulge these conditions), but in case a preacher diffuses a
viewpoint contrary to Amman Message, he would be summoned for discussion.
This statement implies that only compliant preachers are sanctioned. When the
Researcher faced Salah with his findings that takfiri speech still exists, the minister
answered that there are very few infringement cases and the awqaf officials tackle
them case by case. But the minister indirectly justified hate speech against Jews
and Americans by attributing this discourse to “certain conditions”.
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One can infer the State has been serious in enacting the pertinent regulations, but
leaves a space for preachers to diffuse people’s emotions in times of crisis,
especially during Western or Israeli assault against fellow Muslim and Arab
countries.
Battiri narrates a case when he sent a petition to the ministry to preach at
mosques. After passing the qualification test, his interview did not go well as the
interviewer (a Sufi) classified the applicant as a salafi. Battiri says he was banned
several times (had opposed mixed-gender swimming, and greeting Christians
during their feasts) and was apprehended one day in jail, although the ministry
would sometimes invite him to preach given the dearth in the number of available
preachers.
al-Riati pinpoints at the Senate as the propeller to pass the Law in 1997. After the
deputies had rejected the Law, al-Riati recalls that the deputies were geared “by
remote control” to endorse it. But when the Law was amended in 2006, the
deputies rushed to endorse it this time as proposed by the government. Thereafter
the security apparatus played a pivotal role in banning certain preachers, because
this apparatus is the power which guides the government to ban or sanction
preachers. al-Riati was banned several times,
“the last was in May 2009 when the director of awqaf called him saying
“you are prohibited until further notice”, but why, I know not!””
The majority of the interviewees, whether Imams, officials or politicians indicate
the government leaves a leeway for infringements to the law, as several preachers
were intermittently banned then allowed to preach again. A participant observation
by the Researcher elicits the same notion- hate speech being propagated and
other infringements by the preachers they do not stand accountable for.
Seemingly, the successive regulations were meant to deal with a certain political
impasse (such as passing the peace treaty with Israel) more than genuinely
curbing hate speech still vocal in sermons ever after the Amendment. Apparently,
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the target of this control, namely the Amendment, was the Muslim Brotherhood
movement whose discourse is not merely doctrinal but political in nature. But once
the effect of the ban is accomplished, the practice of regulations waters down and
the State seems less adamant at enforcing the law.
6.2.5. The Fate of the Pre-Amendment Discourse at Mosques
(Proposition: law and Amendment failed to accomplish their goals)
As to how has the religious discourse morphed; has it simply receded or shifted
into other podiums/settings, Zuneibat contends that official censorship over
preachers continues in spite of the pre-licensing condition by the minister, but the
mosque continues to be the principal influential podium in addressing the people
and shaping public opinion. This pro-regime Islamist senator views that the
Amendments came to impede the Islamic expansion, especially the role of the
Islamic movement in preaching and guidance, as it was clear the movement’s
preachers are influential in steering public opinion and discussing issues which
some preachers would not dare to tackle such as the foreign political stances and
direct criticism to local governmental policies; the latest Amendment has limited
the movement’s role in this regard.
It should be noted here that although the worshippers opine they feel bored of
listening to political substance in the sermon (see Chapter Four), this is true when
the political atmosphere is calm, and vice versa. On the other hand, the
participating Informants (Chapter Five) chose to pray in a certain mosque if they
feel the preacher has addressed the political reality, and as long as he is not
geared by official agenda.
When faced with the research findings that even after the 2006 Amendment, takfiri
speech (disavowing others as apostates), or hate speech such as cursing Jews
and Americans, is still laced in Friday sermons, deputy Maayah exclaimed,
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“The State must be aware of this […] but if not, then we are doomed”.
When the Researcher faced Minister of Awqaf, Abdulfattah Salah, with on-the-
ground findings that Friday sermons still embed takfiri speech or cursing Jews and
Americans, the minster reacted,
“you have no right to record at these mosques; you need an official
approval…There are a very few infringement cases [takfiri content] which
we tackle case by case [...] This is unacceptable but it can be attributed to
certain conditions”.
While the minister’s advisor, Mobaidin, attributes this type of discourse to the
situation of Muslims at large whereof the preacher has to address their conditions,
be they in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan or elsewhere. As for the jihadist discourse,
Mobaidin admits that it has not changed but been rationalized by the same
preachers; those who have changed are very few. This viewpoint is corroborated
by Abu fares who views that the post-Amendment discourse has not changed at
all because the Law is not new; it was a temporary Law then became permanent.
Abu Fares also contends that the jihadist discourse still persists.
Statements by the aforementioned State and State-friendly figures bear out the
notion that the government’s control over the religious space cannot and should
not completely wear away takfiri or hate speech; this speech being indispensible
for people to vent their anger and to feel the State is present and responsive to
foreign challenges facing the umma. In addition, although regulations targeting the
religious speech are being enacted for political reasons, there still exist some
preachers, other than the Islamic movement, who also exploit State tolerance in
order to propagate antagonistic speech which at certain times appeals to the
worshippers. The State in this case let go given that these preachers are not
politically motivated nor can they organize the masses against the government; on
the contrary, they enhance the image that the regime is the custodian of Islam
(religion of the State as per constitution) and Islamic symbols.
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Regarding the question of where has the takfiri or jihadist discourse wind up after
the 2006 Amendment, Bani Ersheid argues that,
“this discourse still exists, but it has managed to remodel and adapt itself,
and the content and setting of this discourse now disseminate through other
means of communication with people such as wedding parties because it
appeals to the supporters and carries out a mobilizing and provocative
element throughout social events… There are still people who carry out this
role [preaching] sometimes in mosques or even after prayers, not only on
Friday prayers… especially in social events, particularly during funerals and
wakes”.
Abu Fares holds a likewise view that the pre-Amendment jihadist discourse is,
“still ubiquitous; on and beside the podium, in lessons and preaching, in
gatherings and seminars, lectures and festivals”.
al-Faqir considers that following the Law Amendment, mosque speech has moved
into private sessions (weddings, wakes) and oratory festivals by the Muslim
Brotherhood movement in addition to their gatherings, forums and the media as
substitutes to the mosque podium.
Mansour did not answer the above question, saying merely that in the absence of
reformers, unauthorized people issue fatwa (over the podium) which becomes
subject to hearsay.
Battiri views that “effective speech” is now being proclaimed through satellite
television stations (such as the infamous preacher Amr Khaled), Pal Talk, radio
stations (state-run Jordan Radio which interviews foreign preachers, not locals!).
The Researcher asked al-Maqdisi regarding what some figures of the Islamic
movement proclaim- mosque speech has moved on to social events, wakes and
weddings, al-Maqdisi contended,
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“These [platforms] constitute breathing spaces, but we still receive threats…
They [security apparatus] often interrogate us; so this is not a setting which
they do not watch over or which constitutes a genuine and free space left
for us to use; no! But if you suffocate people what can they do; they would
breathe out in these kinds of settings”.
As to what al-Maqdisi means by “suffocating people”, the interviewee answered,
“If they allow me to sermonize at mosques I will do...I will not slam the
regime to start with, no! I like to deliver systematic sermons and educate
people who know very little… people will abstain if you talk a lot, as this
would transform Friday sermons into mere political discourse, because then
you will dishearten people who need to be reminded of Allah and study their
religion. So if I were allowed such a chance this will be a breathing space
for people, but we are deprived of these chances. Neither do you [the
regime] allow me to deliver a Friday sermon, nor conduct two or three
religious lessons on fiqh [jurisprudence] or hadith [prophetic saying]! Not
that you suffocate Abu Mohammad alone but other preachers as well. You
only allow a preacher who would glorify you and praise you. So one starts
looking for alternative ways; either secretive or clandestine lessons or
breathe out in events of weddings or wakes. They deal with people in a
police mindset”.
Here al-Maqdisi asserts a notion apparent in the participant Observation part and
in the Questionnaire posed to the worshippers in a nearby mosque in Zarqa (his
directorate); the worshippers yearn for sermons which educate the people in their
religion, and that most people feel bored of listening to sermons which embed
economic or political substance.
This viewpoint is also upheld by Shbeilat, who testifies that official repression
drives people to behave in taqiyya [religious dissimulation]; holding on to a twofold
type of discourse- one over the podium, but a different one in privacy when they
trust you, therefore the veiled discourse is the true standpoint of the people.
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al-Fitiani thinks that by endorsing the Amendment, the government, whether
consciously or not, nurtures extremism in society by placing the wrong man
[unqualified preachers] in the right place.
Shaqra admits he has not read the latest Amendment to the law, but the
consequences of violating these regulations depend more on how the preacher
handles his sermon and the issues that he tackles; a wit also shared by al-Maqdisi
above.
The above-mentioned quotations reveal that more than two thirds of the
interviewees235, whether State officials or Muslim Brotherhood figures, cannot
deny the perception that the Law has not fully curtailed takfiri speech which spills
over from the mosque onto other venues, whether open or concealed. State
officials even implicitly justify the existence of the evasive takfiri speech by
attributing it to the surrounding political context. The Muslim Brotherhood
movement, which recognizes the legitimacy of the regime and functions within the
confines of the established political and legal system, accuses the government of
standing behind the diffusion of takfiri speech by enacting the Amendment,
acknowledging it has lost its most effective platform, the mosque podium from
which it could speak to its public base. Whereas the jihadist movement which
disavows the regime as apostate cares less about the Law or its Amendment,
because de rigueur it is being targeted by the security apparatus regardless of the
content of its speech. In August 2013, a security brass informed the Researcher
that al-Maqdisi is in jail because of his “dangerous thought” more than for his
actions, and whenever out of prison they will return him back to jail. From this it
appears the State is more concerned about using the regulations to disarm the
Muslim Brotherhood, its political contender over the control of religious sphere and
therefore the public opinion, rather than cleaning the mosques of hate speech, a
content which still exists in Friday sermons. The State is also keen to use the
Amendment as a mantle to rein in the jihadists who deny the legitimacy of the
235 The Researcher could only pose this question to 11 of the 14 interviewees.
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regime. Therefore, the whereabouts of the takfiri speech and the ability to control it
remains a peripheral issue when compared to the more critical question - which
actor has the power to influence the masses and shape their mindset!
6.2.6. The Impact of Enacting the 2006 Amendment to the Law
Mohammad Abu Fares, a leading figure of the hardliner stream of IAF (Horani et
al, 1997: 298) points out that,
“By then [before the Amendment], a man would be summoned and
questioned, but the actual Law imposed a penal sentence of imprisonment
and fines […], sometimes they are arrested for days so they would either
succumb to pressure or refrain from the opposition, or else they sustain and
carry on so that the authorities would desperately give up on them and
stand off because it has failed to affect them neither by prison nor by other
means”.
Abu Fares alludes to the difference between the official treatment before and after
the Amendment,
“in fact, the Law was there but it has been added some articles. Before,
they [ministry of awqaf] would only ban the preacher from delivering a
speech [Friday sermon], but now they have added teaching and guidance
on top”.
al-Riati believes the Amendment has imposed several constraints through reigning
in the sermons, lessons and lectures delivered at mosques especially by
competent preachers who are being banned by the security apparatus.
The difference the government has induced in activating the Law [banning certain
Imams from delivering Friday sermons as well as teaching and guidance inside or
outside the mosque] is further confirmed by Fityani, who speaks of “collective
punishment” among preachers in order to inflict a blanket punishment and justify
punishing the Muslim Brotherhood preachers; a concealment tactic by the
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government in an attempt to target the Islamic movement and not imbue on the
Amendment a sectarian cast,
“The Law of Preaching and Guidance relegates the task of sermonizing and
counseling at mosques to a group of State-friendly people… there were still
chances to teach and guide at mosques and penalties were still limited, but
thereafter, the whole issue has turned into total banning from sermonizing,
teaching and guidance”.236
Senator and Lawyer Abdulmajid Zuneibat (interviewed in March 2010) clarifies
that,
“The ministry of awqaf is the authority concerned with licensing preachers
to deliver Friday sermons, and it follows up on preaching-related issues and
complaints by imposing penalties, banning the preachers and referring
them to the court which inflicts penalties on violations… Official censorship
over the preachers continues in spite of licenses being issued by the
minister of awqaf”.
Zuneibat is more vocal regarding the influence the Amendment has inflicted on the
Islamic movement,
“The Amendments have come to stop the Islamic expansion in society,
especially the role of the Islamic movement [Muslim Brotherhood] in
preaching and guidance as it was clear the movement’s preachers are
influential in steering public opinion and discussing issues which some
preachers were not allowed to address, especially political stances and
direct criticism to governmental policies. The latest legal Amendments have
limited the movement’s role in this regard”.
As to the effect of the Amendment, Bani Ersheid states that,
“The Law of Preaching and Guidance has managed to appropriate the
manaber [podiums], but not the masses… An additional besiege, pressure
236 Fityani added that “after the Law was endorsed, 1300 appointed preachers… did not hold a
Shari’a certificate. How come the unqualified are allowed to practice one of the most important and
dangerous professions! How will guidance in mosques be in the hand of unqualified people! The
official authorities, whether they know or ignore, help in nurturing extremism in Jordanian society.”
However, in a reply to a female citizen complaining from gender racism in Friday sermons, a
Ministry of Awqaf’s official asserts they only recruit qualified preachers (see p.1. of Annex I).
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and cornering of the Islamic movement will formulate a fertile environment
for nurturing extremist and tense mindsets which would really hamper
Jordan’s national security”.
This statement by a hawkish Islamist figure and leader who adopts a
confrontational policy and narrative with the regime sounds more like a warning
bell to the State: national security resides not only with the regime, but also with
the movement, so you either allow our preachers who gradually Islamize society
(therefore contesting the State’s presence over the religious sphere and its impact
on public opinion), or else leave the arena for fanatic groups (including the
movement’s hardliners) to act through makeshift mosques or other subversive
means. This view is also espoused by the independent Islamist Shbeilat, who
views the effect of a suppressed religious discourse at mosques as driving people
to,
“…act in a double-standard fashion. They have two types of discourse- one
over the podium, but their actual discourse is different in private settings
when they confide to you, therefore the concealed discourse is the actual
one”.
This opinion is also upheld by a university scholar commissioned by the State to
convince the jihadist salafi prison inmates to revise their takfiri thought. The
scholar doubted the true intention of the repentant prisoners given they believe in
takiya principle [obscuring what they really believe in]237. Another remark by a
shari'a scholar denoted the apparent senselessness and boredom in Friday
sermons given that those whom assumed the task of preaching are the
incompetent238. This view is yet supported by a high ranking official directly related
237 Al Rai Newspaper, p.7 (15/12/2008), See Annex I, p.3.
238 Al Ghad newspaper, p.15 (07/04/2010), See Annex I, p. 7&8, whereas official statistics show
that by 2012, 61.8% of the Friday speakers are university graduates
Source: http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_a/main/yearbook_2012.pdf
accessed on October 15th, 2013.
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to the movement’s portfolio, cited in Abu Rumman (2007:29) 239, and who views
that,
“They are not clear or transparent in their positions and in their discourse
towards the State and its institutions…they have more than one face- with
this fact self-evident in the basic principle or ‘motto’ to which the
Brotherhood holds itself and its members “Spread the word openly, but
organize secretly”
al-Faqir views that the Amendment entails arbitrariness and it has vexed the
preachers given their reference has now become the administrative governor
instead of the judiciary body.
Mobaidin rejects the idea that the Amendment has negatively affected the sermon
as half of the population still attends Friday sermons without any interruption by
anyone to the preacher. This public servant also downplays, albeit admitting, the
notion that hate speech still exists, attributing it to political changes in the region
which necessitates a certain reaction by the preacher.
Battiri, close to the salafi movement, views the pre-Amendment discourse as,
“influential, now being broadcast via satellite TV stations…away from
censorship and control… through Paltalk rooms and the Internet or through
some [Islamic] radio stations”,
Battiri was banned from preaching several times, but has been called back to
preach due to a resulting dearth in the number of preachers. While banned, Battiri
was apprehended after delivering a post-Friday prayer240 religious lesson where
he criticized the parliament for not cancelling a law that allows mixed-gender
swimming, to be released after signing a commitment and a bail not to sermonize
again or cause any gathering inside the mosque. This banned preacher views that
the ceiling of freedom in speech has ebbed following the Amendment, especially if
239 Abu Rumman (2007- endnote no. 32 p.83).
240 This lesson took place in 2002 right after the sermon where thousands of worshippers were still
present in the mosque.
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the preacher slams the government or friendly countries such as USA or the Jews
[Israel]. The official reaction would then be total banning from preaching and harsh
reprimand by the governor. Battiri views that preachers’ sermons in general have
become barren and boring, as if the government intentionally chooses the
preacher who is less influential.
While Maayah contends that,
“These kinds of sermons [hate speech] do circulate amongst people and if
seen to bear certain effect then regulations and procedures should be
implemented”.
Minister of Awqaf, Salah, and his legal advisor Mobaidin, deny that a sectarian
division [salafi, jihadi, State-friendly, Muslim Brotherhood etc] of mosques existed
prior to the Amendment, although he acknowledges that some limited infringement
cases are being dealt with by the Ministry.
As to whether the 2006 Amendment to the law has affected the jihadist salafi
thought in Jordan, al-Maqdisi states that,
“No, not the jihadist salafi thought in particular because this thought has
been pressured since its earlier days; it was not dependant on the podiums
for it to be affected, but I guess it [Amendment] would affect the common
people...”
al-Maqdisi alludes to the Internet as the prime platform for the jihadist salafi
thought as it opens up a sphere which the governments cannot outlaw. Abu
Rumman (2007:69-70), talks about the “neo-preachers’” phenomenon spreading
among the youth especially through the Internet and media, a competitor that has
left its toll on the Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity. However, al-Maqdisi does not
see that the Amendment has affected the Muslim Brotherhood movement alone
given that,
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“Some people might have initially directed this law according to their
interest to pressure down the Muslim Brotherhood and their electoral
discourse; in fact it has eventually targeted the Muslim worshipper himself
at the mosque.”
Asking al-Maqdisi how he views the effect of the Amendment, specifically on the
Muslim Brotherhood, the doctrinaire contended,
“No doubt they are unhappy about it… I guess it did affect them as they
make use of the podiums for their electoral campaigns and to direct their
preachers and followers through their own orators and podiums”241.
Jarrar (2009:50) contends that the legal provisions have had little effect in terms of
punitive measures being enacted, while the legal and regulative framework has
brought about more of a deterrent factor. These restrictive measures sanctioned
by some conservative voices in the West have had their toll on civil liberties in the
Kingdom as they do not differentiate between Islamic groups who, while
condoning to the political objectives of the extremists, they do not necessarily
agree with their modus operandi. Jarrar is also doubtful about the effect of the
regulating legislations on radical Islamists who mobilize their recruits through
informal networks. This is due to their ability to find alternative measures through
informal structures to circumvent these regulations and disseminate their views.
On the other hand, the toll was more evident on the mainstream Islamists who
operate within the State-controlled religious space.
The Researcher views that radical Islamists, such as the jihadist salafis, were
relatively out of the reach of these regulations not because of their ability to
bypass their restrictive measures, but because they are banned from preaching
241 Al-Maqdisi added that "the Law of Preaching and Guidance influences the government staff
[preachers appointed by ministry of awqaf] but I am not a government employee therefore it does
not affect me. In each setting I can organize private lessons at my home and other homes. I can
make use of any setting. We have a verse in Quran that says “he made me a blessing wherever I
am” – this verse was about Issa [Jesus] Peace Be Upon Him. This means my religion and tawhid
‘monotheism’ resides in my heart and I relay it whenever I am. I am not confined to the mosque
podium. So I do not think the jihadi salafi stream has been hampered by the Law of Preaching and
Guidance. It might have hampered those who use it for electoral propaganda and it possibly
deprives them from relaying this propaganda to their people but as for me it has no affect”.
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even sheer fiqh at the mosques, a view also upheld by al-Maqdisi as mentioned
earlier. Therefore, with or without the 2006 Amendment, extremists would still be
out of the reach of relevant punitive measures, if any at all. Jarrar (p.66) also views
that the State’s restrictive measures will eventually isolate the overwhelming
moderate Islamists and push them towards more radicalism thereby tapping into
radical groups. Still, the Researcher views that expelling the Muslim Brotherhood
preachers, whether fanatics or moderates, will push them to hold prayers in the
open space, even enjoining the jihadists, therefore a policy to expose them and
their true intentions about a civil state which their movement claims to embrace
given its motto “overt dawa, but covert organization”. Besides, the State cares less
about radical speech at mosques as long as it does not translate into material
action on the ground.
The supra statement by Bane Reship (that the Amendment would create a prolific
setting to cultivate an extremist way of thinking which would ultimately hinder
Jordan’s national security) corroborates Jarrar’s argument. Zune bat admits that
the Amendment has limited the Islamic movement’s role in Islamizing society and
gearing public opinion. This view suggests that a lessened Islamization of society
should also reflect in the diminishing propensity by the worshippers to join the
radical groups.
In the above table, a relatively close ratio between those who agree the
Amendment has negatively influenced the mosque speech (54%) vis-à-vis those
who disagree (45%) is due to the notion that those who disagree are either
jihadists whose platform is the evasive makeshift mosque, or Muslim Brotherhood
figures close to the jihadist thought. The latter group wants to indicate that the
government has failed to thwart their influence, or that “competent” preachers
were being banned even prior to the Amendment. This is a sign that the type of
preachers whom they consider fit for the podium are those who would dare defy
the State’s redlines and instill their own stigma on the religious space, therefore
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impacting public opinion given the high number of people who regularly observe
and attend Friday sermons.
Apparently, the 2006 Amendment has left its toll on the traditional discourse being
Delivered at mosques, especially Friday sermons. State officials and State-friendly
figures do not deny the existence of some “infringement cases”. IAF members and
other Islamists focus on the degrading quality of mosque preachers, their
discourse and its effect on the worshippers. While some of the interviewees
depicted traditional means of communication such as satellite televisions and the
Internet as the ideal platforms for alternative Islamic speech, others focus on the
more elusive and interpersonal conduits such as schools, homes, festivals,
weddings, prayers in open space and wakes, some of which play into the hands of
the security apparatus as an exposure policy to ferret out the jihadists. Still, both
channels of communication constitute a spillover of the State control and a latent
factor for extremists that lie in wait to disseminate their takfiri thoughts. The Muslim
Brotherhood movement is trying to ossify its traditional hierarchical structure with a
more grassroots-based networking within its public base. IAF leaders (Bani
Ersheid and Mansour, among others) warn of the spread of extremism as a result
of this transformation in the traditional and open platforms of religious discourse.
Abu Rumman (2007:76) referred to the Amendment as one of the means the
regime resorted to in order to weaken and curtail the Islamic movement’s
capability to sustain strong political ties and straight touch and interaction with the
citizens, concluding that banning the IAF activities in Jordanian mosques
contributed to the movement loosing half of its seats in the 2007 parliamentary
elections. Less was the effect of the Amendment and its ensuing pressure on the
non-traditional and more “elusive” podiums such as the makeshift mosques, or
virtual means of interaction used by the jihadist salafi movement in Jordan. Jarrar
(2009:66) views that a restrictive basket of legislations by the State tends to limit
the reach of radical Islamists, lessen their message and mobilizing outcome on the
mainstream Islamists; however, radicals will always seek other informal
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arrangements to convey their message. This Islamic school of thought ends up
benefiting from the spillover of the official crack-down on the mosque as their
venues for mobilization and dawa through informal settings and social events
constitute a safe haven for a fugitive Islamic discourse.
Stemmann (2008:15) assumes that the Jordanian government managed to limit
the role which religious lessons play in mobilizing the recruits at the mosque
following the signing of the peace accord with Israel in 1994, but these lessons
have moved to the followers’ homes where State vigilance and control is minimal.
Thus far, the Researcher views that State attempts to regulate the religious fora
has had more influence on the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has a formal
hierarchical system and works within the confines of pertinent laws, than on the
informal and underground movements such as the jihadist salafis. In both cases,
non-conformist speech tends to move to other settings in order to attract
adherents. This conclusion is yet to validate through a closer ogle on the
messenger (the mosque preacher) and the recipient (the worshipper) by living as
close as possible and observing their day-to-day actions and convictions so as to
investigate the role of the sermon in shaping the worshipper's opinion. Ibahrine
(2008:4) argues that,
“we should remember the current rise of ideological Islam and the
diminishing importance of the official Islam. These hyperactive social actors
are predisposed to challenge the power relations institutionalized in
traditional religious discourse, characterized by its powerlessness.”
The question remains how much the State can regulate virtual speech, unveil
informal means of communication and their ensuing networks (in the case of the
jihadists), and deter the Islamic movement from rejuvenating its discourse and
activating alternative means of communication within its public base such as
educational institutions, religious lessons and professional syndicates.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE PREACHER, THE SERMON AND ITS INFLUENCE
IN THE SOCIAL MILIEU
The aim of this Chapter is to analyze the performance of the mosque preacher, his
sermon and the impact it wields on the worshippers. Mizher (2008:151-152)
asserts that in order to improve the sermon and its impact upon people,
researchers should carry out surveys and questionnaires in different areas in order
to explore the themes of the sermon, the successful preacher, and the impact of
the sermon on the district.
In this survey, the preacher’s performance is probed by inquiring his efficiency;
any outstanding performance, whether he addressed any political and economic
issues (given the pure religious part is present anyway). This section is further
explored by asking the respondents to rate salient economic and political issues in
the sermon, or whether the preacher has conveyed extremist or moderate
expressions. The purpose is to verify the respondents’ views regarding any
religious quotations or dictums which per se reflect exclusion or libel against the
“other”. This part is tested by asking whether the Imam had alluded to other
religions and in what way.
In summer 2013, the Researcher, with the help of collaborators, distributed the
questionnaire to 200 worshippers upon their exit from the mosque on Fridays. In
total 196 persons responded. The setting is mosques located in Rusaifa town
(outskirts of Amman), and in Zarqa (the third largest city)242; both a hotbed for the
Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood movement whose public base is mainly
242 Constrained by access limitations, this is where the Researcher has managed to find
collaborators to carry out the questionnaire.
Page 229 of 299
Jordanians of Palestinian origin who constitute more than half the population in
Jordan.
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7.1. Respondents’ views regarding the performance of the preacher:
# Question
Yes No No Answer
# % # % # %
1 Was the Imam efficient in delivering
his sermon
168 86 20 10 8 4
2 Have you felt an outstanding or
influential performance by the Imam
152 78 30 15 14 7
3 Has the Imam addressed political
issues in his sermon
112 57 77 39 9 4
4 Has the Imam addressed
economical issues in his sermon
131 67 53 27 12 6
5 Is there a call by the Imam for
compassion among people
146 75 40 20 10 5
6 Do you sense a call for extremism
and negative perceptions
5 3 169 86 22 11
7 Do you sense a call for moderation 143 73 42 21 11 6
8 Has he alluded to other religions 16 8 172 88 8 4
9 If the Imam has dealt with the
following issues, rate them
according to their importance (order
reads from left to right; (1) as most
important, (4) as least important):
4. Reform in Jordan
3. Price hike in Jordan
2. Jerusalem/ Palestinian issue
1. Situation in Syria
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Reading of the Data:
Records in (Table1) related to respondents’ views regarding the preacher’s
performance indicate that (86 percent) consider him efficient in delivering the
sermon, while (10 percent) say he was inefficient, and (4 percent) abstained from
answering. This could be attributed to the respondents’ orientation as people who
frequently visit the mosque and listen to the sermon by eloquent preachers given
their established line of work and their ability to employ verses from the Quran,
hadith and religious discourse to fit reality and draw certain conclusions for life. As
for those who view the preacher was inefficient (10 percent), they might be more
educated and more familiar with scientific ideas and thoughts, or that they are not
as religious as the first group. The affirmative ratio indicates that people’s
expectations from the preacher have more to do with his eloquence and ability to
present a coherent subject with suitable quotations and examples from the Quran
than his ability to address the issue at hand.
Responses to Question2 (Have you felt an outstanding or influential performance
by the Imam?) verify data posed in Question1 as 78 percent of the respondents
answered positively, 15 percent answered negatively, and 7 percent abstained. It
may be reasonable here to find the affirmative rate slightly lower than in the first
question, and necessarily stems from the general perception that the preacher is
efficient. This contradicts with what Khalifeh al-Dayyat, mayor of Deir Alla town in
Jordan Valley, told the Researcher on Monday May 20th, 2013; that the expulsion
of efficient Imams by the State has left the mosques deficient of personnel, which
drove the government to allow unqualified mosque servants to teach and deliver
Friday sermons243, therefore people participating de rigueur and not to acquire life-
felt knowledge and guidance.
243 A ministry of awqaf official admits that more than half of the mosques in the kingdom do not
have qualified Imams, but all mosques are staffed with qualified preachers. This assurance came in
response to a letter to the editor by a female journalist who complained against incitement by
mosque preachers against women. Source: Al-Rai newspaper, Issue of October 30th, 2010.
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In Questions 3 and 4, on whether the preacher addresses political/economical
issues in his sermon, the ratios are respectively 57/66 affirmative, 39/27 negative
and who 4/6 abstained. It goes without saying that in general the economic
situation in the country tops the concerns of the people244, and the notion that
since the 2006 Amendment to the Law of Preaching and Guidance at Mosques,
mosques chaff under State and security control, therefore the slight precedence of
the economic issues over political themes in the sermon.
It is natural to depict that in Question5, the majority of the respondent worshippers
(75 percent) denote that the mosque preacher calls for compassion among
people, while 20 percent said “no” and 5 percent abstained. However, this
negative ratio (20 percent) is still a significant number given the call for
compassion is not only a religious duty but a humanitarian and societal value in
general. This negative ratio also denotes the existence of preachers who proclaim
a speech defiant to State injunctions such as the Amman Message or suggestions
of sermon themes posed by ministry of awqaf.
This ratio is about the same as in Question7, which queries on whether the
worshipper has sensed a call for moderation, where the answers’ ratio came 73,
21 and 6 percent respectively. It is likely that respondents with less religious
inclination are sensitive and attentive to non-moderate discourse as they have
their own standards for moderation among people based more on criteria such as
secular law or international conventions than on sheer religious injunction.
While only 3 percent say they have sensed a call for extremism and negative
perceptions, and 86 percent negated this in Question6, it is noteworthy to observe
244 As per a poll conducted in March 2013 by International Republican Institute (sample 1000, error
margin 2.5% ±), 59 percent of Jordanians believe the country is going in the wrong direction, and





accessed on October 13th, 2015.
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the relatively high abstention rate at 11 percent. Apparently, some worshippers
prefer not to answer this delicate question with the highest abstention ratio in the
entire questionnaire. This could be attributed to the controversy engulfing this
rather political term used mostly by the State, which also connotes a Western
political concept, and/or a conscience-related embarrassment of accusing the
preacher of being extremist or fundamentalist.
In Question8, only 8 percent affirmed the preacher alluded to other religions, 88
percent said no, and 4 percent abstained, whereas the Researcher noticed that in
the prayer that precedes the sermon, the preacher recites surat al-fatihah [the
opening sura in Quran], mentioning both Christians and Jews245 in rather negative
terms,
“Guide us to the straight path, the path of those upon whom you have
bestowed favor, not of those who have evoked [Your] anger or of those who
are astray”
Adding to this other negative perceptions related to “other religions” which the
Researcher had noticed while attending several sermons, one might infer that the
Muslim worshipper takes these Quranic citations not as directly targeting his fellow
citizens of other religions, but as a non-arguable label originated and sacralized in
the Quran and hadith; a customary practice and an integral part of the prayer with
no imperative exigencies for the worshipper’s daily life. The low ratio of
respondents who affirm the preacher has alluded to other religions confirms this
induction. It is also a sign that the worshippers rule out negative labels to the
“other” if they came in the rituals, and would only take stock of them if the preacher
mentioned them in the sermon theme.
Question (9) is posed at the end of this Chapter due to its elaborative
nature!
245 Source: http://www.qurantoday.com/fatihah.htm
accessed on May 24th, 2013
Page 234 of 299
7.2. Respondents’ views regarding the sermon itself
# Question
Yes No No Answer
# % # % # %
1 Have you sensed a prosaic sermon 30 15 157 80 9 5
2 Have you felt the theme of the sermon
addressed a problem in society
163 83 21 11 12 6
3 Had you misconceptions about the
theme of the sermon which the sermon
has corrected
140 71 41 21 15 8
4 If you are to evaluate the sermon how
much would you give it out of ten 6.8
5 Do you think the sermon theme tackled
reality
160 81 21 11 15 8
6 Has the theme of the sermon dealt with
general issues
166 85 21 11 9 4
7 Has the sermon theme dealt with a
personal issue of you
119 61 71 36 6 3
8 Do you think the sermon has brought
about an outstanding subject that
deserves public dissemination
131 67 47 24 18 9
9 Is there a conformity between the
sermon theme and reality
142 73 44 22 10 5
Reading of the Data:
The low affirmative rate (15 percent) of the answers to Question1 (Have you
sensed a prosaic sermon) corroborates answers to Question1 in the previous
table, as the word rakakah in Arabic [prosaic] refers more to lingo being used.
Imams/preachers are presumably university graduates who studied shari’a and
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Arabic language, and are subject to continuous rehabilitation by Ministry of Awqaf.
However, this rate defies the prevalent perception, especially by the Muslim
Brotherhood figures following the Amendment to the Law with the ensuing ban on
competent preachers and replacing them with incompetent ones, and a resulting
shortage246 to cover all the mosques in the kingdom. As for qualifying existing
preachers, apparently the State is more interested in advancing religious
knowledge among them than enhancing their knowledge in politics, economy or
other fields of knowledge. Worshippers who listen to Quran recitation cannot
tolerate weak language by the preacher or shibboleth in his sermon, as Quran is
considered the culmination of the Arabic language. Antoun (1989:103) observed
that the preacher in a Jordanian village in 1960 delivered his sermons in classical
Arabic, the consecrated language of Quran, and by doing so he authenticates the
meanings embedded in the sermon by bestowing legitimacy on it and sacralizing
its soteriological elements. The Researcher views that this observation has not
changed in the 21st century.
Question2 shows that (83 percent) of the respondents say the sermon’s theme
addressed a problem in society, while (11 percent) say no, and (6 percent)
abstain. Given the majority of the respondents say the preacher addressed
political, economic and other issues in society, and the overall evaluation of the
sermon is outstanding and efficient, it goes without saying that the sermon did
tackle societal issues. The question remains whether the respondents are being
influenced by the sermon, or have their conceptions been changed as a result,
which takes us to Question3 where (71 percent) affirm this notion, (21 percent)
negate it and (8 percent) abstain. This majority ratio shows that the worshippers,
mostly frequent visitors of the mosque, take Friday sermon as referent in shaping
their views concerning life-felt issues, especially when the country is facing
246 An awqaf official says more than half of the 6,000 mosques in the kingdom do not have an
Imam.
Source: http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleno=222926
accessed on August 15th, 2015.
Another press account (http://www.alrai.com/article/703191.html) quotes an awqaf official who
admits that this shortage had pushed the ministry to employ incompetent Imams and preachers in
Mafraq directorate (adjacent to and northeast of Zarqa directorate).
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security challenges such as the Syrian crisis, grinding economic problems, or
societal disputes such as the ongoing campus violence.
Most likely, the moderate evaluation of the sermon in Question4 at (6.8 points out
of 10), gives more credit to the sermon’s religious content and general peace-
making discourse in society than to essence that provides methodical solutions to
the country’s economic problems and challenges. This bears the notion that the
worshipper at the mosque does not expect the preacher to undertake the role of
an expert in economy or politics, but that of a pious instructor, or a social mediator
who reinterprets the religious text and help the community of the worshippers
internalize it into their worldviews. Another deduction is the perception that the
quality of sermons has drawn back with the expulsion of competent preachers by
the State following the 2006 Amendment to the Law.
Question5 (Do you think the sermon’s theme tackles reality) scores (81 percent)
as affirmative answers, (11 percent) negative, and (8 percent) with no opinion.
This answer goes with figures in Question2 (Have you felt the theme of the
sermon addressed a problem in society) and Question6 (Has the theme of the
sermon dealt with general issues). It only depicts that the sermon embeds issues
relevant to society, but nothing on whether it offers solutions to people’s problems
and needs.
When it comes to conformity between the sermon theme and reality as in
Question9, (73 percent) of the respondents approve, (22 percent) disapprove and
(5 percent) abstain. Though a relatively lower percentage, the affirmative
respondents’ share is still considerable, but the question remains whether the
respondents’ perceptions about reality have been altered or confirmed as a result
of this compliance. When read in light of Q5 (Do you think the sermon theme
tackled reality), we see that although the rates are not highly variant, a
disproportionate rate of disapproval means that a considerable proportion of
people view that although the sermon deals with real life issues, these issues do
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not always fit reality. One possibility is that the preacher sets the agenda in a
fashion inconsistent always with people’s priorities, in a sense that he downplays
certain issues which should take precedence.
Question7 depicts (61 percent) saying yes, (36 percent) no and a negligible (3
percent) with no answer. With almost two thirds of the respondents affirming
relevance of their personal life to the sermon and the probability that these are
frequent visitors to the mosque, even though the sermon does not offer a panacea
for their problems, the mere submission to the mono-directional public speech
(preacher to worshippers) and the joint contemplation with the community of
worshippers (salat djama’a), gives the worshipper a sense of social cohesion and
commonality with the umma, thereby the feeling that their personal issues can
found their solutions in as much as they are commonly felt and shared; probably
an eschatological solution; a dream for deliverance from an individual problem that
can be pushed down the echelon of priority for the sake of commonly shared
challenges. This might illustrate the variance in ratio between sermons that tackled
personal issues and sermons that dealt with general issues.
With the high rates of efficiency in the sermon as shown in the previous answers
(including Table1), those who believe the sermon is worth of dissemination to the
public goes down to (67 percent), with the nay ratio standing at (24 percent) and (9
percent) who seem hesitant to give any answer. This is almost identical to the
overall evaluation of the sermon (6.8/10), and exposes the point that while the
rating is very good when the sermon addresses general issues, a downward
appraisal is apparent when the concern is about personal issues that need sound
advice and guidance. This is another sign the worshippers remain loyal to perform
the prayer as a must ritual regardless of whether it guides them through the
terrains of life or not. For the sermon content to disseminate from the religious sp
to the public sphere is an issue which requires reconsideration by the worshippers
given the higher competitiveness in the marketplace of ideas which embed public
deliberation, and the preachers appearing not quite adept in proposing practical
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solutions for the problems of the individual worshipper. This is further corroborated
by on-the-ground observations (see Chapter Five) as the worshippers refer to
sources other than the preacher in search for answers to life queries, including to
their own intuition.
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7.3. Respondents’ views regarding the influence of the sermon
# Question Yes No No Answer
# % # % # %
1 Has the sermon affected you 165 84 20 10 11 6
2 Did you have misconceptions about
the theme of the sermon which the
sermon has managed to correct
140 71 41 21 15 8
3 Has the sermon changed a certain
behavior in you
131 67 52 26 13 7
4 Do you feel bored of listening to
sermons that tackle political issues
120 61 64 33 12 6
5 Do you feel bored of listening to
sermons that tackle economical
issues
120 61 66 34 10 5
Reading of the Data:
Question1 (has the sermon affected you) is being posed in the general sense; (84
percent) answered yes, only (10 percent) said no, and (6 percent) gave no
answer. The following Question2, which inquires about the sermon modifying
preconceptions in the worshippers247, affirmative rate goes down to (67 percent)
that is (15 percent) drop from the general question. Question3 deals with change
in behavior as a result of the sermon, and here the affirmative answers are (67
percent), [therefore, a (17 percent) drop off the general question], negative
answers at (26 percent), and no answer at (7 percent). This depicts a logical
sequence from the broad spectrum to the more practical and specific. Although
this does not exactly correlate with Question7 in Table2 (Has the theme of the
247 This is being shown herewith for comparison purposes.
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sermon dealt with a personal issue for you), where the affirmatives stand at (61
percent), the difference is negligible.
From the following two last Questions4&5, which show that (61 percent) say they
feel bored of listening to sermons which tackle political or economic issues, and
almost the same rate saying the preacher did address political and economic
issues, one could infer that the impact of the sermon falls within the spiritual and
personal behavioral spheres, and that this sphere of influence constitutes a
considerable element in the worshipper’s decision to go to the mosque. It also
draws attention to the idea that the worshipper’s expectations from the preacher
are largely limited to this area (religious serving as a frame to legitimize and give
meaning to the societal/personal although the “personal” is a commonly shared
value), whereas the more technical domains (political and economic) no more fall
within the preacher’s purview of expertise given they had been suppressed and
censored by virtue of State control over the mosque. In addition, the worshipper
attends the sermon in order to fulfill a religious duty rather than to receive political
or economic edification.
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7.4. Analysis of the Questionnaire Results
The Researcher asked the respondents to rate the following four issues according
to their importance:
 Reform in Jordan
 Price hike in Jordan
 Jerusalem and the Palestinian issue
 The situation in Syria
The responses to these issues came as follows:
 186 respondents answered completely.
 Three respondents answered: I do not care!
 Seven respondents left the question with no answer (or incomplete rating
therefore being dropped).





Reform in Jordan 598 4
Price hike in Jordan 442 2
Jerusalem and the Palestinian issue 355 1
The situation in Syria 452 3
The above table shows that the sequence of the importance for issues posed in
the survey is as follows:
 The first important issue: Jerusalem and the Palestinian issue
 The second important issue: Price hike in Jordan
 The third important issue: The situation in Syria
 The least important issue: Reform in Jordan
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It goes without saying that the issue of Palestine and Jerusalem tops the concerns
of the respondents. The Researcher noticed this issue was also omnipresent in
mosque sermons in the Kingdom given what al-Quds (the holy city of Jerusalem)
resembles as the place to which Prophet Mohammad had taken a nightly journey
to from Mecca [al-Isra’ wal Mi’raj 248 as mentioned in the Quran], and the site of the
third most sacred mosque in Islam, al-Masjid al-Aqsa. Calls to liberate al-Aqsa
mosque is present in mosque sermons and other religious events, including the
yearly commemoration of the mosque incineration in 1969. The Islamic Action
Front, political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood movement whose public base is in
Zarqa, had issued political communiqués in which the Palestinian issue ranked
second in number249 after the relationship with the Jordanian regime. This
precedence to the Palestinian issue could be attributed to the fact that the
movement is controlled by the ‘hawks’, most of whom are Jordanians of
Palestinian origin, and this discourse appeals to the people of Zarqa. With this
public mood, one would expect that the worshippers should give precedence to
this issue in the mosque. 250 Even with State-friendly speech, the centrality of al-
Quds to the Jordanian polity is deeply seated. The West Bank and Jerusalem
were Jordanian territories since the unification 1950 until the Israeli occupation in
1967. Even then, Jordan was still linked in administrative and legal ties to
248 According to Islamic tradition, al-Isra wal Mi’raj are two parts of a physical and spiritual single
night journey which Prophet Mohammad took to the ‘farthest mosque’ that is, al-Aqsa mosque in
Jerusalem.
249 In 2007, the party issued 38 communiqués out of which 13 were related to the relationship
between the Islamic movement and the regime, 8 on the Palestinian issue, 6 on political reform, 3
on normalization [with Israel], 3 on social issues, 2 on the Arab situation, 2 on internal
organizational issues, and only one statement tackling the economy.
Source: http://www.judran.net/?p=48 (A study by Mohammad Abu Rumman)
accessed on July 19th, 2013.
250 Results of the 2012/2013 Arab Opinion Index (AOI) show that Arab public opinion considers the
Palestinian issue the issue of all Arabs and not just the Palestinians (84 percent, the same ratio in
Jordan), while (69 percent) of the Jordanian respondents say they ‘oppose’ or ‘somehow oppose’
the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. AOI was conducted between July 2012 – March 2013
by the Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies (ACRPS) in 14 Arab countries, sample 20,350
respondents, margin of error 2-3%
Source: http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/af5000b3-46c7-45bb-b431-28b2de8b33c7
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Jerusalem and the West Bank until the legal and administrative disengagement
decision on July 31st, 1988. With more than half the population of Palestinian
origin, one can imagine the centrality of Palestine and Jerusalem in the
conscience of the Jordanian people, and a craftsmanship by the officialdom as the
regime uses religion as a means to ossify its legitimacy251; King Abdullah II claims
of being the 43rd descendent from the Prophet Mohammad, and religion
constitutes an integral and important component of the culture. Al-Quds
(Jerusalem) is a chapter in the non-mandatory guidebook for typical sermons
which the Ministry of Awqaf distributes to the preachers to help them “write a
rational material for their Friday sermons […] in a balanced manner”.
While the worshippers prioritize the issue of Palestine, and largely oppose official
tendencies to manipulate religion to gain public support, they however let go with a
religious speech that praises the monarchy, given the public appreciation to the
stability of the country, and the fact the Quran invokes obedience to the Muslim
ruler. This is apparent as the multitude of worshippers say “Amin” which signifies
“amen” to calls by the preacher/Imam to bless the king, although two participating
Informants (in Chapter Five) have had their reservation to ascribing a majestic
prefix to him. As for the government, the worshippers expect it to gain support by
enacting genuine programs apt of tackling the country’s grinding economic
problems rather than using the mosque podium to squelch public dissent and
shore up support for its policies.
The repercussions of the Palestinian issue also wreak havoc on Jordanians in
general. As the Israeli right wing in power considers Jordan the alternative
homeland for Palestinians, this standpoint constitutes an alarm bell which ignites
anti-Israeli sentiments among East Bank Jordanians given Arab nationalism is
strongly rooted in their political upbringing, and the liberation of Palestine part of
251 The AOI shows that (68 percent) of the Jordanian respondents (70 percent of the Arab world
sample) ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ to the argument that “the government has no right to use religion
to gain people’s support for its policies”.
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their nationalistic and religious responsibility. Mosque preachers pick up this
subject matter and use it to appease to the audience, especially in a city heavily
inhabited by both Jordanian clans fiercely opposed to this Zionist concept, or
Jordanians of Palestinian origin who cling to their right of return, some still living in
refugee camps since 1948.
The second most important topic to tackle in Friday sermons in the eyes of the
respondents is purely economic albeit with social repercussions; namely price
hike! Official economic indicators252 show relative stability over the past decade
(2004-2012), depicting the following figures in 2012: Crude Activity Rate for the
Jordanian Population253 at 24.4; Unemployment rate at 12.2 percent254; inflation
rate at 4.7; GDP Per Capita255 on a steady rise, but so is the Consumer Price
Index256 which rose steadily from 90.9 in 2004 to score 130.0 in 2011.257 However,
252 Source: Department of Statistics Yearbook.
Source: http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_a/main/yearbook_2012.pdf
accessed on October 16th, 2013.
253 Labour force divided by total population.
254 Unemployment Rate reached 14.0% during the third Quarter of 2013; the lowest rate was
recorded in Zarqa Governorate at 9.8%.
Source http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/archive/Unemp/2013/3rd_Q.pdf
accessed on October 16th, 2013.
255 Per capita GDP measures a country’s standard of living, albeit not reflecting income distribution.
It ranges between JD 1512.3 in 2004 to JD 3438.6 in 2012. Average size of household is steady
between 2004 and 2012 at 5.4 persons/ family.
256 CPI measures changes in the price level of a basket of consumer
goods and services purchased by family units.
257 As per a nationwide poll conducted in March 2013 by International Republican Institute (sample
1000, error margin 2.5% ±), 59 percent of Jordanians believe the country is going in the wrong
direction, and the main two reasons are the rising prices (44 percent), only 4 percent attribute it to
lack of reform in general. The poll shows that 28 percent of the sample view that price hike and the
cost of living are the major problems facing Jordanians today, followed by bad economic situation
(15 percent), unemployment (14 percent), the presence of Syrian refugees (11 percent), and lastly
comes political reform at (9 percent). Whereas results of the 2012/2013 Arab Opinion Index (AOI)
indicate that almost half of the respondents consider that “our family income does not cover our




accessed on October 13th, 2015.
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unequal income distribution is apparent258 as “poverty pockets” increased from 20
pockets in 2008 to 31 in 2012, and per capita share of economic sectors widely
differing between a heavily manned sector and another with a low labor
occupation. Figures also reveal that the drop off in Real GDP Growth (2005-2012)
started even before the “Arab Spring”, which exonerates the Syrian crisis of being
the prime propeller for this impact.
Regarding the labor market, statistics259 show that Jordanians received a smaller
share of the net jobs created in 2012 compared to 2011260. The report attributes
this decrease to the migration of a large number of Syrians to the Jordanian labor
market because of the dominant circumstances in their country261. However,
unemployment rate did not increase in year 2012, which suggests that the
precedence of this factor (price hike) is more of a mental factor than a genuine
worrisome reflecting the life-felt hardships of Jordanians in general262.
258 Analytical article by economist Salamah Darawi, Source: http://www.maqar.com/?id=26337
accessed on October 17th, 2013.
259 Source:
http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/archive/job_creation/2013/Created%20Jobs.pdf
accessed on October 16th, 2013.
260 Newly created jobs for Jordanians reached 87% of the total net newly created jobs (around 43
thousand job opportunities) compared with 48 thousand job opportunities during the last year, while
the share of employment among non-Jordanians has increased in 2012 to about 17% of the net
created jobs compared with 2011.
261 By July 2013, the Syrian refugees acquired 38,000 jobs in Jordan.
Source: Study by the Economic and Social Council in Jordan, cited in The Impact of Syrian refugee
Crisis on Jordan July 2013, a study by economist Yusuf Mansur,
http://www.slideshare.net/YusufMansur1/inter-conference-on-the-socio-economic-27
accessed on October 17th, 2013.
262 To corroborate this assumption, the Central Bank of Jordan gives the following figures in the
first quarter of 2013 “Unemployment rate during the second quarter of 2013 increased to 12.6
percent compared to 11.6 percent during the same quarter in 2012”. However, the effect of the
regional turmoil does not seem to have a major impact as in the following explanation “As a
reflection of the repercussions of the Arab Spring and the unrest in the region that still have their
effects on the Jordanian economy in various sectors. Real GDP grew by 2.6 percent during the first
quarter of 2013 compared to 3.0 percent during the same quarter in 2012. When excluding “net
taxes on products”, which grew by 3.5 percent compared to 2.1 percent during the same quarter in
2012, GDP at constant basic prices grew by 2.5 percent, compared to 3.1 percent during the same
quarter in 2012”.
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The Jordanian economy will lose two points in economic growth, that is 3 0r 3.5
percent instead of five percent. The governor of the Central Bank of Jordan
attributes this drop to the direct and indirect impact of the Syrian refugees on the
resources, general spending and environment. However, the governor expects the
economy to prove resilient and absorb the effect of regional conflicts263.
From the above data (including footnotes) one can give a picture of the economy
and security as two intertwined factors; while most of the people face economic
hardships, though on a steady fashion, they still appreciate the level of security
they cherish, especially when compared to the ongoing and escalated turmoil in
the region. This equilibrium sways people to expect the mosque preacher to focus
more on price hike as a means to lay pressure on the government, but without
meddling with the national security, especially that public protests against
governmental policies follow Friday sermons and take the mosque as a doorstep
to demonstrate. This does not necessarily mean that the worshippers expect that a
panacea to the country’s economic problems to proceed out of the mouth of the
preacher, but that out of the six thousand mosques in the kingdom, a unilateral
message to the government might leave some impact, and/or, that by default, this
stance is requested by the mosque preacher and falls within the purview of his
religious tasks regardless of the influence. This is because the role of the
preacher, following the role model of Prophet Mohammad, is to “remind”264 the
faithful. The Arab public in general views that the challenges facing their
governments (Jordan is one of the countries directly affected by the ‘Arab Spring’)
Source: http://www.cbj.gov.jo/uploads/monthly_english.pdf




accessed on November 01st, 2013.
264 Surah 87: verses 6&9 “We will make you recite, [O Muhammad], and you will not forget, […] So
remind, if the reminder should benefit”.
Source: http://quran.com/87
accessed on August 15th, 2015.
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are in need of technocrats more than theocrats to handle them265. One can
extrapolate that Jordanians want the religious sphere confined to places of
worship given the fact that realpolitik is complex and the religious speech cannot
tackle society’s grinding economic problems by the stirring of emotions. Mosque
sermons almost always exhort the pious to solidarity and takaful. A verse of the
Quran which is a leitmotif over the minbar is,
“… and establish prayer and give zakat and loan Allah a goodly loan. And
whatever good you put forward for yourselves - you will find it with Allah. It
is better and greater in reward”266.
A hadith often referred to in the sermons is for Prophet Mohammad holding his
middle finger and forefinger apart and saying in gesture,
“I and the one who sponsors an orphan will be in Paradise like these
two”267.
This concept of takaful268 is an integral and permanent fixture of the sermon, and
in time of crisis and economic hardships, much of the burden the State is ought to
265 The AOI poll reveals that (50 percent) of the respondents view “a political system governed by
Islamic Shari’a law, devoid of political parties and elections” is “not at all suitable”, while (21
percent) deem it as “very suitable” or “suitable”. Majority of respondents (67 percent in Arab world;
69 percent in Jordan) are also opposed to the clergy having influence over public affairs or
government decisions, while (53 percent) in Jordan are opposed to the clerics assuming public
office. This reveals that while the majority of Jordanians (91 percent) and of their context (88
percent of Arabs) self-define as religious, Jordanians expect clerics to tackle a serious life-felt issue
such as the price hike, but have no penchant to see the clerics’ discourse shaping their mundane
life.
266 Surat Al-Muzzammil 73:20 Reference: http://quran.com/73 accessed on October 25th, 2013.
َ َقْرًضا َحَسًنا " َكاَة َوأَْقِرُضوا هللاَّ الَة َوآُتوا الزَّ ِ ُھَو َخْیًرا َوأَْعَظَم أَْجًراَوأَِقیُموا الصَّ ْن َخْیٍر َتِجُدوهُ ِعنَد هللاَّ ُموا ألَنفُِسُكم مِّ "َوَما ُتَقدِّ
)20سورة المزمل (
267 Source (In Arabic from Sahih Al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim)
أبي ھریرة برقم في صحیحھ من حدیث رواه مسلم). لغیره أنا وھو كھاتین في الجنةكافل الیتیم لھ أو :(قال رسول هللا
. ، واللفظ لھ7660
رواه البخاري في صحیحھ من حدیث ). انا وكافل الیتیم في الجنة ھكذا، وقال بإصبعیھ السبابة والوسطى: (قال رسول هللا
.  واللفظ لھ،6005سھل بن سعد برقم 
Page 248 of 299
incur is relieved thanks to mosque preachers invoking social solidarity, and
worshippers acting accordingly. One vivid example is the Syrian refugee crisis
which, especially in its early stages, has recalled the Jordanian-Syrian blood
bondage and mosque worshippers urging the faithful Muslims to overlook their
needs and give alms to their fellow Muslim brothers.
The third most important issue is ‘the situation in Syria’, which comes close in the
order of points and is closely interrelated to the second issue as a priority to tackle
in Friday sermons. Jordan borders with Syria extend over 370 KM and both
peoples who share kinship and blood ties enjoy visa exemption. On top of this, a
pan-Arab affinity is strong among both peoples as Jordan was part of Greater
Syria during the Ottoman rule. This bond was further reinforced during the 1950s
and 1960s when the nationalist and left-wing parties were dominant in Levant.
With the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis, Jordanian families on the Jordanian
borders would welcome this human deluge and receive refugees at their homes,
many of whom share kinship ties.
Given the presence of Syrians who had fled the fight between the Syrian regime
and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982, and the Zarqa-based Muslim Brotherhood
movement backing anti-Syrian regime forces, one would expects the conflict in
Syria to be a leitmotif in the third biggest city in Jordan. Zarqa is close to the
capital Amman, but is also considered a hotbed for the Muslim Brotherhood
movement. As the spokesperson of the Jordanian Committee to Support the
Syrian People (chaired by top figures of the Muslim Brotherhood movement), the
Researcher has had the chance to march in the streets of Zarqa and attend
speech festivals where the movement relies on its public base to mobilize citizens
against the Syrian regime and invoke relief aid to the refugees. By September
2013, there were approximately 1.3 million Syrians in Jordan (representing about
268 Sheikh Wael Battiri explained to the Researcher that while Zakat is an individual duty (fard ayn),
in times of dire need Muslims should resort to takaful (a collective obligation, or fard kifayah,
meaning if money available is sufficient to cover society needs, then no additional almsgiving is
required), but in the case of dire need, takaful is akin to individual duty.
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17.3 percent of the population), more than half a million of them are considered
refugees, 80 percent living outside the refugees camps. 62 percent of the Syrians
in Jordan are unregistered with UNHCR; therefore the Jordanian economy
assumes the liability of the expenses of their stay. This burden reached nearly
U.S. $ 4 billion, which accounts for about 13 percent of the country's GDP gross
and 45 percent of the total current expenditures of the government, draining more
than 54 percent of the total domestic revenue of the country and accounting for
about 90 percent of the fiscal deficit269. However, one has to look at the positive
side of the picture. Between January and May 2013, Syrians came second after
Jordanians in terms of registered capital270. Estimates speak of Syrian investments
reaching US$1 billion in Jordan- a total of 388 companies were registered in 2012,
compared to 113 in 2011, let alone the increase in trade balance due to the rising
use of Jordanian ports to move merchandise instead of the idle Syrian ports, and
Jordan replacing Lebanon and Syria as a preferred tourism destination for the
wealthy Gulf countries.
The Researcher conducted the questionnaire in an area where the Syrian
refugees abound. As a relief activist in Zarqa, the Researcher witnessed their
populated presence and its impact on the neighborhood; hence the priority of this
issue which has reportedly affected employment chances for Jordanians271, and
269 A lecture by economist Dr. Khaled Wazani entitled The Economic and Social Impact of the
Syrian Refugees in Jordan, delivered on September 19th, 2013 at the Royal Jordanian National
Defense Academy. Source http://www.rjndc.edu.jo/news.aspx?lng=1&NewsID=82
accessed on October 16th, 2013.
270 Followed by Iraqi nationals; a sign that the refugee crisis on the long run brings about positive
results on the economy.









accessed on July 13th, 2013
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the economy and life in general (scarce water supplies272, price hike, and social
problems273). Given their impact on the economy274, including rising prices and
rent, and relief aid exclusively distributed to the Syrians, no wonder this theme is
very close in importance to the previous factor, namely the price hike. The mosque
plays a pivotal role as Friday sermons are laden with calls for compassion and
benevolence. This should drive people to donate zakat275 which would alleviate
the economic hardships of the needy. The Researcher himself witnessed how the
Muslim Brotherhood movement was active is collecting zakat from merchants in
Zarqa to fulfill urgent needs of Syrian refugees. Almost all Friday sermons remind
the worshippers to fulfill the ‘five pillars of Islam’, zakat among them. Nevertheless,
Jordanians would groan about the direct impact of the recurring refugee crisis. As
of 2008276, there were approximately two million Palestinian refugees in Jordan.
Although almost 14 percent of the population lives below poverty line277, World
272 As a relief activist responding to water shortages during Ramadan month in summer 2013, the
Researcher was advised by the mayor of Bab Al-Hadid district in Rusaifa to distribute water bottles
to Jordanian homes alongside the Syrian homes so as to avert negative reactions by the
neighbourhood. Officials say the influx of Syrian refugees will cause the water deficit to increase
50% in 2013 (Source: http://jordantimes.com/article/german-grant-to-address-increasing-demand-
for-water-in-northern-region----ministry accessed on October 19th, 2013). Jordan is one of the four
most water scarce countries in the world.
Source: http://web.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/12431464431JO_Water-Strategy09.pdf
accessed on October 19th, 2013).
273 According to a poll by The Center for Strategic Studies conducted in April 2013 (sample 1200,
error margin 2.5% ±), 58 percent of the respondents said that the presence of the Syrian refugees
in their area of residence has led to a lack in public services provided to them.
Source: http://www.css-jordan.org/Photos/635015077438673397.pdf
accessed on May 25th, 2013.
274 “The cost of hosting Syrian refugees on Jordan’s economy has in 18 months exceeded JD590
million, which is around 3 per cent of the Kingdom’s gross domestic product, as a recent study has
found.”
Source: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107
accessed on July 13th, 2013
275 Zakat is obligatory to all Muslims who can give out of their accumulated wealth.
276 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA), “UNRWA Statistics”, 13 July 2008, Source:
http://web.archive.org/web/20080713042517/http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/index.html
accessed on October 31st, 2013.
277 While official data estimates poverty rate at 14.4 percent in 2015 (13.3 percent in 2008), World
Bank figures estimates the ratio of Jordanians living below poverty line at 37.5 percent in 2015.
Source: http://www.alghad.com/m/articles/898519-
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Bank classifies Jordan as an “upper middle income country278.” As the positive
prospects of the crisis would not pay off in the short run279, a negative mood
induced by the imminent needs of the Jordanian citizen prevails. By the time this
future prospect has come to fruition, citizens would have co-opted with the status
quo of the Syrian refugee crisis and the pay-off is no more the prevalent discourse,
reminiscent to the crisis of the Iraqi refugees in 2003 onwards.
In a roundtable by the Muslim Brotherhood, pundits concluded that in spite of the
havoc which the Syrian refugee crisis has laid on the life of Jordanians in general,
the Syrian crisis has brought about manifestations of solidarity and assistance
between Jordanians and their fellow Syrians, where blood ties and kinship bind
many families in the two countries280. It is no wonder to see the close correlation
between the Economic factor, which scored 452, and the Syria factor which scored
452 in the survey; the only two factors close to each other in the opinion of the
worshippers.
The least important of the themes is Reform in Jordan. Pro-reform policies driven
by the Arab Spring and its resonance in Jordan drove King Abdullah II to enact
constitutional Amendments (rendering more power to parliament, creating an








accessed on October 18th, 2015.
278 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan
accessed on October 31st, 2013.
279 Still, the Syrian refugee crisis has brought new investments worth JD 150 million.
Translated from source http://www.maqar.com/?id=35207
accessed on October 31st, 2013.
280 Translated from source http://www.maqar.com/?id=35207
accessed on October 31st, 2013.
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amending the elections law, and dealing with kleptocracy). To some extent, these
measures have managed to water down public protests, but fell short of pleasing
the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the main opposition front in Jordan. A national
poll281 shows that (26 percent) of the respondents believe the parliament is
incapable of making progress on the path of reform, while (43 percent) answered
‘maybe’, a sign of a wide state of uncertainty regarding a prime product of the
reform process. Former government consultant Yusuf Mansur views that the
political impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordan,
“has lowered the expectations from reform; returning to slow political and
economic reform, if any at all; IMF reform program taking off”282.
The AOI depicts a clear majority of Jordanian respondents (63 percent) indicating
they are “unconfident at all” or “unconfident to some extent” with their
representative parliament. The supra opinion poll indicates how inferior people
rate “reform” as a factor behind the “wrong direction” of the country as compared
to the rising prices. A separate poll283 demonstrates that only (3 percent) of the
national sample believe that political reform is the main problem Jordan is facing at
the present.
The Researcher attributes this public leaning to two mutually dependent factors:
Firstly, in a trade-off between political emancipation (reform) and security, regional
turmoil has convinced Jordanians to highly appreciate the level of security they
enjoy. Secondly, the regime would only enact reform commensurate to public and
international pressure; ultimately citizens giving up on the regime being serious in
281 Conducted by Identity Center between February 15th & March 15th, 2013; national sample 1200;
error margin ± 3%. Source: http://www.identity-center.org/sites/default/files/A1.pdf
accessed on July 13th, 2013.
282 International Conference on the Socio-Economic Dimension of the Syrian Conflict- Impact of
Syrian Crisis on Jordan, by Yusuf Mansur (PhD), 4 July 2013.
Source:http://www.slideshare.net/YusufMansur1/inter-conference-on-the-socio-economic-27
accessed on October 17th, 2013.
283 Conducted by Center for Strategic Studies between October 17th & 22nd, 2012; sample 2500;
error margin ± 2.5%. Source: http://www.css-jordan.org/Photos/634865918864430429.pdf
accessed on July 14th, 2013.
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enacting real reform. Add more to this the fact that the average longevity of the
cabinets in the past decade is 18 months, rendering any strategy to act out reform
or structural developmental policies volatile. Therefore, the worshippers who have
doubts that the mosque speech can significantly change the course of things have
no penchant to prime ‘reform’ as a theme to attract attention to while performing
their customary religious duty, neither do they expect complex political issues to
be deconstructed or find their recipe through Friday sermons. This furnishes for
the reading why reform is the lowest on the ladder of interests by the worshippers.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
FINAL CONCLUSIONS
Friday congregational sermon represents the centerpiece of the mosque’s
function; the medium through which different actors (preacher, audience, State,
law as institution, worshippers and society at large) interrelate to convey or receive
messages of religious essence and worldly influence.
Thematic analysis of 24 attended sermons depict that the preachers embed
messages that serve as a framework to endorse a certain definition for the subject
issue, suggest a causal interpretation in a religious structure, furnish for a moral
evaluation, and recommend a certain worldly-wise or soteriological treatment for.
Throughout this process the preacher intends to reinforce, validate or deny certain
values, symbols, beliefs, legitimacies or behaviors in society by means of, mostly,
premeditated selection and salience of the message and the attributes of this
message. The end is that the priority of this message be embraced by the
worshippers, and its attributes (characteristics) move from the agenda of the
preacher to the umma at large.
The spiritual essence of the sermon provides a framing tool for the preacher to
tackle worldly concerns of the worshippers (personal, political, social or economic)
in such as way as to bestow legitimacy upon or delegitimize certain values,
symbols or institutions. This framing technique also works as a hedge against
unnecessary clash with the pertinent regulations, and is filled with content drawn
from the mutual expectations between the preacher and his pious audience.
Having achieved its objectives from pertinent regulations, the State invests in
content which at times trespasses these regulations and values of society in order
to achieve the more pressing need to control the religious space and employ it to
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reinforce the legitimacy of the regime by crowding out political competitors. Price
(1994) contends that,
“The market for loyalties has existed everywhere and at all times. What
differs about today’s market is the range of participants, the scope of its
boundaries, and the nature of the regulatory bodies capable of establishing
and enforcing rules for participation and exclusion.”
In a realpolitik of an oligopoly nature (State and Muslim Brotherhood), the
Researcher deems the influence of this speech as affirmative to the legitimacy of
the regime by helping it crowd out the political competitor(s) and limit their ability to
shape public opinion. On the long run however, this approach would result in the
concentration of powers in the hand of the regime, ultimately weakening a healthy
collective bargaining process for the shuffle of allegiances in the religious sphere.
This is being done by the State diminishing the role of the administrative arm
(ministry of awqaf) to ensure the mosque conducts mere ritualistic functions, while
relegating the task of reining in noncompliant preachers to the security apparatus.
However, the preacher can circumvent this atmosphere of political gravitation by
framing the sermon; to wit, by interrelate the message to an ever changing political
context aided by expectations of an ostensibly dormant but highly religious
audience. On the other hand, the worshipper is not a mere recipient of a
sacralized message, but a co-maker who has a say in the shuffle for loyalties in
the religious marketplace. A process of historical cultivation of a predominantly
religious culture and an interactive media landscape render the worshipper
(whether radical Islamist who disavows the State as apostate, or a pro-regime
activist) immune to political gravitations between the State and other contestants
in the religious domain; a notion evident in the worshipper being able to demystify
the real motives behind the changing State regulations and their counter reactions
by the preacher, therefore bridging the gap between a mono-directional religious
speech and an interactive public sphere.
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With regard to covering content germane to the religious sphere, the media in
Jordan enjoys relative freedom, as State censorship to mosque-related news
appears limited to the awqaf officials bemoaning a State-friendly newspaper which
had trespassed the customary tradition of self censorship. This is also apparent in
the high number of comments by the readers/users who criticize both the
government and Islamic opposition. However, this pseudo environment of freedom
seems limited to the electronic news websites, whereas newspapers, whether
mainstream or independent (such as Al Arab Al Yawm) all lack inclusion of the
readers in media accountability practices, apparently due to the lack of citizens’
trust in traditional media.284 The supra case of the ministry of awqaf reprimanding
a mainstream newspaper for publishing criticism to a purportedly ‘hate speech’ in
the sermon is just one case285.
Public opposition to governmental policies in the press and online media does not
necessarily translate into support for or sympathy with the Muslim Brotherhood
movement; a possible indication the public does not directly attribute the
degradation in the quality of Friday congregational sermons to the fact that the
movement’s preachers have been ostracized, nor is the public keen to see those
preachers reassume their lost task of preaching and guidance at mosques.
284 Pies, J. & Madanat, P. (June 2011). Beyond State Regulation: How Online Practices Contribute
to Holding the Media Accountable in Jordan, p. 36.
Source: http://www.mediaact.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/WP4/WP4_Jordan.pdf
Journalism Research and Development Centre, University of Tampere, Finland 2011.
285 By the end of this study, in August 2015, the Islamic daily newspaper As-Sabeel (Muslim
Brotherhood) published a news bout 150 Imams and preachers bemoaning “an ofensing
reprimand” to them by the Amman awqaf director who, in his meeting with them, held them
responsible for the week attendance in Friday sermon and its “zero influence on human behavior
and the development process” and that “the lack of preparation for their sermons has resulted in
the great majority of citizens believing they go for Friday prayers merely out of an imposed






%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%AD and checking with the newspaper they referred this
censorship to pressure by the awqaf director. The news appreas in another link accessed on
August 31st, 2015. http://www.almejharnews.com/index.php?page=article&id=119747
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Although the movement’s preachers are replete with sound fiqh and politically
loaded speech, worshippers are content with sermons that nourish their yearning
for jurisprudence and religious teaching rather than diatribes that arouse public
sentiments. As shown in a quantitative tool (questionnaire), the worshippers do not
expect the preacher to come up a methodological solution for complex political
issues, be they local or regional, as this task is elusive even to the political parties,
therefore the dichotomy between citizens’ disagreement with then changing State
regulations (2006) and the vindication of the Muslim Brotherhood movement as
the prime victim of State policies which had censored the religious speech and
limited the movement’s reach.
A close field study by means of ‘participant observation’ shows that the impact of
the changing mosque regulations are being offset by the preachers’ ability to
circumvent State expansion by means of framing the sermon content, and the
worshippers’ strong affinity to the corpus of Islamic teaching and tradition, a
reference which defies attempts by the State or preachers to instill a patri-oriented
Islam that dwarfs the role of the mosque (and khutba as its prime message) to
sheer religiosity when the dynamic political context requires the mosque to
shoulder the all-inclusive task it used to shoulder during the early Islamic periods.
This conclusion is corroborated by interviews with concerned actors which reveal
that the Hashemite Jordanian regime (which relies on religiosity as an
indispensable pillar to uphold its legitimacy) has managed to diminish the role of
the religious establishment (ministry of awqaf) to the extent that it stands defiant to
the mosque shouldering its historical role of edifying the umma in all aspects,
including political. Islamic parties and movements which participate in political life,
Muslim Brotherhood in particular, are being directly affected by the new
regulations which have juxtaposed an internationally driven scheme to rein in the
radical religious speech, whereas other more extremist schools of thought
(whether anti-State preachers or scholars who work within the confines of the
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regime) appear to be indifferent about attempts by the State to censor religious
speech. These groups with loose patriarchal structure appear to be more adept
than the Muslim Brotherhood movement in adapting their modus operandi and the
plasticity to invent new schemes to circumvent State control. On the other side the
regime has proved it is keener to dwarf the Muslim Brotherhood movement (which
contests the strategic policies of the government such as the peace treaty with
Israel [1994] or challenge the regime during the Arab Spring (2010-2013)) than to
reign in the more radical jihadist stream, even though the latter group disavows the
very legitimacy of the regime. This is a telltale the State is more concerned with
exercising monopoly over the religious space and its spillover in the public sphere
than in curbing ‘hate speech’ in tandem with the Western war against terrorism. A
close ogle on dissonant speech at mosques postulates the State prefers to nurture
a manageable radical speech than have it metamorphose into makeshift mosques
used by the jihadist stream to emerge as another contestant and defiant of the
State’s legitimacy. This notion defies the pretext the government had postulated to
change the relevant legislations.
The overall evaluation by the worshippers to the performance of the preacher and
the sermon content is relatively good, giving more credit to issues of religious
nature or societal/behavioral but less so with themes of economic or political
essence. Worshippers also attest to the influence of the sermon on their
perception of reality and their personal life; a postulation more evident in the
“communal” sphere than the “individual”. This active role by the audience is upheld
by framing researchers such as Entman (2010:333) who puts forth that,
“Although they are generally the least conscious and strategic of the frame
choosers in the system, citizens are not passive receptacles for whatever
frame dominates the media”
Just as Entman suggests a feedback by public opinion that ultimately influence the
future framing behavior of the elites in power and the communicator, so this study
posits that the worshippers, as a congregation, do impact the framing performance
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of the mosque preacher. This tendency speaks of the congregation being content
with a preacher who would nourish their religious needs and answers queries
about life in a religious frame, therefore enhancing a sense of unanimity rather
than eccentricity and social seclusion. What engenders this inference is the
propensity among the worshippers to prioritize listening to speech that tickles their
religiously-driven patriotic nostalgia (Palestine, al-Aqsa mosque, jihad) and/or
addresses their imminent socioeconomic life-felt needs.
In a setting with high Islamic presence and activism (Zarqa city) including several
radical Islamic groups, the worshippers do not perceive radical discourse or
negative label about other faith groups as ‘hate speech’; a telltale of a tight State
control over the religious sphere by means of premeditated selection, salience
and/or exclusion. But given the frequency of negative stereotypes and ‘hate
speech’ uttered against other ethnic and religious groups in the thematic analysis
part (see Chapter Three), one other explanation is the worshippers not perceiving
this speech as radical or targeting other religious groups in society (mainly
Christians) given the sacralized frame the sermon is being engulfed with. What
upholds this conclusion is the “participant observation” part which rules out any
negative perception or stance towards the Researcher by the participating
Informants.
To conclude, a State’s natural penchant to monopolize the religious space is offset
by the preachers’ competence to outwit this statecraft by means of framing
techniques meant to imprint their preselected agenda of sermon themes and the
attributes of these themes on the worshippers’ schema. This official tendency is
also offset by preachers being tied up to the prior expectations of an informed,
albeit static, audience. This audience also has the wit to fathom the officialdom’s
scheme thanks to multifarious available reference sources they can resort to in
order to interpret and reinterpret controversial religious content. Through this
process of framing contest the audience integrates the perceived message into
packages forged by means of their personal experiences and discussions with
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others in the religious space and the public sphere. Therefore, none of the frames
can exclusively shape the opinion of the worshippers (Nisbet 2010: 47 & 48) as
these frames can gain effectiveness in as much as they resonate with the
audience’s prevalent popular culture and their strongly held value constructs such
as ideology, political affiliation or religious belief. This conclusion condones a late
acknowledgement by Habermas regarding the process through which norms are
being produced in society. Habermas, cited in Salvatore & Eickelman (2004: 6),
put forth that,
“the process through which norms are produced, which reflect general
interest and create an “overlapping consensus” in society, can only be
rooted in tradition, familiarity, and culture, through which individuals
internalize the procedure of consensus […] The communicative
presuppositions for generating such a consensus are not the privilege of a
particular culture”
The losers in this shuffle of allegiances’ game are the major actors, namely State
and Muslim Brotherhood. A security-driven policy by the former to reign in religious
speech would weaken its capacity to maintain the delicate balance between
religiosity and modernity (both prerequisites and pillars for legitimacy), and the
latter has failed to construct and deliver a convincing religious speech tantamount
to its dawa project. The spillover is the preacher and the congregation reaching an
implicit consensus in setting the agenda for the sermon theme, and the attributes
of content embedded in this sermon.
Hopefully, this eight years’ research project has managed to employ qualitative
and quantitative research tools to add academic value to an underestimated
subject regarding the interesting interplay between religious speech, media and
state in Jordan. Further scholarship is indispensible to analyze how framing and
agenda setting, in a sociological approach, are used to construct meaning
necessary to shape the worshippers’ perception of reality.
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This conclusion opens opportunities for questions related to the nature of the
agenda settings of both the state and the leaders of the Friday sermons
concerning their functions and viability. The Researcher recommends that a team
of researchers equipped with sound knowledge and experience in ethnography,
critique-based and quantitative scholarship further fathoms this interdisciplinary
field in order to unravel how the agenda-setting, framing and priming processes
work together to shape public opinion in an Arab and Islamic context. A Western
vs. Middle-Eastern comparative approach is advisable to test the reliability of the
agenda-setting theory on an international scale.
The lack of academia and think-tank circles in Jordan and the Arab world renders
this quest all the more indispensable to reify the abstract religious sphere and
normalize this taboo-considered field of knowledge.
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GLOSSARY OF THE ARABIC/ISLAMIC WORDS
Ad̲h̲ān: ““announcement”, a technical term for the call to the divine service of
Friday and the five daily ṣalāts. According to Mussulman tradition, the Prophet
soon after his arrival at Medina (1 or 2 years after the Hid̲j̲ra) deliberated with his
companions on the best manner of announcing to the faithful the hour of prayer.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-1/adhan-
SIM_0318?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-1&s.q=adhan
Ahl al-Bait: ““the people of the house, of the family“. With reference to Ḳorʾān,
xxxiii.33, the S̲h̲īʿites (and in general the Muḥammedans friendly to ʿAlī) attribute
to ʿAlī, Fāṭima, their sons and their descendants to whom alone they restrict this
appellation, the greatest moral and spiritual merits as well as the greatest
influence on the political rule and religious guidance of Islām. These ideas come to
the surface in a more or less exaggerated form with regard to the ʿAlīdes
according to the views of those spheres [see s̲h̲īʿa].”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-1/ahl-al-bait-
SIM_0394?s.num=14&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-1&s.q=ahl+
Ahl al- Kitāb: “the people of the Book“. Muḥammed calls so the Jews and
Christians, in distinction from the heathens, on account of their possessing divine
books of revelation (Tawrāt = Torah; Zabūr = Psalter; Ind̲j̲il = Gospel), which, it is
true, they transmit in a falsified form, but the recognition of which secures for them
a privileged position for the heterodox. In contradistinction to the heathens
Muḥammed granted them (Korʾān, ix. 29) after their submission free public
worship against payment of a poll-tax (d̲j̲izya, q. v.)”.
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-1/ahl-al-kitab-
SIM_0401?s.num=3&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-1&s.q=kitab
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Ahzab (Ḥizb): “(pl. aḥzāb) means primarily “a group, faction, a group of
supporters of a man who share his ideas and are ready to defend him”, and this is
why the term has been adopted in modern Arabic to mean a political party; it
means also “part, portion” and it is from this meaning that it has come to indicate a




Al-Aqsa Mosque (al-Masd̲j̲id al-Ạkṣā): “literally, “the remotest sanctuary.” There
are three meanings to these words.1. The words occur in Ḳurʾān, XVII, 1: “Praise
Him who made His servant journey in the night (asrā) from the sacred sanctuary
(al-masd̲j̲id al-ḥarām) to the remotest sanctuary (al-masd̲j̲id al-aḳṣa), which we
have surrounded with blessings to show him of our signs.” This verse, usually
considered to have been revealed during the Prophet’s last year in Mecca before




Al-Fātiḥa: “the first and most popular Sūra in the Ḳorʾān). Its name means the
“opener” (i. e. of the Ḳorʾān). This short Sūra which only contains seven verses
has a certain number of peculiar features; it is at the beginning of the book, while
all the other short Sūras are at the end; it is in the form of a prayer while the others
are in the form of a sermon or lecture; in reciting it the word amīn (amen) is added
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Al-Isra’ wal Mi’raj: (Isrāʾ) “The term isrāʾ is taken from the Ḳurʾān, Sūra xvii. 1:
“Glory to Him who caused His servant to journey by night (asrā bi ʿabdihi lail an)
from the sacred place of worship to the further place of worship, which We have
encircled with blessings, in order that We might show him some of our signs!
Verily He (i. e. God) is the Hearer and the Beholder”.
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-1/isra-
SIM_3251?s.num=0&s.q=isra
Allāh: “God the Unique one, the Creator and Lord of the Judgment, polarizes the
thought of Islam; He is the sole reason for its existence. ¶ Allāh was known to the
pre-Islamic Arabs; he was one of the Meccan deities, possibly the supreme deity
and certainly a creator-god (cf. Ḳurʾān, xiii, 16; xxix, 61, 63; xxxi, 25; xxxix, 38; xliii,
87). He was already known, by antonomasia, as the God, al-Ilāh (the most likely
etymology; another suggestion is the Aramaic Alāhā ).—For Allāh before Islam, as
shown by archaeological sources and the Ḳurʾān, see ilāh .”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/search?s.q=allah&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.enc
yclopaedia-of-islam-2&search-go=Search
Amīr: “commander, governor, prince. The term seems to be basically Islamic
(Naḳāʾiḍ, 7, 964; Ibn Durayd, Ḏj̲amhara, iii, 437. In the Ḳurʾān, only the expression
ulu ’l-amr is found (sūra iv, 59, 83), but amīr occurs often in traditions (cf.
Wensinck, Concordance , s.v.). The sources for the early period frequently use the
terms ʿāmil [q.v.] and amīr as synonyms (cf. Hamidullah, Documents, 36, 38 and
39, 83). In the reports on the meeting of the saḳīfa ,amīr is used for the head of the
Muslim community (Ṭabarī I, 1840, 1841; Ibn Saʿd, II, 3, 126, 129).”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/amir-
SIM_0602?s.num=12&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=emir
Aya: “plu. āyāt , a sign, token, miracle, verse of the Ḳurʾān. The original meaning
is a sign or token and as such is found in the pre-Islamic poetry.”
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http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/search?s.q=aya+&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.enc
yclopaedia-of-islam-2&search-go=Search
Awqaf (waqf): “in Islamic law, the act of founding a charitable trust, and, hence
the trust itself. A synonym, used mainly by Mālikī jurists, is ḥabs , ḥubus or ḥubs
(in French often rendered as habous). The essential elements are that a person,
with the intention of committing a pious deed, declares part of his or her property
to be henceforth unalienable (ḥabs, taḥbīs) and designates persons or public
utilities as beneficiaries of its yields (al-taṣadduḳ bi ’l-manfaʿa , tasbīl al-manfaʿa).”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/search?s.q=awqaf&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.en
cyclopaedia-of-islam-2&search-go=Search
Basmala: “is the formula biʾsmi llāhi l-raḥmāni l-raḥīmi , also called tasmiya (to
pronounce the [divine] Name). Common translation: “In the name of God, the
Clement, the Merciful”; R. Blachère’s translation: “In the name of God, the Merciful
Benefactor”, etc. The formula occurs twice in the text of the Ḳurʾān: in its complete
form in Sūra xxvii, 30, where it opens Solomon’s letter to the queen of Sheba: “It is




Bayt Mal al-Muslimeen (Bayt al- Māl): “in its concrete meaning “the House of





Dawa: “, pl. daʿawāt , from the root daʿā , to call, invite, has the primary meaning
call or invitation. In the Ḳurʾān , XXX, 24, it is applied to the call to the dead to rise
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from the tomb on the day of Judgement. It also has the sense of invitation to a
meal and, as a result, of a meal with guests, walīma : al-Buk̲h̲ārī, Nikāḥ , 71, 74;
LA, xviii, 285. It also means an appeal to God, prayer, vow…”.
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/search?s.q=dawa+&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.e
ncyclopaedia-of-islam-2&search-go=Search
Ḏj̲amāʿa: “(literally, “union, unity”) “the whole body of Muslims, in opposition to the
heretics, who are separated from the community as seceders” (Juynboll,
Handbuch dss Islāmischen Gesetzes, p. 46, note 1). It is not to be confused with




Duʿāʾ: “appeal, invocation (addressed to God) either on behalf of another or for
oneself (li...), or else against someone ( ʿalā ...); hence: prayer of invocation,
calling either for blessing, or for imprecation and cursing, connected with the
Semitic idea of the effective value of the spoken word. Cf. Ḳurʾān XVII, 11: “Man
prays for evil as he prays for good”. Duʿāʾ therefore will have the general sense of




Duat (Dāʿī, rarely, dāʿiya ): “he who summons” to the true faith, was a title used
among several dissenting Muslim groups for their chief propagandists. It was
evidently used by the early Muʿtazilites [q.v. in EI 1]; but became typical of the
more rebellious among the S̲h̲īʿīs. It appears in the ʿAbbāsid mission in K̲h̲urāsān;
and in some Zaydī usage. It was ascribed to followers of Abu ’l-K̲h̲aṭṭāb. It was
especially important in the Ismāʿīlī and associated movements (which were called
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daʿwa , “summons”), where it designated generically the chief authorized
representatives of the imām.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/dai-
SIM_1668?s.num=0&s.q=dai
Eid (ʿĪd): “festival. The word is derived by the Arab lexicographers from the root
and  explained as “the (periodically) returning”. But it is really one of those Aramaic
loanwords, which are particularly numerous in the domain of religion; cf. for
example the Syriac ʿīdā “festival, holiday”. The Muslim year has two canonical
festivals, the ʿīd al-aḍḥā [q. v.] or “sacrificial festival” on the 10th Ḏh̲u ’l-Ḥid̲j̲d̲j̲a and
the ʿīd al-fiṭr “festival of breaking the fast” on the 1st S̲h̲awwal.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-1/id-
SIM_3111?s.num=7&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-1&s.q=raka
Fatwā: “opinion on a point of law, the term “law” applying, in Islam, to all civil or
religious matters. The act of giving a fatwā is a futyā or iftāʾ ; —the same term is
used to denote the profession of the adviser;—the person who gives a fatwā, or is




Fiqh (Fiḳh): “(“intelligence, knowledge”) is the name given to jurisprudence in
Islām. It is, like the jurisprudentia of the Romans, rerum divinarum atque
kumanarum notilia and in its widest sense covers all aspects of religious, political
and civil life. In addition to the laws regulating ritual and religious observances
(ʿibādāt), as far as concerns performance and abstinence, it includes the whole
field of family law, the law of inheritance, of property and of contract, in a word
provisions for all the legal questions that arise in social life (muʿāmalāt); it also
includes criminal law and …
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COM_0055?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-1&s.q=fiqh+
Fitna: “the primary meaning is “putting to the proof, discriminatory test”, as gold,
al-Ḏj̲urd̲j̲ānī says in his Taʿrīfāt (ed. Flügel, Leipzig 1845, 171), is tested by fire.
Hence the idea of a temptation permitted or sent by God to test the believer’s faith,
which, for the man wedded to his desires, would have the appearance of an
invitation to abandon the faith. “Your goods and children are fitna ” (Ḳurʾān, VIII,
28; LXIV, 15). The term fitna occurs many times in the Ḳurʾān with the sense of
temptation or trial of faith.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/fitna-
SIM_2389?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=fitna
Ghazwa (G̲h̲āzī): “plur. g̲h̲uzāt, one who undertakes a g̲h̲azwa, particularly the




Ḥadīth: “(narrative, talk) with the definite article ( al-ḥadīt̲h̲ ) is used for Tradition,
being an account of what the Prophet said or did, or of his tacit approval of
something said or done in his presence. K̲h̲abar (news, information) is sometimes
used of traditions from the Prophet, sometimes from Companions or Successors.
At̲h̲ar , pl. āt̲h̲ār (trace, vestige), usually refers to traditions from Companions or
Successors, but is sometimes used of traditions from the Prophet. Sunna (custom)
refers to a normative custom of the Prophet or of the early community.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/search?s.q=hadith&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.en
cyclopaedia-of-islam-2&search-go=Search
Hajj (Ḥad̲j̲d̲j̲): “pilgrimage to Mecca, ʿArafāt and Minā, the fifth of the five “pillars”
(arkān) of Islam. It is also called the Great Pilgrimage in contrast to the ʿumra [q.v.]
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or Little Pilgrimage. Its annual observance has had, and continues to have, a
profound influence on the Muslim world. Those not taking part follow the pilgrims




Hizbu’ttahrir: “Taḳī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī (1909-77), founder and chief ideologue of
the Islamic Liberation Party ( ḥizb al-taḥrīr al-islāmī ), which has striven since its
formation in 1952 to establish an Islamic state and has been particularly active in
Jordan. Al-Nabhānī was born near Haifa, studied at al-Azhar and the Dār al-ʿUlūm
in Cairo (1927-32), then returned to Palestine, where he taught religious sciences




ikhwan (al-Ik̲h̲wān al-Muslimūn): “ “the Muslim Brethren”, Muslim movement,
both religious and political, founded in Egypt by Ḥasan al-Bannāʾ. Many facets of
the history of the Muslim Brethren are still unknown, which is to be expected since
the movement engaged in many secret activities, on several occasions threatening
the established régimes and being persecuted by them, many notorious militant




Iqama (Iḳāma): “is the second call to the ṣalāt which is pronounced by the
muʾad̲h̲d̲h̲in in the mosque before each of the five prescribed daily ṣalāt’s as well
as before the ṣalāt at the Friday service. This second call gives the moment at
which the ṣalāt begins. The formulae of the iḳāma are the same as those of the
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ad̲h̲ān [q. v.]. According ¶ to the Ḥanafīs, they are repeated as often as in the
ad̲h̲ān; according to the other Fiḳh schools, they are pronounced only once with
the exception of the words “God is great”, which are repeated twice at the




Ḥadd: “(plural ḥudūd), boundary, limit, stipulation, also barrier, obstacle. As a
scientific term the word is used in several senses. In the Ḳorʾān, where it is always
found in the plural, it means the “limits” laid down by God, i. e. the provisions of the
Law, whether commands or prohibitions. It appears in this sense at the end of
several verses, which contain legal provisions, e. g. Sūra ii. 183, where it is said
after the exposition of the rules regarding fasts: “These are God’s ḥudūd (the




Iqamat Al Hadd/Hudud (Punishments): “a class of punishments prescribed
by the Quran and the sunna for crimes considered to be against God.
Although interpretations by Islamic jurists vary, such crimes commonly
include theft, adultery, making unproven accusations of adultery, consuming
intoxicants, armed robbery and apostasy. The prescribed punishments range
from lashes to banishment to death. Strict evidence is required for conviction,
such as four credible eyewitnesses to prove adultery. In addition, the crime
must have been committed by a willful and sane adult.”
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-
society-appb/
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Jibril: “(Ḏj̲abrāʾīl, or ḏjibrīl, Gabriel, is the best known figure among the angels of
Islām. He is one of the four archangels, one of angels favoured by or “brought
near” (muḳarrabīn) God, and one of the divine messengers. His duty is to bear the
orders of God to mortal prophets and to reveal his mysteries to them. Gabriel
plays an important part in the Ḳorʾān; Muḥammad applied the legend of this
celestial messenger holding converse with the prophets to himself and believed
that he had received his mission and the subject of his preaching from him.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-1/djabrail-
SIM_1959?s.num=7&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-1&s.q=djibril
Khutba: “(a.), sermon, address by the k̲h̲aṭīb [q.v.]. The k̲h̲uṭba has a fixed place
in Islamic ritual, viz. in the Friday-service, in the celebration of the two festivals, in
services held at particular occasions such as an eclipse or excessive drought. On
the Friday it precedes the ṣalāt , in all the other services the ṣalāt comes first.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/khutba-
SIM_4352?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=khutba
Mad̲h̲hab: “(pl. mad̲h̲āhib ), inf. n. of d̲h̲-h-b , meaning “a way, course, mode, or
manner, of acting or conduct or the like” (Lane, i, 983b); as a term of religion,
philosophy, law, etc. “a doctrine, a tenet, an opinion with regard to a particular
case”; and in law specifically, a technical term often translated as “school of law”,
in particular one of the four legal systems recognised as orthodox by Sunnī
Muslims, viz. the Ḥanafiyya, Mālikiyya, S̲h̲āfiʿiyya and Ḥanbaliyya [q.vv.], and the




Minbar: “the raised structure or pulpit from which solemn announcements to the
Muslim community were made and from which sermons were preached. 1. Early
historical evolution and place in the Islamic cult. In contrast to the miḥrāb [ q.v.],
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the minbar was introduced in the time of the Prophet himself. The word, often
pronounced mimbar (cf. Brockelmann, Grundriss , i, 161), comes from the root n-
b-r “high”; it could be derived from the Arabic quite easily with the meaning
“elevation, stand”, but is more probably a loanword from the Ethiopie (Schwally, in




Miʿrād̲j̲: “originally ladder, later “ascent”, especially Muḥammad’s ascension to
heaven. In the Ḳurʾān, Sūra lxxxi. 19—25 and liii. I—12, a vision is described in
which a heavenly messenger appears to Muḥammad and Sūra liii. 12-18 deals
with a second message of a similar kind. In both cases the Prophet sees a
heavenly figure approach him from the distance but there is no suggestion that he




Muṣallā: “the noun of place from ṣallā “to perform the Muslim worship, ṣalāt
[q.v.]”, hence the place where the ṣalāt is performed on certain occasions. When
Muḥammad had fixed his abode in Medina, he performed the ordinary ṣalāts in his




Mushrikun (S̲h̲irk): “a term from the religious vocabulary, of Ḳurʾānic origin, which
signifies the act of “associating” with God, in other words, accepting the presence
at His side of other divinities; it may be translated either literally, by associationism
or, in more explicit fashion, by polytheism. In numerous instances in the Ḳurʾān
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there is criticism of the “associators” (al-mus̲h̲rikūn, 42 occurrences; also
encountered nine times is the phrase allad̲h̲īna as̲h̲rakū), defined as those who





Naṣarā: “Christians, more especially the adherents of the Oriental churches living
under Muslim rule (differentiated from Rūm “Greek Christians”, Ifrand̲j̲ “Western
Christians”). The word is derived from the Syriac Naṣrāyā (Horovitz, Koran.




Quran (al-Ḳurʾān): “the Muslim scripture, containing the revelations recited by
Muḥammad and preserved in a fixed, written form. The earliest attested usage of
the term ḳurʾān is in the Ḳurʾān itself, where it occurs about 70 times with a variety
of meanings. Most Western scholars have now accepted the view developed by F.
Schwally (Gesch. des Qor., i, 33 f.) and others that ḳurʾān is derived from the
Syriac ḳeryānā , “scripture reading, lesson”, as used in Christian liturgy”.
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/search?s.q=kuran&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.en
cyclopaedia-of-islam-2&search-go=Search
Ribā: “lit. increase, as a technical term, usury and interest, and in general any
unjustified increase of capital for which no compensation is given. Derivatives from
the same root are used in other Semitic languages to describe interest. In classical
Islamic law. Transactions with a fixed time limit and payment of interest, as well as
speculations of all kinds, formed an essential element in the highly developed
trading system of Mecca”.
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http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/riba-
COM_0918?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=riba+
Salafiyya: “a neo-orthodox brand of Islamic reformism, originating in the late 19th
century and centred on Egypt, aiming to regenerate Islam by a return to the
tradition represented by the “pious forefathers” ( al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ, hence its name)
of the Primitive Faith.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/search?s.q=salafi+&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.e
ncyclopaedia-of-islam-2&search-go=Search
Ṣalāt: “ritual prayer. Unlike other types of prayer—in particular the prayer of
supplication [see duʿāʾ ], the remembrance of the Divine Names [see d̲h̲ikr ] or
Ṣūfī confraternities’ litanies [see wird ]—the ṣalāt , principal prayer of Islam, forms
part of the ʿibādāt or cultic obligations. The word clearly derives from the Syriac





Salat al-Istikhara (Istik̲h̲āra): “deriving from a root k̲h̲-y-r which expresses the
idea of option or choice, consists of entrusting God with the choice between two or
more possible options, either through piety and submission to His will, or else
through inability to decide oneself, on account of not knowing which choice is the
most advantageous one. To the first category belong the ak̲h̲yār or “chosen”, who
regulate their lives according to the model inspired by God in the Ḳurʾān and the
Law; to the second belong the mustak̲h̲īrūn , those who seek to escape from
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Salat al-Tarawih (Tarāwīḥ): “pl. of tarwīḥa, the term for ṣalāt s which are
performed in the nights of the month of Ramaḍān. Tradition says that Muḥammad
held these prayers in high esteem, with the precaution, however, that their
performance should not become obligatory (al-Buk̲h̲ārī, Tarāwīḥ , trad. 3). ʿUmar
is said to have been the first to assemble behind one ḳāriʾ those who performed
their prayers in the mosque of Medina singly or in groups (loc. cit., trad. 2); he is




Ṣawm: “with ṣiyām, maṣdar from the root s-w-m; the two terms are used
indiscriminately. The original meaning of the word in Arabic is “to be at rest” (Th.
Nöldeke, Neue Beiträge zur sem. Sprachw ., Strassburg 1910, 36, n. 3; see
previously, S. Fränkel, De vocab. ... in Corano peregrinis, Leiden 1880, 20:
“quiescere” ). The meaning “fasting” may have been taken from Judaeo-Aramaic
and Syriac usage, when Muḥammad became better acquainted with the institution




Shafi’i: “al-S̲h̲āfiʿiyya, a legal school (mad̲h̲hab) of Sunnī Islam whose members
claim to follow the teachings of the Imām al-S̲h̲āfiʿr (d. 204/820 [q.v.]), Origins (first
half of the 3rd/9th century). The issue of the institution of the Snāfiʿī mad̲h̲hab
remains poorly understood, and it poses a series of problems, fundamental as well
as chronological, which are not confined to this school alone, applying in an
identical manner to the emergence of other legal schools within the Islamic legal
system.”
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http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/al-shafiiyya-
COM_1021?s.num=3&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=shafii
Shahadatayn (Tas̲h̲ahhud): “verbal noun of form V of s̲h̲-h-d, the recitation of the
s̲h̲ahāda [q.v.], especially in the ṣalāt [q.v.]. It must, however, be kept in mind that
in this case s̲h̲ahāda comprises not only the kalimatān, but (1) the following
formula: “To God belong the blessed salutations and the good prayers”; (2) the
formula “Hail upon thee, O Prophet, and God’s mercy and His blessing; hail upon




Shari’a1: “Sharia, or Islamic law, offers moral and legal guidance for nearly all
aspects of life – from marriage and divorce, to inheritance and contracts, to
criminal punishments. Sharia, in its broadest definition, refers to the ethical
principles set down in Islam’s holy book (the Quran) and examples of actions by
the Prophet Muhammad (sunna). The Islamic jurisprudence that comes out of the
human exercise of codifying and interpreting these principles is known as fiqh.
Muslim scholars and jurists continue to debate the boundary between sharia and
fiqh as well as other aspects of Islamic law.”
1 Fiqh: literally means knowledge or intellect. In Islam it refers to the corpus of jurisprudential
principles that cover all aspects of civic, spiritual, legal and political life. Hashem (2009:14) clarifies
the difference between Fiqh and shari’a in that “The Shari`ah is the overall organizing moral and
practical principles within the Islamic outlook. Although sometimes erroneously translated as
“Islamic law,” such a definition might be more appropriate to the Islamic term, fiqh. Yet even fiqh
does not qualify the legal description, for it is not connected to the state and there is no attached
mechanism of enforcement. Fiqh is the corpus of the ulama’s understandings of social, economic,
political, as well as personal conduct based on what they understood from the Qur’an and Sunnah
(the tradition of Prophet Muhammad). Therefore, fiqh might be described as the ulama’s socio-legal
accounts as exist on the books.” One example Hashem (p.23) drives to differentiate between
shariah and fiqh is the following: “Properly understood, the Shari`ah stands as a comprehensive
body of generative principles and directives that reflect Islam’s moral outlook, social philosophy, and
legal precepts. It is not the Shari`ah principles that really raise questions about gender; rather, it is the fiqh
(the corpus of jurisprudential writings) that try to apply Shari`ah principles in a specific time and space.”
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http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-
overview/
Shiite (S̲h̲īʿa): “in the broad sense, refers to the movement upholding a privileged
position of the Family of the Prophet ( ahl al-bayt [q.v.]) in the political and religious
leadership of the Muslim Community. The name is derived from s̲h̲īʿat ʿAlī , i.e. the
party or partisans of ʿAlī, which was first used in the inter-Muslim war during ʿAlī’s
caliphate distinguishing them from the s̲h̲īʿat ʿUt̲h̲mān , the partisans of the
murdered caliph ʿUt̲h̲mān opposed to ʿAlī.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/shia-
SIM_6920?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=Shia
Sunna: “(a. pl. sunan; see above, s.v. sunan, for a different connotation), an
ancient Arabian concept that was to play an increasingly important role during the
formative centuries of Islam, acquiring a range of interrelated nuances. Eventually,
some time after the preaching of Islam had begun, the term sunna came to stand
for the generally approved standard or practice introduced by the Prophet as well
as the pious Muslims of olden days, and at the instigation of al-S̲h̲āfiʿī, the sunna




Taʿawwud̲h̲: “means the use of the phrase aʿūd̲h̲u bi ’llāhi min ... “I take refuge
with God against...”, followed by the mention of the thing that the utterer of the
phrase fears or abhors. The term istiʿād̲h̲a “seeking refuge”, is often used as a
synonym. The phrase, with variants, is well attested in the Ḳurʾān, in particular in
the last two sūras which each consist of one extended taʿawwud̲h̲ [see al-
muʿawwid̲h̲atān 1 ]. The litany-like enumeration of evil things in the first of the two
foreshadows similar strains in a number of Prophetic invocations recorded in the
Ḥadīth”.




Tafsīr: “pl. tafāsīr, ex pl a n a t i o n, commentary, verbal form: fassara to explain.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-1/tafsir-
SIM_5605?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-1&s.q=tafsir
Tahlīl: “the verbal noun from hallala, form II verb, with two differing etymologies
and meanings. (1) From hilāl, the new moon, meaning “jubilation or excitement at
seeing the new moon” [see hilāl. i; talbiya]. (2) From the formula la ilāha illā ’llāh,
the first and main element of the Islamic profession of faith or s̲h̲ahāda [ q.v.]. The
verbal form is here obtained by the so-called procedure of naḥt “cutting out,
carving out”. The tahīl then denotes the pronouncing, in a high and intelligible





Takbīr: “verbal noun of form II from the root k-b-r in the denominative sense, to
pronounce the formula Allāhu akbar. It is already used in this sense in the Ḳurʾān




Takfīr: "the verbal noun from the form II verb kaffara “to declare someone a kāfir
or unbeliever”. 1. General definition. From earliest Islamic times onwards, this was
an accusation hurled at opponents by sectarians and zealots, such as the
K̲h̲ārid̲j̲ites [q.v.]; but a theologian like al-G̲h̲azālī [q.v.] held that, since the
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adoption of kufr was the equivalent here of apostasy, entailing the death penalty
[see murtadd ], it should not be lightly made ( Fayṣal al-tafriḳa bayn al-Islam wa ’l-




Taḳīya: “caution, fear (see Glossarium to Ṭabarī, s.v. t-ḳ-d) or keitmān, “disguise”,
is the technical term for dispensation from the requirements of religion under
compulsion or threat of injury. Muḥammad himself avoided suffering in the cause
of religion in dogmatics by docetism (Sūra iv. 156) and in everyday life by the
hid̲j̲ra and by allowing in case of need the denial of the faith (Sūra xvi. 108),
friendship with unbelievers (iii. 27) and the eating of forbidden foods (vi. 119; v. 5).
This point of view is general in Islām.”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-1/takiya-
SIM_5633?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-1&s.q=takiya
Taṣliya: “the invocation of God’s blessing upon the Prophet Muḥammad. The
word has many applications, but commonly refers to the section of the tas̲h̲ahhud
[q.v.] in the ritual ṣalāt [q.v.], following the taḥiyya (“greeting”) and ¶ s̲h̲ahāda [q.v.],
in which the worshipper recites the ṣalāt ʿalā ’l-nabī (taṣliya being derived from this
sense of “performing the ṣalāt”, perhaps). One typical formulation of the taṣliya is
known as al-ṣalawāt al-ibrāhīmiyya, see ṣalāt. III. B. A taṣliya is also a part of the




Taqwa (Taḳwā): “a term of Islamic religion denoting piety. Taḳwā is a verbal noun
from taḳā “to fear [God]”, itself a secondary formation from form VIII of w-ḳ-y ,
ittaḳā “to fear [God]” (see on this phenomenon, Wright, Arabic grammar, I, § 148
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Rem. b). From this same secondary formation is derived the adjective taḳī, pl.




Tawḥīd: “in the true sense of the term, the act of believing and affirming that God
is one and unique (wāḥid), in a word, monotheism. For the Muslim, it is believing
and affirming what is stated by the first article of the Muslim profession of faith:
“there is no other god but God” (lā ilāha illā llāh). Often, this first s̲h̲ahāda is
specifically called kalimat al-tawḥīd, just as the name sūrat al-Tawḥīd is
sometimes given to sūra CXII (al-Ik̲h̲lāṣ) which declares that God is aḥad, and that




Ulama: “pl. of ʿālim , active participle of ʿalima , "to know, to be aware of", denotes
scholars of almost all disciplines ( lug̲h̲a , bayān , ḥisāb , etc. [ q.vv.]). However,
the term refers more specifically to the scholars of the religious sciences ( faḳīh ,
mufassir , muftī , muḥaddit̲h̲ , mutakallim , ḳāriʾ etc. [ q.vv.]), considered here
exclusively in the context of Sunnism, where they are regarded as the guardians,




Umra: ““the little pilgrimage”. The ceremonies of the (Muslim) ʿumra. The ʿumra,
like the ḥad̲j̲d̲j̲ [q. v.], can only be performed in a state of ritual purity (iḥrām [q.v.]).
On assuming the iḥrām, the pilgrim (muʿtamir) must make up his mind whether he
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is going to perform the ʿumra by itself or in combination with the ḥad̲j̲d̲j̲ and
express his intention in an appropriate nīya [q. v.].”
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-1/umra-
SIM_5887?s.num=1&s.q=umra
Zakāt: “the obligatory payment by Muslims of a determinate portion of specified
categories of their lawful property for the benefit of the poor and other enumerated




Zamzam: “the sacred well of Mecca, also called the well of Ismāʿīl. It is in al-
ḥaram al-s̲h̲arīf S. E. of the Kaʿba opposite the coiner of the sanctuary in which the
Black Stone is inserted. It is 140 feet deep and is surmounted by an elegant dome.
The pilgrims drink its water as health-giving and take it home with them to give it to
the sick. Zamzam in Arabic means “abundant water” and zamzama “to drink by
little gulps” and “to mutter through the teeth”. Muslim tradition connects the origin
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